目前大家对全球经济失衡的讨论很多，但基本上都局限在静态的分析层面。本文试图从动态的视角对经常账户失衡的产生根源、福利后果以及调节机制进行经济学意义上的诠释。具体而言，我们首先从经常账户失衡的现状出发，借助开放经济下跨时均衡的动态分析框架，考察影响消费和投资行为的关键因素以及世界利率的决定，然后探讨了经常账户的跨时变化以及由生产率提高引起的国际利益分配问题。最后，本文还将模型的理论结果与当前的现实相联系，并提出了相应的政策建议。

Wurgler（JFE 2000）发现在资本配置越有效的金融市场中，公司层面的信息含量越丰富。然而，Morck 等（JFE 2000）发现在新兴资本市场中公司层面信息的含量很低。在40个样本国家中，中国股市面临的该问题的严重程度列居世界第二。本文以中国上市公司为样本，实证检验发现在控制了相关的公司特征和同时控制了公司固定效应及时间固定效应后，公司的盈余管理水平显著地与公司股价中公司层面信息的含量负相关。另外，我们还发现国有股权的出现也会降低公司层面信息的含量。此外，2007年实施的新会计准则明显降低了我国上市公司的盈余管理程度。本文中的发现说明盈余管理是解释在以中国为代表的新兴资本市场中，公司层面信息含量低的重要原因之一。因此，提高上市公司信息披露的准确性和透明度可以增强投资者保护，使资本在证券市场上得到有效的配置与利用，从而促进经济的长期发展。

This paper investigates whether Chinese equity investors price major earnings components correctly. Total earnings are decomposed into core and non-core earnings according to a classification framework of Chinese accounting principles. The results show that, as expected, core earnings are more persistent than non-core earnings. Most importantly, the market underestimates (overestimates) the value implications of changes in current core (non-core) earnings for future earnings changes. Therefore, future stock returns can be predicted based on the information that is contained in the components of current earnings. Both portfolio tests and regression analysis generate economically significant abnormal returns that are robust to sensitivity checks.

Using a 2004 Chinese securities regulation that required equity offering proposals and other major corporate decisions to seek the separate approval of minority shareholders, we empirically test the effect of a regulatory increase in minority shareholders’ control over corporate decisions on shareholder value. While the overall stock market reaction to the announcement of the regulation is insignificant, the stock market reaction is more positive for firms with higher institutional (especially mutual fund) block ownership and more negative for firms with higher individual block ownership. The regulation helps deter management from submitting value decreasing equity offering proposals, especially for firms with higher mutual fund block ownership. In addition, value reducing equity offering proposals submitted in the post-regulation period are more likely to be vetoed in firms with higher block ownership of institutional and individual minority shareholders. Overall, our results suggest that the 2004 regulation increases shareholder value, especially in firms with higher mutual fund block ownership.

This paper investigates the value effect of large investors through their impact on corporate investment policy using a sample of listed firms in the Chinese stock market where large shareholdings and concentrated ownership are a norm. We find that the impact of capital expenditures on firm value is closely related to the level of large shareholdings (non-tradable or state shareholdings). Capital expenditures are negatively associated with firm value if firms are controlled by entrenched large shareholders. Although there is a general tendency of over-investment, the negative impact of over-investment is cancelled out if firms are controlled by incentive-aligned large shareholders. We also find that, the incentive-alignment effect of large investors is stronger in scenarios where agency conflicts are more intensified. Our findings suggest that capital investment is an important channel through which the value effect of large investors is achieved.

This study examines the relation between political connections and investment efficiency in China. For listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), we find that the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities is significantly weaker for those with than without political connections. Politically connected SOEs over-invest significantly more than non-connected SOEs. This negative impact of political connections is primarily observed in SOEs controlled by local governments and/or in SOEs without sufficient investment opportunities. However, for private enterprises, investment expenditure is significantly more sensitive to investment opportunities and over-investment is significantly less in politically connected firms than in those without such connections. We further show that over-investment reduces firm value across the board for both SOEs and private enterprises. Taken together, our findings suggest that political connections distort investment behavior, reduce investment efficiency, and damage firm value in listed SOEs in China, but for listed private enterprises, political connections improve investment efficiency, reduce over-investment, and consequently enhance firm value.

Until recently, Chinese companies publicly listed in domestic stock exchanges had two classes of stock: tradable and non-tradable shares. These two classes of stock had the same voting, cash flow, and all other legal rights except that non-tradable shares cannot be transferred at the open markets. From 2005 to mid-2007, Chinese government completed the ownership reform, so-called the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR), to convert all non-tradable shares into tradable shares. Under this reform process, the holders of non-tradable shares had to negotiate with those of tradable shares to determine how much liquidity premium, or the compensation ratio, non-tradable shareholders have to pay to tradable shareholders in order to obtain the liquidity right. This paper starts with a theoretical model to identify the fundamental factors, including price discount before and after the SSSR reform, the percentage of non-tradable shares in total shares, the volatility of tradable share price, and the lockup period, that should determine the compensation ratio. We show that those factors except price discount before the reform are statistically significant in determining the compensation ratio proposed by non-tradable shareholders. We further show that the agency problems also reveal themselves in the compensation ratios. Specifically, when a firm is controlled by a governmental agency, the compensation is higher. However, the compensation is lower when more concentrated in the top ten holders, especially when shares are held by mutual funds. Thus, the evidence is consistent with the notion that the agency problem exists in China’s fund managers. Finally, we show that the existence of agency problems also reduce the importance of fundamental factors in determining the compensation ratios.

本文以2002-2007年我国“系族企业”所涉及的280家/年的上市成员企业为研究样本，通过对其内部资本市场效率进行的实证检验，我们发现：从总体上看，市场化环境好的地区，其内部资本市场是有效率的。相比于非国有的系族企业，国有系族的内部资本市场是无效率的。即使是在金融业市场化程度高的地区，国有系族企业的内部资本市场也是无效率的。而国有系族企业内部，由地方政府控制的系族企业的内部资本市场是无效率的。

This paper empirically investigates the determinants of financing decisions in Chinese listed firms, using 3,196 firm-year observations from the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period 2001–2005. Thereby, we investigate the effects of differences in institutions across Chinese provinces and municipalities, and compare the financing choices of state-owned and private-controlled enterprises. We find that a better legal environment negatively affects the debt ratio and the proportion of debt that consists of bank loans in SOEs as well as private-controlled enterprises. Conversely, regional banking development positively influences these two variables. If anything, these effects of the rule of law and regional banking development on leverage are stronger for private-controlled firms. SOEs have lower debt ratios in regions with better stock market access, while private-controlled firms rely less on bank loans in regions with more government intervention in business. Finally, we document that SOEs’ overall debt ratio and composition of debt are comparable to those of private-controlled firms.

We investigate the role of managers’ country of origin in leverage decisions using data on foreign joint ventures in China. By focusing on foreign joint ventures in a single country, we are able to hold constant the financing environment, eliminate the effects of formal institutions in the foreign managers’ home country, and consequently reveal the effects of informal institutions such as national culture on corporate finance decisions. Using cultural values of embeddedness, mastery, and uncertainty avoidance to explain country of origin effects, we find that national culture has significant explanatory power in the financial leverage decisions of foreign joint ventures in China. Country-level variation is evident in capital structure and appears to work through choices of firm characteristics, industry affiliation, ownership structure, and region of investment.