本文针对商业银行流动性风险国际监管框架的演变，探讨监管重点与流动性风险变化的互动关系，从而梳理出国际流动性风险监管的目的、手段和发展趋势，进而研究其对我国流动性风险监管实践的影响。 本文从分析商业银行流动性风险的成因入手，指出其根源是银行存款和贷款业务所形成的期限错配，因此这种风险是银行在经营活动中难以避免的。流动性风险区别于银行面临的其他风险的主要表现是其低频率、高损失的特点，这使得银行一旦面临流动性危机的打击就很难在短时间内恢复过来，所以必须引起银行管理层和监管机构的重视。从20世纪90年代起单一的流动性指标监管方法已经逐渐被综合的流动性风险管理体系所取代，但各国之间尚存在较大差异。 本文对次贷危机前美国、英国和东亚各国的流动性风险监管框架作了横向比较。经过比较后发现，在流动性风险监管体系中，存在两种不同的方法，即定性方法和定量方法。前者偏重在制度层面对银行进行指导以提高其流动性风险管理能力，而后者则偏重以硬性指标客观计量和评估流动性风险，两者互有优劣，不可偏废。相对来说，英美国家因为金融制度比较完善、人才水平较高，其监管机构以使用定性方法为主；而东亚各国由于金融发展水平较低，产品结构简单，从业人员水平参差不齐，所以更偏好使用定量方法。 当各国金融监管机构还在为如何在定性方法和定量方法之间进行取舍的时候，美国次贷危机和之后席卷全球的金融危机不期而至，这大大加快了流动性风险管理理念和监管实践的发展速度。作为次贷危机的受害者，本文深入分析了英国北岩银行（Northern Rock plc）的挤兑危机案例，对危机背景、银行的经营特点、事件经过和后续影响都作了较为细致的论述，并指出银行自身流动性风险管理不善是形成危机的主要原因，这表现在不合理的资产负债结构、期限错配、利率缺口以及内部控制的缺失。尽管北岩银行管理层对于流动性危机的发生负有不可推卸的责任，但是监管失败的教训同样发人深省，这间接促成了巴塞尔银行监管委员会（Basel Committee on Banking Supervision，以下简称巴塞尔委员会）制定后危机时代的流动性风险监督管理新框架。 本文回顾了历年巴塞尔委员会制定的流动性风险监管文件，将其大致分为次贷危机前和次贷危机后两大类。本文指出，巴塞尔委员会早期制定的流动性监管框架已经很难适应飞速发展的国际金融形势，面临诸多迫切需要解决的问题，包括融资渠道的变化、资产证券化、复杂金融工具的泛滥、抵押品的广泛应用、支付结算系统和日内流动性需求以及跨境资金流。在这些问题中，很大部分也同样存在于危机前的北岩银行，因此危机的爆发带有某种必然性。巴塞尔委员会在次贷危机后发布的《流动性风险管理和监督稳健原则》和《第三版巴塞尔协议：流动性风险计量、标准和监测的国际框架》奠定了第三版巴塞尔协议下国际流动性风险监管新框架的基石。前者制定的17项流动性风险监管新原则和后者引入的流动性覆盖率（Liquidity Coverage Ratio，简称LCR）和净稳定资金比例（Net Stable Funding Ratio，简称NSFR）两大指标分别从定性方法和定量方法两方面完善了现有的流动性风险监管框架，这也反映了未来国际流动性风险监管的趋势。 正如在本文开篇提到的，流动性风险是银行不可避免的风险，对于中国银行业来说，也不能置身事外。经过分析我国银行业的流动性风险现状，笔者认为我国银行的资产负债结构仍属传统，偏重以存款作为融资来源、以贷款作为盈利来源，因此长期流动性风险不容忽视而短期流动性风险尚属可控。同时，不同类型商业银行的流动性风险来源也有所不同。此外，国内银行的流动性风险管理水平也有待提高。与巴塞尔协议类似，在次贷危机前后，我国的流动性风险监管框架也有了质的飞跃，这主要归功于中国银监会颁布的《中国银行业实施新监管标准的指导意见》、《商业银行流动性风险管理指引》和《商业银行流动性风险管理办法（试行）》（征求意见稿）。这些法规系统性地借鉴巴塞尔委员会的先进经验，辅以本地化的监测工具，从而形成了兼顾定性方法和定量方法的有中国特色的流动性风险监督管理新框架。 本文最后指出，无论是定性方法还是定量方法，在流动性风险监管中都起着举足轻重的作用，两者不可偏废。监管机构在设计流动性风险监管框架并实施现场或非现场监管时，应灵活运用定性方法和定量方法并结合压力情景评估银行的流动性风险，这样才能全面有效地实施流动性风险监管，避免系统性的流动性危机。另外，本文还建议我国监管机构在本地化国际流动性风险监管框架方面做更多尝试。 With respect to the evolution of the international supervision framework for commercial bank’s liquidity risk, this article aims to discuss the interaction between the regulatory focuses and the diversification of liquidity risk, in order to sort out the purposes, approaches and development trends of the international supervision on liquidity risk and their impacts on China’s supervision practice of liquidity risk. In regard to the causes of commercial bank’s liquidity risk, this article points out that the mismatch of maturity between the bank’s deposits and loans is the fundamental reason. Such risk is inevitable when conducting banking business. The features of liquidity risk (i.e. low frequency but extremely severe) distinguish itself from other risks that the bank faces, which hinders the bank from a quick recovery after being stricken by a liquidity crisis. Therefore, both the bank management and the regulators must draw their attentions to it. From 1990s, the monitoring method of single indicator has been gradually replaced with the comprehensive liquidity risk management system. However, there are still big variances between different countries. This article compares the framework for liquidity risk supervision between the United States, the United Kingdom and the East Asian countries prior to the subprime mortgage crisis. It is noted after comparison that there are two different approaches in the liquidity risk supervision system, namely the qualitative approach and the quantitative approach. The former emphasizes improving the bank’s liquidity risk management skill by guiding the bank from governance perspective, while the latter prefers measuring and evaluating the liquidity risk by means of objective indicators. Each of these two approaches has its pros and cons that neither should be overemphasized at the expense of the other. Relatively speaking, the Anglo-American countries prefer qualitative approaches due to their mature financial system as well as professional practitioners. By contrast, East Asian countries rely on quantitative approach because of their under-developing financial system, simple product structure and less experienced practitioners. When the financial regulators in various countries were still wondering whether to adopt the qualitative approach or the quantitative approach, the subprime mortgage crisis occurred in the United States and thereafter became a global financial crisis. This crisis accelerated the development of the management theory and the supervision practice of liquidity risk. This article analyzes the bank run on Northern Rock plc (the Bank) in the United Kingdom, a victim of the subprime mortgage crisis, by elaborating the crisis background, the business features of the Bank, the incident course as well as the subsequent impacts. The major cause of the bank run was the Bank’s own mismanagement of its liquidity risk, which included unbalanced structure of assets and liabilities, maturity mismatch, interest rate gap and ineffective internal control as well. Although the management of the Bank bore the ultimate responsibility for this liquidity crisis, the lesson of the supervision failure was thought-provoking. It also indirectly led to the renewed framework for the post-crisis liquidity risk management and supervision by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Basel Committee). This article reviews the historical documents of liquidity risk supervision that were formulated by the Basel Committee and divides them into two categories, i.e. before and after the subprime mortgage crisis. This article points out that the framework for liquidity risk supervision which was established by the Basel Committee at the early stage could no longer meet the rapid development of the international financial environment and faced many problems which need be solved urgently. These problems included the change of financing channels, asset securitization, misapplication of complex financial instruments, extensive use of collaterals, payment-settlement system, demand for intraday liquidity and cross-border cash flow. Northern Rock plc had most of these problems prior to its bank run crisis. Therefore, the crisis was with certain inevitability. After the subprime mortgage crisis, the Basel Committee issued “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision” and “Basel III: International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” which laid the foundation of the renewed international framework for the liquidity risk supervision under Basel III. The former defines 17 new principles of liquidity risk supervision whilst the latter introduces two key indicators, i.e. the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). Both of the two foundational documents improve the existing framework for liquidity risk supervision from qualitative and quantitative aspects respectively. They also reflect the trends of international liquidity risk supervision. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, the liquidity risk is inevitable to all banks including the China’s banks. Based on the analysis of the status quo of the Chinese banks’ liquidity risk, the author draws the conclusion that the structures of assets and liabilities of the China’s banks are traditional, i.e. the deposits are the source of financing while the loans are the source of profit. Hence, their long-term liquidity risk cannot be ignored whilst their short-term liquidity risk is still under control. In addition, the liquidity risk management skills of the China’s banks need further improvement. Similar to the Basel Accord, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (the CBRC) promulgated “Guidance Opinions on the Implementation of the New Supervisory Standards of Basel III in China Banking Sector”, “Guidelines on Liquidity Risk Management for Commercial Banks” and “Administrative Measures on Liquidity Risk Management for Commercial Banks (Trial) (Draft for Consultation)” right after the subprime mortgage crisis, which made great improvement in the framework for liquidity risk supervision in China. By referring to the advanced experiences of the Basel Committee, together with the help of the localized monitoring tools, these regulations forms a new framework for liquidity risk management and supervision with Chinese characteristics which takes into account both the qualitative and quantitative approaches. Finally, this article reminds that both the qualitative and quantitative approaches play equally important roles in the field of liquidity risk supervision that neither of them is dispensable. When designing the framework for liquidity risk supervision and conducting the on-site or off-site inspections, the regulators should apply flexibility in the use of qualitative and quantitative approaches and attach importance to the stress scenarios to assess the bank’s liquidity risk. By this means, comprehensive and effective supervision on liquidity risk can be achieved to prevent systemic liquidity crisis. Furthermore, it is suggested that the domestic regulators should make more efforts to localize the international framework for liquidity risk supervision.

Coordination costs among a firm’s shareholders have an important impact on the market for corporate control. I use two measures, one based on the geographic distance among institutional shareholders and the other based on the correlation in their portfolio allocation decisions, to proxy for coordination costs. I find that target firms with low shareholder coordination costs experience significantly higher abnormal returns around the takeover announcement. In a similar vein, acquirer firms with low shareholder coordination costs are associated with higher acquisition announcement returns. These effects are particularly pronounced after the 1992 proxy reform that relaxes the restrictions on communication and coordination among shareholders. These findings suggest that the ease of coordination among shareholders plays an important role in the market for corporate control by raising the bargaining power of target shareholders and enhancing the monitoring role of both target and acquirer shareholders.

The credit collusion is the main form of internal fraud and will lead to the wrong decision on loan-issue and further worsen the operation risk as well as the default risk. At present, the loan initiated by commercial banks in China is surging and challenges the loan management. Based on the literature and the situation of risk management in Chinese banking industry, this paper adopts the P-S-A model to study the collusion between loan officers and lending firms. Finally, it derives the collusion-free conditions and proposes some measures to reduce the collusions, which includes: (1) to impose harsher penalty on bribes to deter any collusion for increasing individual welfare; (2) to launch more sophisticated remuneration for loan officers to develop long relationship with commercial banks; (3) to spend more efforts on monitoring the larger sized loans.

We empirically examine the role of venture capital in VC-backed listed firms in Mainland China using the data of SME Board of ShenZhen Stock Exchange from June 2004 to June 2007. Contrary to the evidence from the US, we find that the VC-backed firms in Mainland China experience higher underpricing, which is not owing to the lower pricing in the primary market but the investors in the second market are too optimistic about the prospect of the VC-backed firms. In addition, the pre- and post-IPO operating performance of VC-backed firms is significantly better than that of nonVC-backed ones. Our finding supports the monitoring hypothesis that the VC-backed firms perform better than nonVC-backed firms before and after IPO for the monitoring of VC funds. Moreover, it is found that high-reputation VC-backed firms have a better post-IPO operating and market performance compared to low-reputation VC-backed ones, which is consistent with the grandstanding hypothesis proposed by Gompers (1996). However, there is no evidence to support the certification hypothesis proposed by Megginson and Weiss (1990) that VC-backed firms have a lower underpricing in the IPO performance.

Many prior studies conclude that Chinese independent directors engage in window dressing. The results of research into the relationship between the proportion of independent directors on the board and firm performance are mixed. We use the number of negative opinions issued by a firm’s independent directors as a proxy for their effectiveness in the monitoring role they play. We hypothesize that both board structure and the personal characteristics of independent directors influence the effectiveness of monitoring. Using a matched control sample of firms in which there were no disputes in the board room over the sample period, we find that independent directors who have more political capital, such as former government officials, Communist Party members, and those who also have a senior management position in another firm are more likely to issue negative opinions. We also find that the independent directors of firms with more balanced power structure in board and those that operate in a better institutional environment have a greater tendency to issue negative opinions.

2009年12月，巴塞尔委员会（BIS）面向全球公布了关于增强银行体系稳健性的一揽子政策建议草案征求意见稿。该意见稿由《增强银行体系稳健性（Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector）》和《流动性风险计量、标准和监测的国际框架（International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring）》两份文件共同组成，是对以往国际银行监管制度的进一步完善。但是，征求意见未强调此轮金融危机爆发的重要原因，即：现有制度未能有效维护金融市场竞争，同时，更未能体现以制度破除金融市场垄断的国际趋势。为此，尤有必要从金融竞争制度视角对意见稿进行完善。

This paper examines the causes and consequences of venture capital (VC) stage financing. Using information about the geographic location of an entrepreneurial firm and the distance between the VC investor and the firm, I distinguish between three different hypotheses: the monitoring hypothesis, which argues that the VC staging and monitoring of entrepreneurial firms are substitutes; the hold-up hypothesis, which argues that staging is a mechanism for mitigating the hold-up problem between the entrepreneur and the VC investor; and the learning hypothesis, which argues that staging creates value through the real options generated by learning by VC investors. My analysis of the causes of stage financing suggests that VC investors located farther away from an entrepreneurial firm tend to finance the firm using a larger number of financing rounds, shorter durations between successive rounds, and investing a smaller amount in each round; however, VC investors’ propensity to stage is independent of whether or not the firm is located in a close-knit community. My analysis of the consequences of stage financing suggests that VC staging positively affects the entrepreneurial firm’s propensity to have a successful exit, operating performance in the IPO year, and post-IPO survival rate, but only if the firm is located far away from the VC investor; however, the entrepreneurial firm’s performance is independent of whether or not it is located in a close-knit community. Overall, the evidence supports the monitoring hypothesis, but does not provide any support for the hold-up or learning hypotheses.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the certification and monitoring roles played by underwriters in IPO earnings management. Prior studies show that IPO issuers have incentives to employ opportunistic earnings management to enhance initial firm values. However, the certification role of underwriters has been largely overlooked. We argue that there is a negative relation between underwriter reputation and IPO earnings management. Moreover, we think that underwriters have strong incentives to continue providing monitoring to the firms they take public due to the lucrative business relationships. We thus hypothesize that there is a positive relation between underwriter reputation and post-IPO firm operating performance. Using a sample of 367 IPOs, we obtain results consistent with our hypotheses. We find that IPOs underwritten by lower-reputation underwriters have more initial discretionary accruals and higher initial firm values, indicating there is a significantly negative relation between IPO earnings management and underwriter reputation. We also find that the post-IPO operating performance of IPOs is significantly and positively related to underwriter reputation. For the robustness test, we consider the possibility that IPO earnings management and the choice of underwriters are endogenously determined. An instrumental variable two-stage least squares regression and a weighted least squares regression confirm the robustness of our results.

This paper extends Lerner and Schoar’s (2004) argument on illiquidity puzzle of private equity funds. We examine the roles that investment illiquidity, along with bounded rationality and rent-seeking behavior, plays in private-equity buyouts. Collectively, investors employ club deals to screen out fund managers who might misuse discretionary rights to engage buyout deals. A club deal is launched by a group of private equity firms that pool their assets together, make a joint bid for a buyout target, and monitor the buyout processes collectively. Thus, this paper aims at clarifying whether or not such discretionary rights improve the choice of buyout target by, as well as the performance of private equity funds. We found that the performance of buyout funds persisted and affected the choice of the club deal as the major monitoring mechanism. This paper contributes to our understandings of investment behavior in private equity buyouts as follows. First, the performance of buyout funds has improved for at least two time periods between 1999 and mid-2007. The phenomenon that fund performance affects the choice of club deals is consistent across a variety of private equity funds, such as buyout, venture, growth, and mezzanine funds. Moreover, risk preference does not affect choice of club deals directly; instead, it has a moderating effect on choice of club deals through its interaction with the location of reference point for risk aversion. Finally, both fund size and fund sequence have U-shaped relations to the choice of club deals, while deal value of buyouts is related positively to the choice of club deals.

Based on the brief analysis of the theory, we analyze the governance effect of the dynamic allocation of control rights and contingent transfer mechanism through an experiment and show that the dynamic allocation of control rights and contingent transfer mechanism are benefit for limiting the manager’s private benefits and protecting the investors’ return. While, the more the control transfers, the less effort the manager spends in private benefits and the more in the firm’s value. We also show that given more perfect external information revealed and monitoring mechanism, the governance effect of the dynamic allocation of control rights and contingent transfer mechanism will be improved more notable.