过去文献中，将泡沫(bubbles)定义为资产价格偏离市场基本面的部份。本文以Flood and Hodrick(1990)的泡沫理论模型及Meese(1986)的货币模型为基础，设定了包含泡沫项的汇率决定方程式，并采用状态空间模型，运用卡尔曼滤波以最大似然法进行递推估计。研究对象为中国自2005年7月汇改政策以来至2010年11月的人民币/美元，及1990年1月至2010年11月的日圆/美元的汇率泡沫现象。本文估计结果显示，中国及日本所估计的汇率泡沫项皆存在且泡沫参数皆显著。分析泡沫项的走势及泡沫参数的梯度，都能符合样本期间汇率的变动行为，合理解释了汇率偏离市场基本面的情形。

财政的平衡预算宣告单一的货币供应规则失效，取而代之的通货膨胀目标政策为中央银行的利率规则提供了政策锚，世界各国政府由此积极推行2%左右通货膨胀政策，配合以低利率，货币超发以及大规模的财政建设，导致了今天全球性经济危机以及高物价、高通胀、高失业和经济渐行衰退的滞涨局面，因此，治理经济危机需要首先确立最优的通胀政策，并严格管理财政和货币政策。本文建立了具有工资和价格粘性的新凯恩斯小型开放经济模型，实证结果显示，开放经济中最优的通货膨胀率为负的零边界，与最优通胀相对应的最优利率为4%，进一步地，当财政政策进行严格的逆周期调节时，最优的通胀会呈现上升趋势为0.15%，最优的利率为4.2%，开放经济财政和货币合作能够平抑经济波动，同时常规类型的财政和货币政策联合作用将会加大通胀趋势，没有证据表明2%的通货膨胀为适度的或者是最优的。我们的实证结果同时展示政府应该彻底废弃货币供应规则，代之以最优的通胀政策和最优的利率政策促进经济的长期持续稳定地增长。

经济全球化为世界各国带来了难得的机遇，直接促进了各国经济不同程度的快速发展，但各国的不一致性政策导致了今天全球经济潜伏着巨大危机，汇率的稳定性将成为各国政府治理本国经济和分享经济全球化成果的重要手段。本文建立了小型开放经济模型，采用贝叶斯分析技术，研究了在Ramsey 最优均衡下，汇率的稳定性目标机制与最优货币政策之间关系。分析表明：汇率的波动与宏观经济波动之间的关系依赖于货币政策所选择的基于无时间视角的政策体制，在Ramsey 均衡下，选择最优政策机制能够保持低通胀和汇率的波动，但是产出波动幅度会增大，而在汇率稳定性货币政策机制下，通胀，产出和汇率的波动都比其他政策机制要小；在实证数据上，我们对比了最优政策，汇率稳定，价格稳定以及实际数据拟合的宏观经济体系，我们发现汇率稳定性货币政策机制是更加趋近于最优政策，汇率稳定性目标是货币政策确保经济稳定性和社会福利最大化的重要目标。同时，本文利用开放经济汇率与一国货币政策的传导机制特性，分析得出开放经济下的最优通货膨胀率为零边界的一个狭小的区域，此时的货币政策最有利于执行汇率的稳定性目标。

This article examines the liquidity-investment relation of Chinese SMEs in comparison to large firms, and specifically focuses on the exogenous IPO event to observe how the responses of firm investment to cash flow change subsequent to the IPO. We find that the sensitivity of fixed investment to cash flow varies with firm size, and the over-reliance on internal funds by SMEs has reduced more prominently after the IPO than their larger counterparts, providing new evidence that liquidity constraints of investment are not constant in the same firm but shift along the life cycle. Our results strongly suggest that other financial resources to cover the cash flow shortfalls resulting from timing differences between the operating and investment cycles need to be considered in the examined relation and previous studies may have underestimated the impact of liquidity constraints on firm investment.

Based on a sample of financial holding companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange, we examine the impact of media coverage of corporate social performance on corporate financial performance. Our findings are as follows. First, information about a firm’s social actions provided by the media is more relevant than provided by the financial holding company (FHC) itself, and the quantity of news articles about positive social activities of FHCs is positively correlated with financial performance; however, strikingly, that of news articles about FHCs’ negative social activities is also positively correlated with financial performance. In addition, we find that news articles about FHCs’ positive social activities for shareholders will trigger a positive evaluation by shareholders; however, rather interestingly, news articles about FHCs’ positive (negative) social activities for employees will trigger a negative (positive) evaluation by shareholders. But if the news articles about FHCs’ positive social activities for employees are initiated by the media, rather than by the company itself, they will trigger a positive evaluation by shareholders. Therefore, the evidence suggests that “doing good” can be expected to be “doing well” if the positive CSP information is provided by the media, rather than by the company itself.

Using a sample of Chinese family firms from 2000 to 2007, we investigate whether the political connection of the family firms will help them to reduce the frictions they face in external financing in a relationship-based economy. We find that political connectedness of family firms could reduce their investment-cash flow sensitivity. More interestingly, this political connectedness effect exists only in financially constrained family firms. However, from governance dimension, we cannot find any significant variation of the political connection effect on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow. We argue that these evidences are consistent with the firm’s underinvestment arising from the asymmetric information problems, and are inconsistent with the firm’s overinvestment arising from the free-cash-flow problems.

针对现有文献对于机构投资者与股价波动率研究结果的大相径庭，我们认为不管是羊群效应模型，还是Fama-MacBeth截面回归方法均由于无法考虑二者之间的相关性问题而使股价波动率的估计有所偏误。于是，基于李勇、王满仓等（2010）所提出的扩展CAPM，本文将影响股价波动率的因素定义为机构投资者的逆向选择效应和道德风险效应，逆向选择效应和道德风险效应构成了机构投资者与上市公司经理人之间的代理成本，从而可以将羊群效应模型和Fama-MacBeth截面回归方法统一到相同的框架分析股价波动率的影响因素。在此基础上，本文运用05年1月至09年12月的相关数据选择反映机构投资者逆向选择效应和道德风险效应的相应指标，利用固定效应模型和TSLS模型等方法对上述结论进行实证检验。最后得出结论和相应的政策建议。

The credit collusion is the main form of internal fraud and will lead to the wrong decision on loan-issue and further worsen the operation risk as well as the default risk. At present, the loan initiated by commercial banks in China is surging and challenges the loan management. Based on the literature and the situation of risk management in Chinese banking industry, this paper adopts the P-S-A model to study the collusion between loan officers and lending firms. Finally, it derives the collusion-free conditions and proposes some measures to reduce the collusions, which includes: (1) to impose harsher penalty on bribes to deter any collusion for increasing individual welfare; (2) to launch more sophisticated remuneration for loan officers to develop long relationship with commercial banks; (3) to spend more efforts on monitoring the larger sized loans.

经济全球化为世界各国带来了难得的机遇，直接促进了各国经济不同程度的快速发展，但各国的不一致性政策导致了全球经济潜伏着巨大危机，汇率的稳定性将成为各国政府治理本国经济和分享经济全球化成果的重要目标。本文建立了小型开放经济模型，采用贝叶斯分析技术，研究了在Ramsey最优均衡下，汇率的稳定性与最优货币政策之间关系。分析表明：汇率的波动与宏观经济波动呈现紧密关系，平抑汇率的波动不仅需要一国合理的汇率管理体制，更需要一贯性的政府货币政策的作用，在Ramsey最优均衡体制下，汇率的稳定性目标机制可以降低宏观经济波动，提高社会福利效应，在间接标价法下汇率与本国利率之间反向最优，贝叶斯后验的结果验证了汇率稳定性目标货币政策机制下，各变量的最优响应更加趋向于最优均衡。同时，本文利用开放经济汇率与一国货币政策的传导特性，研究汇率稳定性与一国通货膨胀的关系，分析得到开放经济下的最优通货膨胀率为零边界。

The Dangerous Return to Keynesian Economics. http://www.quadrant.org.au/blogs/qed/2009/02/the-dangerous-return-to-keynesian-economics