In this paper we argue that ine? cient bank loans can reduce the value of borrowing ?rms when the expropriation of minority share- holders by controlling shareholders is a major concern. Using data from Chinese ?nancial market, we ?nd that bank loan announcements generate signi?cantly negative abnormal returns to borrowing ?rms. The share devaluation following loan announcements are concentrated in ?rms that are perceived to be more vulnerable to controlling share- holders?expropriation. In addition, we ?nd weak evidence that bank quality mitigates the negative market reactions.

This paper studies the determinants of cash holdings and the marginal value of cash in China’s share-issued privatized firms from 1994 – 2007. We first analyze the effects of firm characteristics on corporate cash holdings and find empirical evidence that is largely consistent with U.S. and other international evidence in previous studies. Specifically, we find that smaller, more profitable and high growth firms hold more cash. Debt and net working capital are negatively related to cash holdings, suggesting that debt and working capital may be treated as cash substitutes. We also find that state ownership is negatively related to cash holdings. Firms with high state ownership are less financially constrained in that they have better access to credit in the mostly state-owned bank lending environment. We further examine the cross-sectional variations in the marginal value of corporate cash holdings. We find that the marginal value of cash declines with higher level of cash and higher level of debt, consistent with evidence in U.S. firms. Our most important finding is that the marginal value of cash declines as the equity ownership retained by the state increases. For the average firm in our sample, the value of an additional dollar is $0.94. An additional dollar is valued $0.33-$0.47 higher in firms with zero percent state ownership than in firms with 50 percent or higher state ownership. This difference is both statistically and economically significant.

Financing of and investing in R&D are prone to risks of appropriation by competitors, information asymmetry, and agency problems. Although legal protection of intellectual property (IP) rights at the national level is necessary to encourage investing in R&D, we show that the effective enforcement at the local level is critical. We focus on the impact of provincial level IP rights enforcement on the financing of and investing in R&D, using a unique and rich database of high technology firms. These firms are located in twenty-eight provinces/districts throughout China. The enforcement of IP rights differs at the provincial level, although the firms are under the same set of national and international laws. To identify the causal effect of provincial level IP rights enforcement on firm behavior, we use several approaches to deal with the issues of endogeneity, reverse causality, and simultaneity. Controlling for provincial institutional factors such as economic development, banking system development, legal system performance, and local government corruption, we find that the enforcement of IP rights positively affects firms’ ability to acquire new external debt (including formal and informal financing) and external equity. Firms in provinces with better enforcement of IP rights invest more funding in R&D, generate more innovation patents, and produce more sales from new products. We also find better enforcement of IP rights encourages financing of and investment in R&D in foreign and ethnic joint ventures. The results confirm that enforcement of IP rights matters even in China. Our paper provides firm level evidence that financing of and investing in R&D are the channels that link enforcement of IP rights and economic growth.

The Chinese market is characterized by state-controlled and closely held firms as well as significant differences in economic development and legal structures at the provincial level and corporate regulations that require firms seeking external financing to show a history of dividend payment. Using a sample of listed Chinese firms, we investigate the likelihood of paying dividends, different forms of dividends and market reactions to various dividend announcements. We find that profitable, low leverage, high cash holding, stronger shareholder protection firms, and those firms with state ownership prior to listing and undertaking subsequent equity offerings are more likely to pay dividends and cash dividends, in particular. Firms appear to cater to investor demands in setting dividend policy; hence firms with a large proportion of non-tradable shares are more likely to pay cash dividends. Consistent with the use of stock dividends to attract the attention of analysts, we also find that growing firms with high levels of retained earnings and greater investment in fixed assets pay stock dividends and these firms’ dividend announcements are associated with significant positive market reactions and increased analyst following.

国有股权对公司绩效的影响，不应简单以公司业绩水平高低评价，公司的风险特 征同样重要。本文就经济危机时期，国有股权与公司的风险缓冲能力进行实证检验，发现在 经济危机时期，相对于非国有公司，受到适度经济冲击的国有公司具有更大的风险缓冲能力。 这种作用主要是因为，相对于非国有公司，受到适度经济冲击的国有公司不仅没有承担沉重 的员工负担具有融资便利优势，而且具有融资便利优势，从而国有股权可以提高受到适度冲 击公司的风险缓冲能力。本文为进一步认识国有股权与公司绩效的关系提供了新的视角和证 据。

Numerous studies have focused on the theoretical and empirical aspects of corporate capital structure since the 1960s. As a new branch of capital structure, however, debt maturity structure has not yet received as much attention as the debt-equity choice. We use the existing theories of corporate debt maturity to investigate the potential determinants of debt maturity of the Chinese listed firms. In addition to the traditional estimation methods, the system-GMM technique is used to explicitly control for the endogeneity problem. We find that the size of the firm, asset maturity and liquidity have significant effects in extending the maturity of debt employed by Chinese companies. The amount of collateralized assets and growth opportunities also tend to be important. However, proxies for a firm’s quality and effective tax rate apparently report mixed or unexpected results. Debt market and equity market conditions are also examined in relation to corporate loan maturity. The system-GMM results show that market factors seem to influence debt maturity decisions. Finally, corporate equity ownership structure has also been found to have some impact on debt maturity mix.

This paper investigates pay dispersion and its effects on firm performance in China’s listed firms. Due to weak investor protection and an inefficient legal system, China is expected to have a lower level of corporate governance. In this weak institutional environment, we argue that awarding sufficient power and high pay to CEOs is helpful to increase firm performance. Using data from 2002 to 2007, we find that pay dispersion is related to tournament incentives and agency factors. Importantly, we find evidence that pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance which is consistent with our primary hypothesis. In addition, the relation is more positive when the firm is controlled by the state. Our results are robust to corrections for endogeneity between pay dispersion and firm performance and to several alternative measures of pay dispersion and firm performance.

Applying the principle of the bonding theory, this study examined the relationship between corporate governance practice and performance of Chinese firms that are listed in the major international stock exchanges, including NASDAQ, New York, Hong Kong, Singapore and London AIM markets, and further investigated whether the Chinese firms that adopted the corporate governance mechanisms of the stock exchanges where they are listed would outperform those of firms listed locally in the Chinese stock exchanges that operates in a weak enforcement mechanism environment. Hypotheses are tested using panel data analysis. The results suggest that the Chinese cross-listings exhibit bonding premium only in U.S. markets, while those non-cross-listed Chinese firms demonstrate better firm performance than those listed in London, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Further, the results reveal that for all the cross-listed Chinese firms, profitability rate and the leverage ratio play a positive role in improving the firms’ performance. The adoptions of Big Four auditing firms and international accounting standard as a must-to-do corporate governance mechanism regulated by the host stock exchange has less effects on firm’s performance. The study suggests that merely borrowing a corporate governance mechanism does not guarantee the improvement of corporate governance of a firm, and therefore to its firm performance; rather, a firm’s own background and country effects also matter.

本文基于La Porta等(1999)终极控制权理论，在非线性框架下研究终极控股股东控制权、现金流权、公司治理与掏空问题。研究结果表明，终极控股股东控制权水平与掏空行为有显著正向关系，且当控制人为政府时尤为明显，而现金流权无法抑制掏空行为；管理层薪酬的增加及政府干预的减少可以有效抑制掏空，而其他公司治理机制对掏空行为没有显著抑制作用。进一步考虑不同水平下控制权和现金流的影响，发现在绝对控制权水平下，控制权的掏空效应尤为明显；高现金流权可以有效抑制掏空，而低现金流权不具有抑制效应。本文的研究加深了对控股股东持股、掏空与公司治理的认识，对进一步完善公司治理机制，保护投资者利益有一定的指导意义。

本文以我国民营上市公司为样本，分析有政治联系的企业是否能够比无政治联系的企业获得更多的财政补贴。结果发现，有政治联系的民营企业确实能够获得更多的财政补贴；而且在制度环境越差的地区，政治联系的这种补贴获取效应越强。进一步的检验结果发现，有政治联系的民营企业获得的财政补贴与企业绩效和社会绩效负相关；而无政治联系的民营企业获得的财政补贴与企业绩效和社会绩效正相关。本文的研究结果支持民营企业建立政治联系的寻租假设，即民营企业通过建立政治联系来俘获掌握着财政补贴支配权的地方政府官员，进而得到更多的财政补贴收入；在制度约束弱的地区，这种寻租行为更加盛行。就地方政府的公共政策而言，本文的研究结果意味着，地方政府基于政治联系的财政补贴支出会导致整个社会稀缺资源配置的扭曲，降低社会的整体福利水平。