This study examines how corporate governance influences short-term and long-term bidder returns from China’s domestic mergers and acquisitions during 2001-2010. We examine a range of corporate governance measures covering ownership structure, board structure, insider ownership and managerial incentives while controlling for bidder and deal characteristics. Our initial results from events analyses show that market responses differ in ways which suggest a difference in how the market’s assessment of share price from the perspectives of short run and long run. Bidders obtain significant positive abnormal returns over the five-day event period but suffer significant wealth losses for two years following the deal completion. Our further analyses on factors driving the price difference show that executive ownership (positive) and state ownership (negative) exert opposite effects on the announcement period returns. The returns further differ by way of payments with positive (negative) effects from stock (cash) financing. Our long-term regression analyses show that the positive impact of executive ownership remains. Independent directors record a negative effect on abnormal returns. Nevertheless, board independence measured by the composite corporate governance index exerts a significant, positive effect on shareholder wealth. Our study highlights the need for the state to accelerate the share structure reform and formulate policies that encourage executive ownership and sound corporate governance.

本文研究了用8个模型预测A股23个行业和市场收益率的问题，针对文献中常用的平方预测误差损失函数和R_OS^2统计量的不足构建了损失函数g(r_(t+1),r ?_(t+1) )和R_OS^ORDER统计量。R_OS^2统计量显示收益率不可预测而R_OS^ORDER统计量显示收益率可预测，我们进而研究了基于预测的行业轮动策略，结果支持使用损失函数g(r_(t+1),r ?_(t+1) )和R_OS^ORDER统计量评估预测。本文给出了不同预测模型的相对表现。

与管理层权力理论不同，社会影响理论强调存在着CEO和董事会的社会心理因素对高管薪酬的影响。本文将从社会心理因素视角出发分析社会影响机制对高管薪酬的作用，首先对社会心理因素的内涵加以分析，然后通过文献梳理总结董事会服务于高管利益的动因及过程，并对社会心理因素和社会影响机制如何影响高管薪酬水平加以阐释，最后提出研究展望。

Working with unique data on land values in 35 major Chinese markets and a panel of firms outside the real estate industry, we estimate standard investment equations that yield no evidence of a collateral channel effect. This is markedly different from previous work on the United States and Japan which finds economically large impacts. One reason for this appears to be that some of the most dominant firms in China are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which are unconstrained in the sense that they do not need to rely on rising underlying property collateral values to obtain all the financing necessary to carry out their desired investment programs. However, we also find no collateral channel effect for non-SOEs when we perform our analysis on disaggregated sets of firms. Norms and regulation in the Chinese capital markets and banking sector can account for why there is no collateral channel effect operating among these firms. We caution that our results do not mean that there will be no negative fallout from a potential real estate bust on the Chinese economy. There are good reasons to believe there would be, just not through a collateral channel effect.

审计师选择是审计研究的核心问题。本文首次研究了国有股东在中国A 股IPO 市场审计师选择行为及其具体动机。我们发现，国有股东不太愿意选择高质量的审计师，其 原因既不是因为高质量的审计师有更强的能力限制国有股东或管理者的代理问题，又不是因 为国有股东可以代替高质量的审计师在降低IPO 融资成本过程中的作用，也不是因为国有 股东可以替代高质量审计师的保险作用，而是因为国有股东会损害高质量审计师声誉机制的 发挥，进而损害了其在降低IPO 融资成本过程中的作用。本文对于丰富和深化我们关于中 国A 股市场审计师选择行为和审计师声誉机制作用发挥的认识，具有非常重要的作用。

This paper examines the value of political connections in the Chinese IPO market. We find a positive relationship between CEO/chairman’s political connections and the probability of IPO approval of entrepreneurial firms. We further identify that minority shareholders value those connections and give a market premium to the connected firms after the firms go public. We provide evidence that connected independent directors and PE/VC investors bring important networks which facilitate firms’ access to the IPO market, albeit the former complements and the latter substitutes the CEO/chairman’s connections. We argue that in emerging markets where government intervention is still prevalent, the value of political connections does exist and entrepreneurial firms usually build political connections through different ways in order to facilitate their access the IPO market and obtain a higher market premium.

This paper examines the interactive effect of private equity (PE) and excess control rights on the process of firms’ going public. We find that firms with high excess control rights have more earnings management before IPO, and they are more likely to seek PE investors especially when the earnings management is high. We further show that the involvement of PE investors increases the probability of the firms’ IPO application being approved by the regulators in firms with high excess control rights. However, PE backed firms with high excess control rights are found to have a higher IPO fee, lower initial returns and lower long term post-IPO performance. We argue that in emerging markets where the protection of minority shareholders is weak and the economy is dominated by relationship and networks, ultimate owners have a strong incentive to have PE investors help them access the IPO market at the expense of minority shareholders’ interests, especially when they have excess control rights. In fact, instead of playing a monitory role, PE investors actually conspire with the ultimate owners to exploit minority shareholders’ interests and both PE investors and controlling shareholders become big winners, while minority shareholders are the only losers in the IPO process.

本文立足于承销商的角度，首次从“关系”视角实证研究了投行与上市公司之间 的“关系”在投行竞争公司再融资（SEO）承销业务中的影响，并进而深入探讨了“关系” 与“声誉”机制在影响SEO 承销竞争方面的相互替代作用。结果发现，投行与上市公司“关 系”越紧密，即如果该投行是公司IPO 的承销商，或者在公司IPO 时的承销份额越高，或 者持有上市公司的股权，那么其越有可能获得公司SEO 的承销业务；然而，“声誉”会削弱 “关系”的影响，只有在投行声誉较弱的情况下，“关系”才能发挥作用。本文研究不仅提 供了在中国制度环境下“关系”在微观层面发挥作用的证据，从而丰富了投行行为的研究内 容，而且开拓了“关系”与“声誉”机制交互研究的新领域。

Using a sample of China’s listed private firms we investigate the relationship between control-ownership wedge, bank connections and collateral requirement. We find that while control-ownership wedge relates to more pledged collateral, it is mainly the firm’s bank connections rather than its political connections that reduce the collateral requirement and weakens the positive relationship between the control-ownership wedge and collateral. We furhter find that the split-share structure reform and regions with high lender competition also require less collateral and weaken the positive relationship between the control-ownership wedge and collateral. We argue that in an emerging market where legal protection for creditors and investors are weak and relationship is prevalent, bank connections is a substitute for collateral through mitigating the information asymmetry and agency concerns by creditors, which has been further exacerbated due to the tunnelling risk by the controlling shareholders.

corporate governance. We hypothesize that (a) Firms in more individualistic cultures should suffer more from agency problems and should use more corporate governance practices; (b) Firms in more individualistic cultures should use more debt since financing policy can also be used to control managerial opportunism, but the cultural effect should be smaller in firms with already higher corporate governance standards. Using the corporate governance scores from ASSET4, we find that individualism can explain a large variation in firm-level corporate governance and the empirical results are consistent with the our hypotheses.