上市后，商业银行的市场约束和监管约束会明显加强，这将提升银行公司治理水平，进而影响银行管理者的行为。本文实证检验了我国商业银行特别是上市前后贷款损失准备计提操纵的变化，发现银行在贷款损失准备计提中存在较为明显的“膨胀利润”的盈余管理，而上市后其“膨胀利润”的盈余管理大大减弱，直至不显著；其负向信号发送作用没有改变；未发现其存在资本管理的证据。该研究表明上市有利于改进商业银行公司治理，为支持银行外部治理环境的强化提供了证据。

机构投资者的快速崛起正改变我国公司的治理结构。本文选取2004-2007年有机构投资者持股的公司为样本，考察机构投资者在公司治理中的角色。全部样本的结果显示，机构投资者持股与公司业绩正相关，机构投资者在公司治理中扮演着有效监督者角色。分组样本研究结果表明：持股较高时机构投资者能改善公司业绩，符合有效监督假说；持股较低时机构投资者对公司业绩产生负面影响，符合利益冲突假说和战略结盟假说。研究结果意味着，机构投资者在公司治理中的角色取决于其持股情况：持股高时机构投资者扮演有效监督者角色，持股低时充当利益攫取者角色。

后危机时代，中央银行将在宏观审慎管理上发挥更重要的作用已成为一种共识。随着金融创新活动发展，中央银行的调控目标多元，调控能力显得“捉襟见肘”。本文引入强制、可变的资产项准备金而架构的资产项准备金政策框架既可以重建准备金制度，提高货币政策的有效性；且该准备金政策又可以充当一种监管工具，建立一个将“资本金和准备金”相统一的广义资本充足率监管规则，将中央银行的货币政策调控和监管当局的资本监管统一到一个框架，从而突出和强化中央银行在宏观审慎管理中的地位和职能。

基于我国61家股票型基金2004-06~2008-03的16个季度面板数据,使用动态面板回归模型对 数据进行了探索性建模,研究了政策性资产配置和基金经理对基金业绩的贡献。主要发现有:①政策性资 产配置与基金业绩之间的关系显著,在控制其他因素的情况下,基金资产配置能力提高1%,约能提高基金 业绩0.8%;②基金经理的学历、年龄、从业时间和从业背景对基金业绩的贡献显著,但贡献度不大;③基金 业绩存在可能的“反转”现象,反转周期估计半年。

运用EGARCH模型首先考察了沪深300指数期货与股票现货市场上10大基金重仓股之间进行套期保值的效果，然后又运用EGARCH模型考察了沪深300指数期货与10只随机选取的深圳证券交易所中小企业板上市的股票之间进行套期保值的效果。发现前者的套期保值效果并不很理想，后者的效果更差。为了给投资者提供更多的、实用的套期保值工具，应该借鉴海外市场的经验，在我国推出中小市值股票指数期货和其它行业股票指数期货。最后对政策构想中的“中小板综合指数期货”的套期保值效应进行了模拟实证检验，证明这种政策构想是值得付诸实践的。

运用EGARCH模型首先考察了沪深300指数期货与股票现货市场上10大基金重仓股之间进行套期保值的效果，然后又运用EGARCH模型考察了沪深300指数期货与10只随机选取的深圳证券交易所中小企业板上市的股票之间进行套期保值的效果。发现前者的套期保值效果并不很理想，后者的效果更差。为了给投资者提供更多的、实用的套期保值工具，应该借鉴海外市场的经验，在我国推出中小市值股票指数期货和其它行业股票指数期货。最后对政策构想中的“中小板综合指数期货”的套期保值效应进行了模拟实证检验，证明这种政策构想是值得付诸实践的。

文章以我国上市公司2005-2011年的经验数据为样本，实证分析了控股股东不同性质下投资者情绪对企业非效率投资的影响。结果表明，投资者情绪与企业投资不足显著负相关，而与企业过度投资显著正相关。进一步研究得出，控股股东持股比例高时投资者情绪与过度投资正相关性更强；相比于国有企业，民营企业非效率投资受投资者情绪影响较大；控股股东两权分离系数越高，投资者情绪对企业非效率投资影响越大。基于上述经验证据，我们得出投资者情绪对企业非效率投资具有“助长效应”和“缓解效应”，控股股东的存在加剧了“助长效应”而减弱了“缓解效应”。

The conflict of interest between controlling and minority shareholders is an important issue in firms with concentrated ownership. We document that expropriation behavior by controlling shareholders through tunneling or self-dealing is far more severe in politically connected firms than in nonpolitically connected firms. This severity results more from the formers’ lower concern with capital market punishment than from the possibility that such firms tend to establish political connections for protection. Consistent with the view that a firm’s financing condition influences its corporate governance, we show that such severe expropriation occurs only in firms whose political connection helps them secure bank loan access.

We examine how regulators tackle two types of widespread tunneling activities in China. Controlling shareholders and related parties can divert assets from listed firms or coerce firms to serve as guarantors on questionable loans. The government announced and enacted two new rules during the same period: the first rule prohibits asset diversion from listed firms for ‘non-operational’ purposes by large shareholders, while the second standardizes the practice of listed firms providing loan guarantees. Relative to firms not affected by either rule, firms complying with the first rule experience a reduction in the ownership stakes of controlling shareholders, an increase in investment, and significantly better performance. The second rule has no impact on firms. Our results highlight the importance of enforceability: laws and regulations that can be enforced at lower costs are much more likely to succeed, especially in countries with weak institutions.

This paper examines the value of political participation by private entrepreneurs in China. Using a unique sample of all initial public offerings by entrepreneurial firms during 1994-2007 and political participation by the controlling entrepreneurs, we test the hypothesis that firms with entrepreneurs who participate in politics are able to exploit rent-seeking opportunities that normal firms do not have access to. We document that the long-run stock performance after the IPO of firms controlled by entrepreneurs who participate in politics is superior to that of common entrepreneurial firms. Our results also show that political participation has a significant positive effect on change in operating performance and a negative effect on first-day returns. Moreover, we find that economic development and local institutions are important for this value effect. The difference in performance is even larger in regions characterized by more abundant rent-seeking opportunities, indicating that the value effect of political participation likely originates from rent seeking. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that political participation facilitates entrepreneurs’ rent seeking.