在金融市场上，证券分析师的预测行为通常会发生偏差。在股市高涨时，分析师随波逐流，常常发表过度乐观的预测；而当泡沫消退时，分析师则会掉头转向，发布与之前形成强烈反差的盈余预期或股票推荐。对于这种分析师基于市场状态而发布忽高忽低预测的“变脸行为”，传统的理论观点无法做出完整清晰的解释。本文试图将行为金融理论中日渐兴起的迎合理论纳入分析框架，运用声誉博弈分析的方式建立分析师迎合行为模型。该理论模型表明：为了提高自己的声誉以获得更多的利益，分析师会迎合投资者的先验信念而故意发布有偏的信息。本文对中国金融市场上分析师的盈余预测和投票推荐行为展开了实证研究，为声誉博弈模型的理论预期提供了强有力的证据。

本文通过我国股市的高频数据和相关性分析来研究市场群体的学习和心理行为。我们根据心理学中的操作性条件反射，首次提出一个交易性条件反射的概念，用成交量-价概率波方程中的成交量概率来计量市场群体交易性条件反射的强度。我们发现：总体来说，平均收益率与交易性条件反射强度变化之间具有显著的正相关性，市场群体对收益率的心理预期显著地表现了卖出的处置效应和买入的羊群行为，并且该“羊群”对价格趋势的心理预期明显地大于其反转的；第二，我们还发现在细分后的某一时期，它们之间具有显著的负相关性。我们用条件反射来解释他们的交易行为。

本文将状态空间马尔科夫区制转换模型，与向量自回归--对数线性资产定价模型相结合，用于中美股市泡沫区制转换特征的识别和预测。我们发现这一新的计量模型可以成功识别中美股市泡沫的稳定增长和爆炸性膨胀两个区制，估计不同区制之间的转换概率。在此基础上，分析了中国和美国泡沫特征的共性和差异性。我们还做了样本内和样本外预测以进一步验证我们的结论。

2011年，我国全面步入“十二五”时期。为深化改革开放、加快经济发展方式的转变，党中央、国务院加大改革创新力度，相关部门竭力从各自法定职责出发，确保未来我国经济可持续科学发展。从经济社会发展的角度来看，宜从金融反垄断的角度进行完善。

本文利用1990~2008年中国省级面板数据，应用新近发展的PVAR方法，研究了金融发展、技术进步与对外贸易产业升级之间的动态关系。结果发现，金融发展、技术进步与对外贸易产业升级之间存在着非对称的互动关系：金融发展对技术进步和对外贸易产业升级都具有正向的推动作用，但是反过来，技术进步和对外贸易产业升级并没有对金融发展产生正向的推动作用。此外，技术进步与对外贸易产业升级之间存在着良性的正反馈交易机制。因此，三者之间可能存在这样一个作用机制，即金融发展可以通过促进技术进步，进而间接促进对外贸易产业升级。

Although asymmetry of information and positive externalities in venture capital provide the justification for government intervention, no one can guarantee that distortion of resource allocation does not exist when government correct market failures. From the point view of incomplete contract theory, government intervention could affect the achievement of contract for the unverified information and actions, leading to inefficiency of venture capital, therefore It is important for us to understand the performance of public policy which is how to improve how to improve the venture capital. To establish the sequential offer game model with moral hazard of entrepreneur, considering with the additional funds provided by the government and certification of quality as well as the spillover effects of venture capital. Under the assumption that the government has the ability to identify high-ability entrepreneur, the introduction of government leading fund and the arrangement of control can induce more specific investment of entrepreneurs. The preceding investment provide investors with additional information, therefore it is optimal. The non-government leading fund supported entrepreneurs will face with worse situation since limited funding and the requirements of capital preservation. Therefore government leading fund should carefully select the investment strategy.

We study how financial constraints affect the process of firm agglomeration and, in particular, the creation of conglomerates and firms with subsidiaries. We focus on the constraints related to the geographical segmentation of the debt market. We argue that conglomerates/firms with subsidiaries are born as the outcome of a process of agglomeration around less financially constrained firms. This has three major implications: a) conglomerates (firm with subsidiaries) should be less financially constrained than single-segment (no-subsidiary) firms, b) the headquarters – in general the seat of the aggregating company – should be the least financially constrained unit of the new entity and therefore firms with subsidiaries should be more likely to borrow at the headquarters level, c) if conglomerates (firms with subsidiaries) are less financially constrained than the average firm in the market, their Tobin’s Q should be lower than that of the single-segment (no-subsidiary) firms in the same industries – i.e., they should display a “conglomerate (firm with subsidiaries) discount”. We test these hypotheses employing a novel – and exogenous – geographical-based measure of financial constraints. We focus on the US corporations from 1997 to 2004. We show that firms headquartered in less financially constrained areas are more likely to be headquarters of conglomerates/firms with subsidiaries and that conglomerates/firms with subsidiaries are less financially constrained. At the moment of agglomeration (M&A) we document a significant negative relation between the difference in a degree of financial constraints between the bidder and the target and the probability of choosing the target as well as the value created in M&A. In the years following the acquisition Tobin’s Q of acquirers are decreasing relative to their peers which is consistent with the fact that access to lower cost of financing allows to implement projects with marginal Q lower than the average Q of existing projects. Next, we find that the less financially constrained is the headquarters compared to the subsidiaries, the higher is the percentage of the total financing that takes place at headquarters level. Finally, we document a strong positive correlation between the difference in financial constraints of the conglomerate (firm with subsidiaries) and the average degree of financial constraints of the single-segment (no-subsidiary) firms and the conglomerate (firm with subsidiaries) discount. Our findings suggest that conglomerates/firms with subsidiaries are less constrained because less constrained firms take over more constrained ones.

We examine effects of capital structure management and misvaluation on the payment method in mergers and acquisitions. In a sample of 3,097 transactions, we find evidence both for leverage optimization and misvaluation as drivers for the decision to pay with cash or stock. Our evidence also shows that it is difficult to pay with overvalued stock unless justified by economic fundamentals. Few bidders try and often only succeed after going hostile. Paying with cash while capital structure optimization suggests stock payment is more common. These firms are reluctant to pay with undervalued stock and experience positive long-term excess returns.

In this paper, we provide one of the first large sample comparisons of cash policies in public and private US firms. We first show that on average private firms hold less than half as much cash as public firms do. The higher cash holdings of public firms are partially caused by the fact that public firms add more to their cash reserves in a given year, even controlling for a number of spending and savings factors, than do similar private firms. At the same time, however, we find that among firms with excess cash holdings, public firms spend more of it than do private firms. Thus, public firm managers are more aggressive in both accumulating and spending cash reserves. Finally, consistent with the presence of financing frictions, we find that private firms’ cash-to-cash flow sensitivity is higher than that of public firms. Overall, our evidence supports both the agency conflicts and the financing frictions views of corporate cash policy.

This paper examines a board's decision to hire a star CEO and analyzes the consequences of this decision for firm performance. We propose a new methodology to identify star CEOs by analyzing the texts contained in 18,240 Wall Street Journal news articles. Unlike previous measures, our new metric accounts for the time series variations of executives’ visibility as well as how favorably these executives are portrayed in the business press. The proposed measure indicates that boards with short industry tenure or busy boards are more likely to select a star CEO. Consistent with previous evidence, firms that hire star CEOs perform subsequently worse than firms that hire non-star CEOs. However, in contrast to previous work, we show that this underperformance is attributable to boards with short industry tenure or busy boards, rather than the inabilities of star CEOs. Furthermore, our event studies of stock market reactions to hiring news imply that investors prefer star CEOs selected by boards with long industry tenure. Our work contributes to the literature by offering insights into how board composition affects firm performance.