摘要：近年来，商业银行创新问题成为学界和业界普遍关注的问题，一级法人体制下基层机构如何在创新中发挥作用是一个很有意义的课题。当前，各界对商业银行创新研究焦点普遍定位于总行（即法人本身），对在实际运行中起着重要作用的基层机构关注不够。为深入探讨商业银行基层机构金融创新问题，本研究对商业银行基层机构的定位、金融创新制约因素进行了分析，并从六个方面对商业银行基层机构金融创新的路径进行了分析探讨。

本文构建了带外部冲击的国际资产配置的跨期效用优化模型；基于我国 实际数据，计算了不同情景下国际资产在外汇储备和主权财富基金之间的最优配置；并 对国际资产配置关于外部冲击发生概率进行了敏感度分析。研究表明，风险规避型政府 的外汇储备最佳持有量随主权财富基金的风险、主权财富基金的变现成本、外部冲击幅 度、风险规避系数的增加而上升，主权财富基金的最适追加量则与上述变量呈反向变动 关系；跨期与单期优化选择存在显著差异，对资产配置评价期限的延长促使政府选择持 有更多的流动性储备；在国际收支平稳上升时期，可以适当减少外汇储备的持有量。本 研究可为主权财富基金的规模扩张提供参考。

产业资本和金融资本作为两种重要的资本形式，资本市场的出现搭建了产业资本和 金融资本联系的桥梁。本文选取举牌作为产业资本向金融资本渗透的一种典型案例，分析得 出在股票价值被极度低估的时候，渗透成本较低，产业资本会通过举牌渗入金融资本，产业 资本倾向选择同行业、股权结构相对分散的企业作为被举牌公司，产业资本渗透金融资本的 目的是为了扩大自己的市场份额，实现该行业的扩张，同时获得本属于金融资本的资本市场 的超额收益。在渗透之后，产业资本对被举牌企业实施经营管理，提高了被举牌企业的经营 效率，实现了产业调整，证明了金融能够有效的支持产业的结构调整。

自 2008年美国次债危机爆发以来，美联储频繁采用宽松的货币政策来刺激本国 的经济复苏。伴随着美元的不断贬值，作为世界上最大的美元储备资产持有国，中国深受其 害。在当前国际货币体系深度改革的大背景下，如何有效地管理外汇储备，不仅是当前中国 面临的现实问题，也对中国参与国际经济事务具有深远的影响。本文试图在当今美元地位逐 渐下滑、新兴市场国家兴起的背景下，全面系统地分析我国外汇储备的最优币种结构。本文 采用风险-收益模型对外汇储备管理的四个关键因素（国际贸易、参照货币、风险承担能力、 国际货币体系格局）分别进行实证研究，模拟出在不同情境下的中国最优储备币种结构，得 出富有价值的研究结论，并提出相应的政策建议。

本文以2005—2007年上市公司为样本，从事前和事后两个维度考察地方政府质量影响 企业投资和资本配置效率的机理。研究发现，高质量政府可更有效利用市场进行有效的资源 配置，帮助企业获取更有价值的投资项目，并帮助企业获取外源融资。本文分别用投资对 TobinQ和对现金流的敏感性度量投资效率与融资约束，结果显示，政府质量与投资和Q值敏 感度正相关，与投资和现金流敏感度负相关。相对国有企业，政府质量改善资本配置效率的 功能在民营企业中更显著，相对中央国有企，政府质量改善资本配置效率功能在地方国企中 更显著。事后业绩增长的考察表明，在较高的投资与Q敏感度和较低的投资与现金流敏感度 的地区，投资能显著促进企业增长。上述结论在一系列稳健性检验后仍成立。

本文通过 VAR-MVGARCH模型和变参数模型研究了房地产价格增长率分别 与货币供应量、汇率和利率的线性和波动关系，发现：汇率的变化对房地产价格增长率 的变动会产生显著线性影响，但是货币供应量和利率的变化对房地产价格增长率变动的 线性影响不大。尽管货币供应量、汇率和利率对房地产价格增长率存在波动溢出效应， 但由于它们与房地产价格增长率的相关性波动剧烈，同时考虑到不断变化货币政策“盯 住”房地产价格波动的困难以及有悖于央行保持货币政策“连续性和平稳性”的目标， 认为当前最好实施汇率工具去盯住房地产价格增长率的均值变化，才容易产生显著效 果。

在已有的实证研究中，金融发展水平指标的选取存在一定的缺陷，并 得出了存在明显分歧的结论。同时由于时间序列数据过短导致研究结果显著性 差。本文通过计算基尼系数，选取金融产业GDP作为度量金融发展水平的指标， 将时间序列数据扩展到1952-2008年，对中国金融发展水平与收入分配的关系进 行了实证分析。研究表明金融发展水平与收入不平等存在双向的因果关系，中国 存在扩展的库兹涅茨倒U效应，控制变量的加入显著提高了模型的解释能力。因 此，缩小收入差距不仅应进一步发展金融，更应对影响收入不平等的因素进行综 合治理。

We examine the impact of corporate ownership structure on the value of excess cash in Chinese listed firms. We find that the value of excess cash is less in firms controlled by private investors than in those firms controlled by the government. One dollar of excess cash is valued a $0.36 in firms controlled by private investors while it rises to $0.42 in firms controlled by the government. Furthermore, we show that the expropriation of the controlling shareholders is significantly and positively related with the previous year’s excess cash in firms controlled by private investors while it is insignificant in firms controlled by the government. These findings are consistent with the view that private controlling shareholders have the greater ability to extract private benefit in cash holdings.

What are the effects of policy reversals which were initiated by the US bureaucracy in response to the 2008 global financial crisis? Answering this question is challenging because US capital markets are relatively mature and policy reversals are far and in between in recent years. Specifically, the challenges include the one-time nature of these US policy reversals, the confounding effects of many programs targeting interrelated segments of the capital markets at the same time as well as possible endogeneity issues. China, on the other hand, offers a natural experiment to study the effects of policy reversals. In the last three decades, the Chinese government has initiated many policy changes to liberalize the capital markets and some of these have been reversed several times. Using hand-collected data of policy reversals targeting the Chinese stock markets from 1994 through 2009, we are able to address the first two challenges. To resolve any endogeneity issue, we focus on the impact of such policy reversals (targeted at the Chinese stock markets) on the Chinese repo markets, which trade market-driven interest rates. We find that the Chinese policy reversals are indeed effective in reducing the term spread, the volatility of the interest rate, and the volatility of the term spread. Our results suggest that the policy risk is systematically priced in financial securities, implying that policy makers can rely on financial market indicators to objectively evaluate their policy decisions.

What are the effects of policy reversals which were initiated by the US bureaucracy in response to the 2008 global financial crisis? Answering this question is challenging because US capital markets are relatively mature and policy reversals are far and in between in recent years. Specifically, the challenges include the one-time nature of these US policy reversals, the confounding effects of many programs targeting interrelated segments of the capital markets at the same time as well as possible endogeneity issues. China, on the other hand, offers a natural experiment to study the effects of policy reversals. In the last three decades, the Chinese government has initiated many policy changes to liberalize the capital markets and some of these have been reversed several times. Using hand-collected data of policy reversals targeting the Chinese stock markets from 1994 through 2009, we are able to address the first two challenges. To resolve any endogeneity issue, we focus on the impact of such policy reversals (targeted at the Chinese stock markets) on the Chinese repo markets, which trade market-driven interest rates. We find that the Chinese policy reversals are indeed effective in reducing the term spread, the volatility of the interest rate, and the volatility of the term spread. Our results suggest that the policy risk is systematically priced in financial securities, implying that policy makers can rely on financial market indicators to objectively evaluate their policy decisions.