Numerous countries cut payroll taxes in response to COVID-19, including China, which reduced employer contributions by up to 21 percentage points. We use administrative data on more than 800,000 Chinese firms to evaluate payroll tax cuts as a business relief measure. We estimate that the tax cuts cover 31.5% of the decline in business cash flow, but labor informality causes 53% of registered firms—24% of aggregate economic activity—to receive no benefits at all. We quantify the targeting of the policy in terms of how much benefits flow to small firms less able to access external finance and to sectors worse hit by COVID-19. We find that (1) small firms and vulnerable industries are comparatively more labor intensive, which leads to desirable targeting; (2) labor informality worsens, but does not eliminate, targeting by firm size; and (3) labor informality is uncorrelated with the COVID-19 shock, and therefore does not affect targeting by sector.

The advantages and disadvantages of universal banking have long been debated. Using the successive granting of lead underwriter qualifications to commercial banks in China as a quasi-natural experiment, we study the impact of universal banking on non-financial firms’ investment decisions. We find that after a firm’s main lending banks qualify as lead underwriters, the firm’s investment increases by 7.7 to 8.3 percent on a gross or net basis. The underlying mechanism is that universal banking can generate informational economies of scope and relax constraints on the provision of external finance. In contrast, we find no evidence on the conflict of interest between universal banks and their customers. Our study, therefore, sheds light on the potential gains from universal banking.

Firm diversifications are prevalent in many emerging economies in contrast to the practices in developed economies. A fundamental difference between these two types of economies is the existence of sound economic institutions including in particular property rights protection. Indeed it has been argued that diversified firms may thrive in situations of poor economic institutions, but much research is needed to substantiate this idea. In this paper, using a survey data set of private enterprises in China, we examine whether cross-region variations in the degree of property rights protection a¤ect the extent of firm diversification. We find that poorer property rights protection causes firms to be more diversified. We then explore several possible mechanisms through which property rights protection may affect firm diversification.

Firm diversifications are prevalent in many emerging economies in contrast to the practices in developed economies. A fundamental difference between these two types of economies is the existence of sound economic institutions including in particular property rights protection. Indeed it has been argued that diversified firms may thrive in situations of poor economic institutions, but much research is needed to substantiate this idea. In this paper, using a survey data set of private enterprises in China, we examine whether cross-region variations in the degree of property rights protection a¤ect the extent of firm diversification. We find that poorer property rights protection causes firms to be more diversi?ed. We then explore several possible mechanisms through which property rights protection may affect firm diversification.

This paper studies the relationship between corporate leverage and the ultimate corporate ownership structure, particularly the separation of cash flow rights and control rights. We empirically disentangle the three potential effects of the divergence of control rights from cash flow rights on corporate leverage, i.e., the non-dilution entrenchment effect, the bonding role of debt and the fear-of-financial-distress entrenchment effect. Our evidence from the East Asian corporations mainly supports the notion that controlling shareholders with relatively small ownership share tend to increase leverage out of the motive of raising external finance without diluting their shareholding dominance. The separation of cash flow rights and control rights contributes to the risk-taking tendency of the large controlling shareholders in capital structure choice.