We examine how sell-side equity analysts strategically disclose information of differing quality to the public versus the buy-side mutual fund managers to whom they are connected. We consider cases in which analysts recommend that the public buys a stock, but some fund managers sell it. We measure favor trading using mutual fund managers’ votes for analysts in a Chinese “star analyst” competition. We find that managers are more likely to vote for analysts who exhibit more “say-buy/whisper-sell” behavior with these managers. This suggests that analysts introduce noise in their public recommendations, making the more-precise information provided to their private clients more valuable. Analysts’ say-buy/whisper-sell behavior results in information asymmetry: the positive-recommendation stocks bought by the managers who vote for the analysts outperform the stocks sold by these managers after the recommendation dates. Our findings help explain several puzzles regarding analysts’ public recommendations.

We document a novel platform effect caused by the emergence of FinTech platforms in financial intermediation. In China, platform distributions of mutual funds emerged in 2012 and grew quickly into a formidable presence. Utilizing the staggered entrance of funds onto platforms, we find a marked increase of performance-chasing, driven by the centralized information flow unique to FinTech platforms. This pattern is further confirmed using proprietary data from a top platform. Examining the platform impact on fund managers, we find that, incentivized by the amplified performance-chasing, fund managers increase risk taking to enhance their probability of getting onto the top ranking.

风险投资在最终退出阶段取得的收益以及对被投企业的影响长期以来是国内外学术界研究的空白点。通过对2007年-2017年A股新上市公司公开市场交易中大股东的减持收益进行测算，并对风险投资最终退出对被投资公司的影响进行实证分析，本文发现：风险投资减持可以获得比其他大股东减持更大的上市日至减持日的购买并持有异常收益率（BHAR）和减持期累计异常收益率（CAR），风险投资的实力越强，风险投资减持的收益越大；在高铁直通和风投投资人出任董事的情况下，风险投资可以获取更大的减持收益，形成了“监管逆转”现象；通过信息操纵，盈余管理和财务违规等途径，风险投资获取了更大的减持收益，实现了风险投资对被投公司的“价值剥削”，造成了风投退出后被投公司的业绩下滑。本文对于风险投资最终减持阶段的行为刻画具有重要贡献，对于全面认识风险投资最终退出的影响具有现实意义，对于解读中国发展现实丰富国外经典金融理论具有重要启示。

Exploiting staggered COVID-19 lockdowns and reopening across different regions in China, we study how lockdowns affect the investment decisions of venture capital (VC) investors and whether such changes are temporary or enduring in the post-pandemic era. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that lockdowns exacerbate the “tyranny of distance” (i.e., VCs avoid investing in remote ventures), our findings suggest the “death of distance”: VCs invest in remoter ventures during a lockdown and such effects persist even after the economy reopens. Such lockdown effects are more pronounced when there is better internet infrastructure, when the level of information asymmetry between VCs and entrepreneurs is lower, and when VCs are more experienced. The lockdown effects can be explained by the advancement and adoption of remote communication technology as a response to the social distancing requirements. As geographic boundaries of VC investment are shattered by remote communication technology, local competition among VCs has been intensified, the monopoly power of VCs has been curtailed, and the regional inequality of entrepreneurial access to VC financing has been mitigated.

We examine the impact of mixed ownership on the performance of venture capital (VC) firms in China. We use successful/unsuccessful exits from VC-financed entrepreneurial companies and number of patent applications by VC-financed companies as proxies for VC firms’ performance. Consistent with existing research on the inferior performance of SOEs relative to non-SOEs, we find that on average government-controlled VC firms (GVCs) underperform domestic private investors-controlled VC firms (PVCs). More importantly, we find that introducing minority private investors (i.e., mixed ownership) helps improve the performance of GVCs. However, we find no evidence that introducing minority government investors (i.e., mixed ownership) helps improve the performance of PVCs. Our results provide relevant information to the ongoing debate on the role of the government investors and private investors in developing the VC industry in emerging markets.

In recent years, with the rapid expansion of commercial banks' non-standardized business, the systematic correlation between shadow banking and commercial banks in China has been gradually enhanced, which enables the partial liquidity crisis of shadow banking to spread rapidly to commercial banks, leading to the increased vulnerability of China's financial system. Based on this, we built shadow banking indexes of trusts, securities, private lending and investment, introduced the dynamic correlation coefficient calculated by the dynamic conditional correlation multivariate GARCH model into the improved CoVaR model, and used the DCC-BEKK-MVGARCH-Time-Varying CoVaR Model to measure the risk overflow contribution of shadow banking in China. We find that shadow banking and commercial banks have an inherent relationship. Due to their own risks, different types of shadow banking contribute to the risk spillover to commercial banks in different degrees. The risk correlation between shadow banking and commercial banks fluctuates.

：本文手工整理了2010 年~2017 年非上市银行数据，利用集成机器学习技术测算中国商业银行的系统性风险，弥补了V-Lab 仅包含部分上市银行的缺陷。发现：总体系统性风险不断上升，2016 年底出台的一系列政策有效控制了这一上升趋势，2017 年显著下降10.3%；SRISK 份额最高的5 大国有商业银行仅占54.78%，城市商业银行的系统性风险份额不断上升、已成为中国系统性风险的潜 在累积点；区域性演进上呈现向东南沿海积聚的特点。控制区域性发展的回归模型进一步揭示了商业银行系统性风险出现和上升的影响机制：资产规模有显著的正向影响，支持“大而不能倒”的观点；杠杆率和期限错配是重要影响因素，银行的杠杆率上升1%，系统性风险上升的概率显著上升0.34%，支持了“降杠杆”政策，这一结论对是否是系统重要性银行都稳健；提高流动性有利于显著降低系统性风险，调控效果没有降杠杆强，但对小规模银行更有效。我们还观察两个银行机构特征，银行主动承担风险使得银行自身系统性风险上升，帮助企业发现债券没有显著影响基本对非系统重要性银行也不会影响系统性金融风险。最后利用省级和城市层面累计的系统性金融风险，发现系统性金融风险对经济的增长和发展质量的确存在显著负作用，风险上升的省份和城市经济作用更显著，系统性金融风险是关乎经济发展的关键因素。

利用我国 2014 年出台的“限薪令”作为外生冲击构造准自然实验，本文基于我 国沪深交易所上市企业2009-2018年的面板数据，采用双重差分方法检验了高管薪酬管制对 企业风险承担的影响。研究发现:在样本期间内，“限薪令”的施行显著降低了国有企业的 风险承担水平。在区分国有企业类型后，这一结果没有改变。进一步地，我们发现“限薪令” 对企业风险承担的效果受到企业内外部条件的影响:在政策不确定性较高、董事长年龄较大、 企业规模较小和薪酬降幅较大的企业中影响更为显著。此外，“限薪令”的出台，使国企对 政治目标的追求提升，企业社会责任披露频率和质量显著提高。最后，我们检验了企业风险 承担降低的经济后果，结果发现企业风险承担水平的下降导致了企业价值的降低。本文的研 究从企业风险承担视角丰富了“限薪令”经济后果的研究，同时能够为深化我国国企薪酬改 革提供经验依据，具有较强的启示意义。

妥善处置僵尸企业是供给侧结构性改革的重要抓手。本文基于 2009-2018 年沪深两市 A 股非金融上 市公司数据，探究了高管薪酬业绩敏感性对僵尸企业复活的影响。研究结果表明:高管薪酬业绩敏感性对 僵尸企业具有显著的治疗效果，在考虑了内生性等问题后，结论依旧稳健;创新绩效在这一关系中发挥了 部分中介作用，即高管薪酬业绩敏感性增加了企业创新绩效，进而提高了治愈僵尸企业的概率。进一步地 分析表明，上述影响在不同类型企业中表现出异质性，对于技术密集型企业和非国有企业，高管薪酬业绩 敏感性对僵尸企业的治疗效果更加明显。本文的结果为从公司内部治理角度处置僵尸企业提供了重要的理 论依据。

高质量的财务报告能够提升利益相关者的信息优势，高管简历作为重要的财务 报告文本，传递了高管背景特征这一私人信息，有利于利益相关者更加准确地评估企业创 新活动价值。基于此，本文以 2008-2018 年中国 A 股上市公司为样本，采用文本分析方 法，从完整性、详细性和可读性三个文本特征维度，探究高管简历信息披露是否以及如何 为企业创新提供信息。本文通过实证研究发现，高管简历信息披露能够促进企业创新。经 过工具变量回归和其他稳健性检验后，这一结论仍然成立。机制检验表明，高管简历信息 披露能够通过吸引高学历员工以及缓解融资约束两个渠道促进企业创新。本文拓展了财务 报告文本信息经济后果与企业创新影响因素的相关研究，揭示了高管简历在企业创新中的 重要作用，对监管部门完善信息披露政策提供了有力依据。