资产价格波动会影响企业净资产，尤其在金融危机期间，会恶化企业资产负债表，提高企业融资成本和降低企业资金需求，引起投资和产量萎缩，实体经济下滑。本文得到的宏观经验事实是资产价格波动单向影响实体经济波动，为此构建资产价格波动影响企业投资行为的微观理论模型，并进一步提供微观经验证据。结果表明：资产价格波动通过资产负债表渠道并没有显著影响融资能力较强的企业，而只是冲击到融资能力弱的企业；实施新会计规则之后，资产价格波动借助资产负债表渠道影响企业投资行为的效果更明显。政策内涵是：公允价值会计规则会借助资产负债表放大资产价格波动效应，需要通过资本缓冲、前瞻性储备和更加透明的信息披露来解决；扩张性宏观经济政策需考虑私人经济主体是否具有资金需求，纳入资产负债表信息到政府经济政策框架中。

提出了一种新的评价方法，用于评价波动率模型。该方法兼顾了模型拟合样本的能力和模型的平滑性，而避免了经典的评价方法只考虑模型拟合样本能力的缺陷。新方法有利于投资者挑选出交易成本相对较低的和风险对冲能力相对较强的波动率模型。实证例子是估计中国股票市场的行业时变风险：对三大类波动率模型进行了评价，并指出评价方法或标准的选择直接影响金融市场风险估计或预测的评价结果。

本文以制度经济学的审视角度，深入分析了金融监管提示的必要性、可能性与现实性，并结合当前银行业监管的实际，对监管提示的层次、顺序、内容等进行了写实性描述，进一步研究了金融监管提示制度的功能效应，比较分析现行不完整提示制度的不足，从而得出“灵活的金融监管提示制度有利于银行业的发展、效率和稳定，从而科学地推动社会经济的发展”的结论。

Using a proprietary dataset collected through a survey targeted to VC funds in Mainland China, we examine the impact of constructing VCs’ firms portfolio from industrial organization perspective on investment efficiency, portfolio size and structure of profit sharing. The results indicate that constructing VCs’ firms portfolio from industrial organization perspective improves investment efficiency because it reduces over investment and increases investment return. Moreover, it also further explains the disparities of VC’s portfolio size and structure of profit sharing between Mainland China and Western Countries. Additional tests provide evidence to suggest that the government assistance to VC industry has obvious political objectives in Mainland China.

This paper studies idiosyncratic risk of new ventures. An option-based model of a new venture with multistage investments and jumps is developed. Our model ex- plains (1) why new ventures?idiosyncratic volatility eventually decreases as they clear R&D investment stages and become mature ?rms ?the stage-clearing e¤ect; (2) the negative relation between jumps in value and subsequent idiosyncratic volatility ?the jump e¤ect; (3) the dynamics of idiosyncratic volatility under di¤erent schedules of staged venture capital investments; and (4) the e¤ect of di¤erent schedules of staged investments on ?rm valuation with the presence of jumps. Empirically, we develop a generalized Markov-Switching EARCH model to simultaneously capture structural changes in ?rms?idiosyncratic volatility and the relation between jumps and idiosyn- cratic volatility. Using a hand-collected dataset of early-stage biotech ?rms, we ?nd empirical evidence supporting the jump e¤ect and the stage-clearing e¤ect described by our model.

We empirically examine the role of venture capital in VC-backed listed firms in Mainland China using the data of SME Board of ShenZhen Stock Exchange from June 2004 to June 2007. Contrary to the evidence from the US, we find that the VC-backed firms in Mainland China experience higher underpricing, which is not owing to the lower pricing in the primary market but the investors in the second market are too optimistic about the prospect of the VC-backed firms. In addition, the pre- and post-IPO operating performance of VC-backed firms is significantly better than that of nonVC-backed ones. Our finding supports the monitoring hypothesis that the VC-backed firms perform better than nonVC-backed firms before and after IPO for the monitoring of VC funds. Moreover, it is found that high-reputation VC-backed firms have a better post-IPO operating and market performance compared to low-reputation VC-backed ones, which is consistent with the grandstanding hypothesis proposed by Gompers (1996). However, there is no evidence to support the certification hypothesis proposed by Megginson and Weiss (1990) that VC-backed firms have a lower underpricing in the IPO performance.

Through four rounds of total coverage survey on VC funds in Mainland China , we received 41 VC fund samples. This paper, we empirically test the relation among the size (number) of VC fund portfolios, entrepreneurs’ (enterprise management teams’) profit shares and exogenous factors and find: (1) the portfolio size of a VC fund significantly varies non-monotonically with entrepreneurs’ profit shares, the number of venture firms is first increasing when entrepreneurs’ profit share is low and then decreasing when it is high; (2) entrepreneurs’ profit share is significantly positive related with the number of venture firms in a VC fund; (3) the government-sponsored VCs invest more venture firms but retain less profit shares .

本文研究风险投资机构背景对于投资策略、公司IPO 抑价、股票市场回报率以及公 司治理的影响。研究发现：相对于政府和民营背景风险投资机构，外资背景和混合型背景风 险投资机构会采取更加谨慎的投资策略；从所投资的公司来看，相对于政府背景风险投资支 持的公司，外资和混合型背景风险投资支持的公司IPO 抑价率较低，股票市场异常回报率 较高，民营背景投资的与政府背景投资的无显著差异，而且只要有外资背景参与投资的公司 相对于那些没有外资背景参与投资的公司IPO 抑价率更低，回报率更高；从公司治理的角 度来看，外资背景风险投资参与支持的公司有较大的董事会规模、较低的大股东持股比例和 较高比例的专业化董事。

We examine how a firm designs capital allocation and managerial compensation schemes to motivate a privately informed manager to (i) engage in innovative activity to search for, and (ii) guide the firm to invest in, a new investment project. We show that relative to the first-best, the firm allocates too little capital and provides too few incentives for the manager to expend innovative effort; the manager may violate the NPV rule by investing the allocated capital in a project with negative productivity. We provide several novel predictions that help identify firms that are likely to innovate and managers who are likely to follow the NPV rule. We also show that uncertainty and incentive pay can be positively related.

The relationship between capital structure and product market competition is recently a new research field and hot topic in the study of capital structure. Focuses on Chinese state-controlled and private listed companies, this paper concludes that private listed companies have greater competition advantages than the state-controlled listed companies through empirical study of the relationship between capital structure and product market competition. The policy implication of this conclusion is that favorable capital structure helps to improve the corporate governance structure and strengthen the product market competition advantage of the listed companies. To improve the quality of Chinese listed companies, Chinese government is strongly recommended to take powerful measures to promote the process of privatization and economic performance of the economic entities.