摘 要：股票市场和债券市场变量之间的溢出效应是近来金融学研究的一个重要课题。本文实证研究了我国股票市场和债券市场流动性之间的溢出效应，提供了关于我国股票和债券市场流动性一体化的证据。研究发现：首先，我国股票市场和债券市场流动性之间存在显著领先滞后关系并互为因果关系，符合“flight to liquidity”；其次，宏观环境的变化对两个市场的流动性会产生显著的影响；更为重要的是，宏观环境对市场流动性的影响很大程度上是通过另一市场的传导而间接的发生作用。

This study examines the effects of different dimensions of financing constraints (financial market development, governance environments, ownership control and other firm-specific characteristics) on cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) for all takeover bids announced in nine East Asian economies from 1998 to 2005. The results of logistic regressions verify that the extent of stock market and governance developments encourages cross-border M&As in this region. The results also indicate that firm-specific financing constraints, except the ownership control variables, reduce the occurrence of cross-border M&As related to domestic M&As. Although family- and state-controlled firms have better access to external financing, they are reluctant to risk diluting their management control and thus prefers less cross-border M&As to domestic M&As. This study enhances the empirical studies of the financing constraint-investment relation based on the market imperfection theory in corporate finance theories. Information asymmetry is the main reason causing the market imperfection and leading to financing constraints to corporate investments. This study, by examining the relation over nine East Asian firms, thus provides an understanding of how such a relation fits in the firms in countries where information asymmetry is high.

本文借鉴Wugler(2000)提出的回归系数法测算了中国上市公司在2001-2007年期间微观层面的资本配置效率，并研究了2004-2005年期间的金融自由化改革措施对上市公司资本配置效率的影响。结果显示改革后上市公司的总体资本配置效率在短期内并没有立即提高，而是出现了暂时下降。进一步分行业研究表明，制造业资本配置效率的下降尤其显著。本文研究表明中国的金融自由化改革对上市公司资本配置效率的影响可能存在“长期往上但短期往下”的“J”效应。

We examine the effects of government ownership on the change in valuation and the uses of proceeds of firms after they raise equity funds – the time when the agency problems of free cash flows are larger. We find that investors generally react more negatively to an equity offering decision by a company whose government ownership is higher. Firms generally increase cash dividend payments after offering equity, and firms with extremely high government ownership increase cash dividends more than other firms do. Further analysis shows that investors react more negatively to an offering decision if they expect the issuer to increase cash dividends post-offering. Our study suggests agency problems exist in equity offerings in China, and firms tunnel resources by offering shares to the public followed by an increase in cash dividends.

Using the data of privately-owned firms in China’s transition economy, we examine the effects of soft budget constraint on the expropriation of minority shareholders. We find that, compared to small firms, large firms have higher bank loans and are more likely to get government subsidies. However, large firms show higher divergence between cash flow and control rights, more fund occupation by controlling shareholders, and lower market valuation. Moreover these differences between large and small firms become particularly pronounced when the firms operate in the provinces with poorer fiscal conditions. These findings suggest that soft budget constraint can mitigate the expropriation costs of controlling shareholders, and subsequently deteriorates the expropriation of minority shareholders.

家族企业治理是世界范围内讨论的问题，对中国这个家族文化传统最为悠久和深厚的国 度而言，研究家族企业有着特殊的理论与实践意义。本文就中外学术界对于家族企业治 理的研究进行了系统的总结和整理，对2003 年至2006 年我国家族企业上市公司的公司 治理结构和融资方式进行了统计学和个案实证研究，在研究中我们发现：家族企业上市 公司董事长总经理两职状态与资产负债率、长期负债率呈负相关；家族上市公司的股权 集中程度与负债融资负相关；家族企业在股权比较集中的情况下更倾向于股权融资，而 在股权比较分散的情况下更倾向于负债融资。

本文采取理论分析与实证研究相结合的技术路线，对我国中小企业板上市公司上市前财务数 据进行统计分析。通过研究我们得到结论，我国中小企业上市前偏重内部融资和债权融资，并且债 权融资比重不断上升，而股权融资相对比重较小，总的融资顺序不完全符合优序融资理论。本文意 在通过对成长性良好的中小板企业上市前的融资行为的研究，分析影响企业选择不同融资结构的因 素，给其它中小企业融资提供参考，并且总结改善中小企业融资问题的途径。

以中国制度环境为背景，研究了国有企业的收购与反收购动机。通过构建 企业收购与反收购模型，考察了管理者控制权私人收益对并购动机的影响，结果发现 如果政府干预补偿了管理者的控制权私人收益，则管理者越有动机进行反收购；如果 政府干预降低了控制权私人收益，则管理者没有反收购动机。模型还发现管理者持股 比率、公司规模、自然世界状态均对企业并购行为有显著影响。

This article uses a contingent-claims valuation method to compare debt financing, investment, and risk choices of a firm adopting the second-best strategy with those of a firm adopting the first-best strategy. The former bears the agency costs, as conjectured by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977), because it chooses suboptimal investment timing and risk levels, while the latter is able to avoid them. For plausible parameter values, we find that the second-best firm that takes on more debt will under-invest and bear excessive risk. We also find that the agency costs of debt are 15.8% of the first-best firm value, which is higher than that found by Leland (1998) and Mauer and Sarkar (2005).

通过研究影响房地产市场需求的主要因素，特别引入不同年龄段人口数这一因素，建立了基于灰色理论的房地产市场需求影响因素分析模型，对影响全国房地产市场需求的各因素进行实证分析，从而得出人口年龄结构在影响房地产市场需求中的重要性。并进一步分析人口年龄结构对需求的影响机理。