We examine the pricing ofsystematic information asymmetry, induced by Chinese gov-ernment intervention, in the cross-section of stock returns. Using market-wide order im-balance as a proxy for systematic information, we observe a strong correlation betweenthe standard deviation of market-wide order imbalance and economic policy uncertainty.Furthermore, we find a significant positive relationship between the sensitivity of stocks tosystematic information asymmetry (OIBeta) and their future returns. The average monthlyreturn spread between high- and low-OIBeta portfolios ranges from 1.30% to 1.77%, andthis result remains robust after controlling for traditional risk factors. Our results providesubstantial evidence that the pricing of OIBeta is driven by systematic information asym-metry rather than alternative explanatory channels.

The process of internationalization of China’s banking industry began in 1917. After a hundred years of development, China’s banking internationalization has made great achievements. However, there is still a big gap between China’s banking industry and the financial institutions in some developed countries in the field of internationalization. In the process of internationalization, China's banking industry are now still facing the dilemma of backward development concept, lack of effective risk control system and international talents. This thesis mainly introduces the history, present situation and difficulties of the internationalization of China’s banking industry. The first part gives a description to the history of the internationalization of China’s banking industry, which starts in the year of 1917. An analysis of the current situation of China’s banking industry’ internationalization is given in the second part of this article. And the third part summarizes the difficulties that are faced by China’s banking industry.

Despite nearly twenty years of privatization, mixed-ownership reform has been the mainstay of SOE reform in China in recent years. This raises the question of whether the financial performance of mixed-ownership firms (Mixed firms) is better than private-owned enterprises (POEs). Although Mixed firms suffer more from government intervention, unclear property rights, and interest conflicts between state shareholders and private shareholders, they can also benefit from the external resources controlled by the state. Therefore, the performance of Mixed firms is still unclear. Collecting data from the Chinese A-share listed market, we divide the firms into POEs, Mixed firms controlled by the state (MixedSOEs), and Mixed firms controlled by the private sectors (MixedPOEs). Measuring profitability using ROA and ROE, we find that on average, POEs perform better than Mixed firms, and MixedPOEs have a higher profitability than MixedSOEs. Within Mixed firms, more state shares are related to lower profitability, and more private shares are related to higher profitability. Using the NBS survey data, we further find that on average, SOEs exhibit the lowest profitability, with MixedSOEs and MixedPOEs in the middle, and POEs have the highest profitability. We try to address the endogeneity challenge in several ways and get similar results. Overall, our analysis provides new evidence on the financial performance of mixed-ownership firms.

Why do firms appoint expired independent directors? How do expired independent directors affect corporate governance and thus impact investment decisions? By taking advantage of the sharp increase in expired independent directors’ re-employment in China caused by exogenous regulatory shocks, Rule No. 18 and Regulation 11, this paper adopts a PSM-DID design to test the impact of expired independent directors on CSR performance. We find that firms experience a significant decrease in CSR performance after re-hiring expired independent directors and the effect is stronger for CSR components mostly related to internal governance. The results of robustness tests show that the main results are robust to alternative measures of CSR performance, an extended sample period, alternative control groups, year-by-year PSM method, and a staggered DID model regarding Rule No. 18 as a staggered quasi-natural experiment. We address the endogeneity concern that chance drives our DID results by using exogenous regulatory shock, an instrumental variable (the index of regional guanxi culture), and placebo tests. We also find that the negative relation between the re-employment of expired independent directors and CSR performance is more significant for independent directors who have more relations with CEOs and raise less objection to managers’ decisions, and for firms that rely more on expired independent directors’ monitoring roles (e.g., a lower proportion of independent directors, CEO duality, high growth opportunities, and above-median FCF). The mediating-effect test shows that the re-employment of expired independent directors increases CEOs’ myopia and thus reduces CSR performance. In addition, we exclude the alternative explanation that the negative relation is caused by the protective effect brought by expired independent directors’ political backgrounds. Our study shows that managers may build reciprocal relationships with expired independent directors in the Chinese guanxi culture and gain personal interest.

We examine the effect of minority shareholder voting rights on labor investment efficiency using a sample of Chinese firms. Taking advantage of the difference-in-difference setting, our study reveals that the expansion of minority shareholder voting rights has a detrimental effect on labor investment efficiency. Through analysis of holding period and a managerial shortsightedness index based on textual analysis, we find that this outcome can be attributed to the fact that minority shareholders typically prioritize short-term gains over long-term corporate growth. Moreover, the impact of voting power is more pronounced in determining the investment efficiency of rank-andfileemployees. Our results are more significant for firms that face severe financial constraints, are non-state-owned enterprises, exhibit lower levels of internal control, possess fewer female managers, demonstrate lower human capital quality and higher labor intensity. Taken together, our paper suggests that minority shareholders could be myopia in making labor decisions.

We investigate the unintended real effects of regulator-led minority shareholder activism on corporate innovation. We use manually collected data from the China Securities Investor Services Center (CSISC), a novel regulatory investor protection institution controlled by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) that holds 100 shares of every listed firm. We find that by exercising its shareholder rights, the CSISC substantially curtails the innovation output of targeted firms. This effect is amplified in cases involving a high level of myopic pressure and few innovation incentives. We further observe variation in the real effects of different intervention methods. Textual analysis reveals that CSISC intervention with a myopic topic and negative tone contributes to a decrease in innovation. The results of a mechanism analysis support the hypothesis that regulator-led minority shareholder activism induces managerial myopia and financial constraints, impeding corporate innovation. Furthermore, CSISC intervention not only diminishes innovation output but also undermines innovation efficiency. In summary, our findings suggest that regulator-led minority shareholder activism exacerbates managerial myopia to cater to investors and financial constraints, ultimately stifling corporate innovation.

Our investigation reveals that the top 10 shareholders are the only credible contenders for dominant control rights in China's listed corporations. To measure the ultimate control of these entities, we adopt the Shapley-Shubik power index and calculate the principal shareholder's control at the top of the control pyramid. Our results demonstrate that approximately 70% of firms exhibit an ultimate control value of 1. Additionally, our analysis reveals a non-linear relationship between the ultimate control, the tunneling behavior of the ultimate controller, and the executives’excess perk consumption .Specifically, our findings suggest that this relationship is characterized by a phase transition.

Based on institutions' general role and the specialty of motivated investors' relatively larger stake, we examine whether ownership by motivated investors is associated with the focal firm's ESG rating disagreement in China. Our results suggest that ownership by motivated investors can decrease the focal firm's ESG rating disagreement. That relationship is strengthened by a better internal or external information environment. What's more, ownership by motivated investors can increase the quality of ESG disclosure and the level of consensus ESG rating. ESG rating disagreement increases stock return volatility and price synchronicity, while motivated investors can mitigate those negative effects. Our results confirm that motivated investors have greater incentive and capability to discipline managers and influence corporate policies and actions even in an emerging market with weak investor protection and the popularity of exploration by ultimate controllers. That would shed valuable insights into the high-quality development of other emerging markets, especially those in south-east Asian.

This study attempts to shed new light on how the state as a minority shareholder can affect the tax planning of non-state-owned enterprises(non-SOEs). We examine publicly traded non-SOEs in China and find that non-SOEs are more tax avoidance when the government is a minority shareholder, indicating that minority state ownership has played a "shelter effect" on tax avoidance of non-SOEs. Further analysis shows that the sheltering effect of minority state ownership is more prominent for firms located in areas with more social burden, worse tax enforcement and firms with stronger incentive to avoid taxes. Furthermore, non-SOEs with minority state ownership increase excessive capital expenditure and employ redundant employees, but still have higher firm value. Overall, our findings suggest the state as a minority shareholder shapes the tax-planning activities of non-SOEs in a “two-way favor exchange” manner and it is beneficial for non-SOEs to maintain a close relationship with the government in China where the government controls key resources.

This study investigates the impact of CIO on the Environment, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance. Our analysis is based on a panel dataset comprising 2395 Chinese listed companies throughout the period from 2007 to 2020. Evidence from empirical results shows that CIO is positively correlated with ESG performance. In other words, CIO enhance the corporate ESG performance. The issue of endogeneity was duly considered, and appropriate measures were made to address it. Furthermore, robustness tests were conducted, and the findings remained consistent and reliable. The examination of the mechanism indicates that CIO enhance internal control quality that facilitates the advancement of ESG activities within firms. This paper contributes to the existing body of knowledge by examining the impact of external governance systems on the promotion of ESG activities in Chinese enterprises. This study adds to the existing body of scholarship on the implications of Common institutional ownership. Findings recommend several possible policy and economic ramifications that might support Chinese enterprises in their endeavors to incorporate ESG initiatives and contribute to the overall sustainability of society.