2013年1月1日，中国证监会《非上市公众公司监督管理办法》的实施，标志着我国证券监管引入了公众公司制度。尤其最近依据《国务院关于全国中小企业股份转让系统有关问题的决定》对《管理办法》作出的修订，对公众公司的监管理念和规则更加清晰，具有重要的制度建设意义。本文试通过归纳《管理办法》中包含的对非上市公众公司的监管分类，予以具体分析。

In this paper, using a set of zero yield curve data of China’s government bonds and credit bonds, along with China’s aggregate credit risk measures, and macroeconomic variables from 2006 to 2013, we document a puzzle of counter-credit-risk corporate yield spreads. We interpret this puzzle as a symptom of the immaturity of China’s credit bond market, which reveals a distorted pricing mechanism latent in the fundamental of this market. As by-products of our analysis, we also find interesting results about relations between corporate yield spreads and interest rates as well as risk premia and the stock index, and these results are somewhat attributed to this puzzle.

本文结合我国新型农村金融机构试点，针对欧美等发达国家社区银行的概况与界定、经营优势与面临的挑战、主要发展模式、组织架构与规模边界等问题，进行了系统分析与论述，并剖析总结西方社区银行的发展特色、模式创新与可取之处。在此基础上，着眼于我国农村新型金融机构的试点与发展，建设性地提出了相关政策建议。

新型农村金融机构主要包括：村镇银行、资金互助社、贷款公司和小额贷款公司等农村金融机构。2005年，人行启动了小额贷款公司试点，2006年以来，中国银监会出台了一系列相关的政策法规，确立了新型农村金融的准入政策、运行机制和监管措施，新型农村金融机构获得了较快发展。

当前，西方发达国家产业集团纷纷收缩旗下金融业务，实施归核化战略，而国内实业集团的产融结合浪潮方兴未艾，二者形成鲜明对比。产融结合本质上是一柄双刃剑，不能脱离集团的核心业务过度扩张金融业务。从我国当前的情况来看，应审慎推进国内产融结合，强化协同监管机制。

摘要：在本次次贷危机过程中，受不同风险文化的影响，部分金融机构在次贷危机中采取的措施不尽相同，最终结局迥异。近年来发生的一系列金融丑闻表明，投资银行和衍生品业务已成为金融风险的策源地。本文立足于后危机时代的全球金融业发展趋势与背景，结合中国大陆金融业务综合化的实际情况和产融结合加快的大趋势，系统分析全球范围内金融控股公司风险控制成败两方面的案例，总结经验教训，并针对中国大陆金融控股公司风险防控与监管，建设性地提出相关政策建议。

In this article, we analyse investment preferences of domestic and foreign institutional investors to the management quality of Chinese listed firms. We find that foreign institutional investors hold higher shareholding in firms with greater numbers of executive officers with MBA degrees, having served as vice president or higher prior to joining the firm and sitting on multiple boards. Foreign institutional investors in China also show preference over investee firms with larger board size. However, they pay no attention to whether directors are independent from the firm management and meet often. Domestic institutional investors show preference to all management quality indicators that are associated with foreign institutional ownership. In addition, domestic institutional investors invest more in firms where the executive officers are certified public accountants (CPA) and are longer tenured in their current position. Furthermore, domestic institutional investors pay more attention to corporate governance of investee firms than foreign institutional investors. Finally, we find that domestic institutional investors show a strong preference to firms that have been invested by at least one Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII), even after controlling for QFII’s preference for management quality. This indicates that the QFIIs’ international reputation has been used by domestic institutional investors as a positive signal for investment opportunities.

本文以2003—2010年沪深两市家族上市公司样本为研究对象，实证研究了家族控制权特征与银行信贷合约之间的关系，以检验家族控制权寻租效应和效率效应的适应性情景，结果发现，家族通过金字塔结构和超额董事席位两种控制权增强机制对上市公司的超额控制程度越高，其获得银行信用借款的比例越低，获得担保借款比例越高。家族对企业的超额控制权传递着公司未来预期和信息风险，增加了银行面临的代理成本，属于寻租观而非效率观。进一步研究发现，家族控制程度与银行信用借款之间的负相关性在具有政治关联、较高公司声誉和公司透明度的企业中会降低。地区法律制度水平会降低家族超额控制引发的代理成本和信贷违约风险。银行业腐败会降低银行对借款企业超额控制所引发的信贷风险的评估能力。此外家族控制权结构影响企业信用借款的机制是通过提高企业债务违约风险来实现，家族对企业超额控制程度越高，企业债务违约概率越高。

This paper surveys how and why the share spilt reform enhance the corporate governance using agency cost as proxy from the perspective of stockholders’ conflict and liquidity increase in the process of share spilt reform respectively. We find that share spilt reform brings significant governance improvement. Besides, we use some governance effect and liquidity theory proposed by Edmans et al. (2011) to testify by which means the share split reform enhance the corporate governance. What is more, we find that the corporations with great difficulty, which represented for severe shareholders’ conflict, in carrying forward the reform tend to have severe governance problems while it was this kind of corporation that benefited most from the reform and formed the main driving force of the realization of the goal of reform. It has some implication on China’s current reform; that is, only when toughest problems have been overcome will the goal of reform be achieved.

The deviation of control right and cash flow right is a common problem of corporate governance in East Asian companies.With Taiwan's listed companies as samples, this paper discusses whether the degree of deviation of control right and cash flow right will affect the company’s earnings distribution policy. The results reveal that, regardless of using stock right or the number of directors to measure the control right, companies of higher degree of deviation of control right and cash flow right have higher proportions of employee bonuses against the shareholder dividends, In this case, the company is more biased in the care of the employees at the expense of the minority shareholders. The company is especially likely to exploit the minority shareholders by controlling the board of directors and paying cash dividends to employees. As investors believe that the controlling shareholders of companies with high degree deviation of control right and cash flow right, and high proportion of employee bonuses are intended to exploit the minority shareholders, such companies have significantly lower declared earnings distribution remuneration compared with companies with low degree of deviation and low employee bonuses.