The existing literature mainly documents the relationship between international and domestic fossil energy markets; however, empirical evidence of the dynamic relationships between fossil energy market and new energy market is lacking. This paper combines TGARCH model and copula model to explore the dynamic linkages and spillover effects between international fossil energy (crude oil, coal and natural gas) markets and China's new energy market using daily data from 4 January 2012 to 3 September 2018. The empirical results indicate that fossil energy returns and new energy returns are positive related over time. And the crude oil returns and new energy returns, as well as the coal returns and new energy returns have lower tail dependence, while there is upper tail dependence structure between natural gas returns and new energy returns. Furthermore, the extreme upside and downside risk spillover from international fossil energy markets to China's new energy market is asymmetric. Among the spillover effects, the downward risk spillover of crude oil market exerts the most significant impact on China's new energy market.

发展绿色金融旨在促进企业生产方式低碳转型，尤其支持企业开展绿色创新。 本文以绿色债券为例，利用双重差分模型研究了绿色金融对企业绿色创新的支持效应。研究发现，发行绿色债券显著提升了企业绿色创新能力， 这主要体现在绿色发明专利和绿色实用新型专利两个方面， 其中发行绿色债券对绿色发明专利的促进作用具有更好的动态持续性。 异质性检验发现，国有企业、非重污染企业、 无第三方认证企业、专利密集型企业在发行绿色债券后绿色创新表现更加积极。 进一步分析发现， 发行绿色债券对企业绿色创新的促进作用源于资源效应和监督效应两个机制。 本文最直接的政策含义是，为企业实现环境保护与竞争力提升的“双赢”和加快发展绿色金融促进企业绿色创新进而更好地实现绿色经济发展提供了有益的理论借鉴。

We examine the effects of controlling shareholder stock pledge on corporate acquisition decisions and associated performance. Consistent with our aggravated expropriation hypothesis, we find that pledging firms in China initiate more takeovers, but these acquisitions conducted by pledging firms experience lower announcement returns. We adopt the difference in differences and the instrumental variable approaches to establish causality. Channel tests further reveal that pledging acquirers overpay for the deals and are more likely to be involved in related party transactions. Cross-sectionally, we find that the relations between the share pledge and corporate acquisitiveness and returns are more pronounced for non-SOEs and firms with high-level excess cash. Lastly, we document that pledging acquirers underperform in the long-run in terms of lower ROAs and a greater likelihood of goodwill impairment. Overall, our findings indicate that controlling shareholders increasingly expropriate minority shareholders through self-serving corporate takeovers after the stock pledge.

This paper examines the association between acquisition performance commitment and earnings management in an emerging market where investor protection mechanisms are not well established. Based on a sample of acquisition transactions by listed firms in China during 2008-2017, we find evidence that firms committed to certain performance targets in acquisition transactions tend to engage in earnings management to meet their commitments. This phenomenon is more pronounced at the later stage of the commitment period. Further, the positive relation between performance commitment and earnings management is attenuated by a stronger governance structure. Finally, we find firms that managed to just meet performance targets experience worsened accounting-based and market-based performances and higher probability of goodwill impairments immediately after the commitment period. This paper contributes to the acquisition literature by providing evidence from an emerging market of post-contractual opportunistic behavior.

救助财务困境企业有助于恢复市场微观主体活力，进而保持金融和社会稳定。但区别于银行和风险投资机构所开展的顺周期投资，困境企业救助属于逆周期投资，具有更高的行为风险和经营风险。金融资产管理公司作为困境企业救助专业性机构，如何开展投资前的救助对象筛选与投资后的风险控制，目前学术界对该问题尚缺乏研究。本文基于金融资产管理公司主导的18家财务困境企业救助的多案例编码研究及典型交易模式分析，构建了财务困境救助的投前企业筛选与投后风险分配的理论模型。本文发现，投前企业筛选主要识别抵偿价值、经营恢复价值和重组价值，投后风险控制关注行为风险抑制和经营风险分配。本文研究成果对逆周期投资价值识别、风险识别与控制等研究做出了重要的贡献，对社会机构参与困境企业救助有实践意义。

Using Chinese data, we investigate the impact of the China Semi-Mandatory Payout Policy that sets an explicit requirement that firms need to distribute at least 20% of their average annual net profits as cash/stock dividends accumulatively in three consecutive years before refinancing via seasoned equity offerings. Firms with the payout level below (above) the cutoff imposed by the Semi-Mandatory Payout Policy are regarded as Treated (Control) group. We find that Treated firms are more likely to cut investment, especially long-term innovation investment, and perform poorly compared to Control group due to lack of money. Treated firms also tend to use earnings management assisting in financing through the debt market as an alternative way to raise money. The negative impact of cutting investment caused by the Semi-Mandatory Payout Policy is more pronounced for firms suffering from severe financial constraints, firms having good corporate governance, and firms located in less financial development areas. We attribute findings to the difficulty of accessing capital that is implicitly increased the China Semi-Mandatory Payout Policy, which alters firms’ behavior leading to insufficient investments and destroys firms’ value.

本文以《关于实施上市公司股息红利差别化个人所得税政策有关问题的通知》的实施为自然实验，考察降低股利税对公司现金分红的影响。研究发现：（1）在股利税降低的年份，上市公司分红水平和意愿显著提高，并且管理层持股越多，现金分红增加的可能性越大，而在股利税不变的年份则不存在这种关系，表明降低股利税能够激励管理层增加现金分红。（2）降低股利税对管理层增加现金分红的激励作用仅在公司治理水平较高或法律环境较好时显著，表明现金分红是公司治理的“果”而不是“因”。（3）股利税降低仅能激励非国有企业的管理层增加现金分红。（4）投资者认可管理层因股利税降低而增加现金分红的行为。本文的政策含义在于，降低股利税能够达到促进上市公司进行分红的目的，但要从根本上提高我国上市公司分红水平，关键在于进一步完善上市公司的治理机制。

本文以 2009 2019 年公开发行的公司债与企业债为样本考察债券承销商与债券发行公司的空间临近性对债券 资成本、违约概率以及债券期限的影响。实证检验发现 当承销商与公司在同一省份或者承销商与公司距离更近时，债券融资成本越低；并且，承销商的声誉以及公司信息透明度会削弱承销商空间临近性对降低债券融资成本的作用；此外，我们还发现承销商与高和中等信用水平公司的空间临近增加了所发行债券的期限，与低信用水平公司的空间临近效果则相反；最后，我们发现承销商与公司的空间临近降低了债券违约概率。本文的发现在考虑内生性、地方政府关联程度以及排除一线城市的影响下依旧成立。

本文采用2000年到2017年中国A股上市公司的数据为样本，研究了流动性 共性与企业投资水平之间的关系。研究结果发现，个股的流动性共性显著降低了企业的投资 水平，经过一系列内生性和稳健性检验后该负相关关系依然不变。此外，基于信息不对称的 视角，从信息透明度、两权分离度和机构投资者持股三个方面对该负相关关系进行了深入检 验，经研究发现，信息越不透明、两权分离越大的企业，其流动性共性与企业投资水平的负 相关关系是增强的;而机构投资持股比例越高的企业该负相关关系是减弱的。最后，还发现 流动性共性与企业过度投资呈正相关关系。

我们对正式与非正式负债所产生的公司治理作用差异进行了比较分析。基于对中国民 营企业内的负债进行结构性区分，我们的实证研究发现，商业信用负债可以提升企业的投资 效率，而金融信用负债则会降低企业的投资效率。该结果说明，商业信用负债融资可以通过 给企业提供监督而发挥有效的公司治理作用，但金融信用负债融资却难以发挥应有的监督作 用，其债权人反而可能成为大股东利益侵占的对象。通过强化家族大股东对公司的控制力， 所有者管理可以促进商业信用负债融资更好地发挥其公司治理作用，但也可能会加剧大股东 对金融信用债权人的利益侵害。总体上看，债权人身份差异对应着差异化的公司治理作用。