作为国际项目融资的行业基准，赤道原则集中体现了商业金融机构致力于金融业可持续发展的愿 景。赤道原则目前已经被越来越多的商业金融机构所采用，也正日渐成为我国商业银行“绿色信贷”的国 际化标准。本文在简介赤道原则运行机理的基础上，分析赤道原则的内在缺陷与执行困难，既为进一步修 订和完善赤道原则提供理论依据，也为赤道原则金融机构能够切实执行自我承诺提供有价值的建议。

本文在总结利率政策调控效果的研究文献的基础上，提出不同市场态势（牛市和 熊市）下投资者会产生异质性预期，且对股票市场的短期价格波动产生决定性影响。通过理 论推导和实证检验，本文发现由于市场态势不同导致的投资者异质性预期的确存在，并对货 币政策效果产生显著影响：牛市中投资者的预期会受到货币政策的同向加强：提高利率反而 导致股价加速上升，降息反而在短期导致股价下跌；熊市中投资者预期则表现出政策依赖： 加息加强悲观预期导致股价加速下跌，降息则缓解股价下跌。因此建议使用利率政策调控经 济时，一定要考虑不同市场态势下投资者的预期在调控传导机制中所起的作用，根据不同的 市场态势选用适当的调控逻辑和政策手段。

美国次贷危机是信用的危机；并因为全球经济的一体化而导致空前未有的全球性经济危机；因此，克服这一由资本决定的生产与生活方式导致的整体性危机只能依靠人类共同提供的无偿效用 —— 全球性公共产品的持续增长并达致和谐，而这一产品的提供有赖于人类理性的普遍与一致。

本文运用统计数据对流动性过剩这一经济现象的宏观表现、形成原因及对经济领域 的影响进行讨论，进而重点探讨了在流动性过剩条件下中国货币政策传导机制的效率。在此基础上，通 过相关经济变量，分析了我国现行货币政策的有效性。研究结果表明，流动性过剩会影响货币政策传导 的效率，从而降低货币政策的有效性。我国货币政策对实现货币政策四大最终目标的作用效果有所不同； 在新的经济形势下，有必要对货币政策本身及其相关的政策体制作相应的调整。文章最后对在新的经济 环境下提高我国货币政策效率进行初步的探索。

新一轮经济复苏的刺激政策绝大多数来自银行资金的支持。短期内商业银行面临增资扩 股的需要。如何从股权结构的安排上来促进其治理优化，从而防范其冒险行为产生显得更为 重要。我们利用沪深两市上市的 14 家商业银行的面板数据实证研究商业银行冒险行为的内 在动力机制与治理机制。结果表明，第一大股东股权越集中，银行倾向于承担较高的风险。 当控股股东的终极控制权大于其在分红当中现金流权时，银行倾向于更大的冒险行为。而且 银行的冒险行为倾向于推高不良贷款率。因此， 如何在银行业的变革中关注股权结构的安排， 特别是股东的终极控制权与现金流权的分离，有助于进一步防范商业银行的风险。

This study examines for evidence of peer effects in the trading decisions of individual investors from Mainland China, a country whose cultural and social structures are vastly different from those of Western countries. Cultural differences, as widely documented, play a significant role in social interactions and word-of-mouth behavior. In contrast to U.S. studies, we find robust evidence that the trading decisions of Chinese investors are influenced, via word-ofmouth, by those of their peers who maintain brokerage accounts at the same branch, but not by those whose accounts are maintained at another branch located in the same city.

政治关系影响了公司价值，但对于如何影响公司价值还知之甚少。本文从资本结构与产品市场竞争关系的角度检验政治关系如何影响公司价值。本文使用1998-2007年中国上市公司中制造行业的公司数据检验公司政治关系对资本结构与产品市场竞争关系的影响，以及不同融资约束下这种影响的差异。本文发现政治关系提高了产品市场竞争对资本结构的敏感性。在使用两种不同的融资约束划分标准后，本文发现不同融资约束下公司政治关系的价值不同，对于存在融资约束的公司，公司政治关系更深地影响了产品市场竞争对资本结构的敏感性，因此具有更高的价值。本文的证据支持了政治关系有助于公司获取融资资源从而提高公司价值的观点。

本文构建了全流通背景下的大股东行为模型，对大股东行为转变的关键因素进行了分析。运用大股东与其控股上市公司关联交易数据，实证检验了股改后大股东行为转变及其对公司绩效的影响。研究表明，发生关联交易的上市公司交易前具有较高的股权集中度和较低的市盈率，交易后业绩显著提升。与股改前上市公司的关联交易相比，股改后的关联交易并非为获取再融资资格，大股东通过关联交易侵害上市公司利益的行为明显下降。股改后关联交易规模与控股股东持股比例正相关，与交易前上市公司的业绩和市盈率负相关，表明股价收益成为影响大股东行为的重要变量。对上市公司业绩的多元回归分析显示，公司绩效与关联交易规模、交易前大股东持股比例显著正相关。因此，实证结果验证了我们的模型：全流通下大股东行为模式发生了明显转变，即从股改前的侵害上市公司利益转变为股改后支持上市公司发展。

We investigate how social capital in both the home and host countries affects foreign direct investment in high tech firms. Difference in the social capital (trustworthiness) among provinces of the host country, China, is shown to matter in foreign companies’ choice of location, ownership type, and investment in R&D. We find that the provinces in China characterized by high levels of social capital attract more foreign investment. We also find that the likelihood of foreign investors establishing joint ventures with local partners increases with the level of social capital prevailing in that area. Foreign high tech firms conduct more R&D investment and hire more R&D personnel in high-social-capital provinces. Moreover, foreign-owned firms located in high-socialcapital areas keep improving their intensity of R&D investments over time. By contrast, in lowsocial- capital areas, foreign high tech firms do not improve and actually diminish their R&D intensity over time. We further show that the social capital in the country of origin (the home country) of a foreign company also affects its investment decisions in China. Cultural difference between the home country and the host country magnifies the foreign company’s weighing of the regional social capital difference in the host country; foreign companies from higher uncertainty avoidance home country prefer to invest in regions with higher social capital in the host country; on the other hand, kinship decreases the need to deal with strangers, and thus reduces the reliance on the provincial social capital.

This paper examines the effects of the agency costs on firm value in 156 Chinese publicly listed companies with individual ultimate owners between 2002 and 2007. The ultimate owners’ agency costs, as measured by the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights, are shown to negatively and significantly affect firm value, as measured by the market-to-book ratio of assets (an approximation of Tobin’s Q). As the agency costs grow, the stock returns decrease around the connected party transaction announcements, and firms are more likely to engage in value-destroying connected party transactions. These effects are particularly strong for some types of connected party transactions, notably loan guarantees and direct fund transfers. Further, as the agency costs grow, the firms violate laws more frequently and the nature of legal violations becomes more severe. Evidence from an exogenous policy shock, the non-tradable share reform confirms that higher agency costs cause more unfavorable stock market reactions to connected party transaction announcements.