中国金融学术研究网
CHINA FINANCIAL RESEARCH NETWORK

公司财务--公司治理
工作论文
2013-11-05 第6卷 第5期

编: 清华大学经管学院金融学教授。

执行主编: 杨之曙清华大学经济管理学院金融学副教授。


本期目录

增加管理层薪酬能提高股价信息含量吗?

肖 浩 复旦大学管理学院
孔爱国 复旦大学管理学院

Uncertainty and Effectiveness of the Board, the China Experience

Jing Liao Massey UniversityCollege of Business
Martin Young Massey UniversityCollege of Business

Ultimate ownership, bank connections and collateral in China

Xiaofei Pan University of WollongongSchool of Accounting and Finance
Gary Tian University of WollongongSchool of Accounting and Finance


论文摘要

增加管理层薪酬能提高股价信息含量吗?

肖 浩 复旦大学管理学院
孔爱国 复旦大学管理学院

Hermalin和Weisbach(2012)表明股东支付给管理层更高的薪酬能提高其披露信息的质量,而Gelb和Zarowin(2002)发现提高信息披露质量能增加股价信息含量。但本文发现,我国上市公司管理层薪酬与股价信息含量负相关。本文模型将其归因于股东在(薪酬,披露信息质量)博弈中讨价还价能力的丧失。进一步的实证结果支持了这一推断,明晰产权、增加管理层持股以及提高公司整体治理效力都能显著降低管理层的薪酬和股价信息含量的负相关性。此外,作为类比,本文也发现国企高管在职消费与股价信息含量负相关。本文的研究表明,我国上市公司必须先完善治理结构,才能通过薪酬激励管理层提高信息披露的质量。

Uncertainty and Effectiveness of the Board, the China Experience

Jing Liao Massey UniversityCollege of Business
Martin Young Massey UniversityCollege of Business

Using a sample of 1250 companies listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock exchanges for the time period from 1999 to 2010, we find that for firms with a higher level of uncertainty, the benefits of the connections and advice provided by directors outweigh the costs of the impairment in decision making related to having a large board size. In particular, the positive incremental effect of board size on Q, for firms with a higher proportion of State shares, suggests that connections provided by directors is crucial for firms to get access to greater resources and it is even more important to Stateowned than to Non-State-owned firms during the economic reform in China. Our results indicate that that both agency theory and resource dependence theory play an important role on board efficient research.

Ultimate ownership, bank connections and collateral in China

Xiaofei Pan University of WollongongSchool of Accounting and Finance
Gary Tian University of WollongongSchool of Accounting and Finance

Using a sample of China’s listed private firms we investigate the relationship between control-ownership wedge, bank connections and collateral requirement. We find that while control-ownership wedge relates to more pledged collateral, it is mainly the firm’s bank connections rather than its political connections that reduce the collateral requirement and weakens the positive relationship between the control-ownership wedge and collateral. We furhter find that the split-share structure reform and regions with high lender competition also require less collateral and weaken the positive relationship between the control-ownership wedge and collateral. We argue that in an emerging market where legal protection for creditors and investors are weak and relationship is prevalent, bank connections is a substitute for collateral through mitigating the information asymmetry and agency concerns by creditors, which has been further exacerbated due to the tunnelling risk by the controlling shareholders.


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