Based on the brief analysis of the theory, we analyze the governance effect of the dynamic allocation of control rights and contingent transfer mechanism through an experiment and show that the dynamic allocation of control rights and contingent transfer mechanism are benefit for limiting the manager’s private benefits and protecting the investors’ return. While, the more the control transfers, the less effort the manager spends in private benefits and the more in the firm’s value. We also show that given more perfect external information revealed and monitoring mechanism, the governance effect of the dynamic allocation of control rights and contingent transfer mechanism will be improved more notable.

劳动生产率是影响汇率的重要因素是巴拉萨—萨缪尔森效应的结论。传统巴萨效应似乎难以解释我国的实际情况。国内外学者对中国的研究都有所不足。本文从巴萨效应的理论模型推导出发，比较不同模型形式采用最优计量模型。基于1978年～2004年的时间序列统计数据为例，建立VAR模型，运用协整分析、误差修正模型、脉冲响应、方差分解等方法分析人民币兑美元实际汇率与中美两国两部门生产率之间的关系。检验结果表明巴萨假说理论也能解释我国实际汇率走势变化的情况。服务业生产率对实际汇率的贡献更大。提高服务业份额和加快服务业生产率有利于缓解我国汇率的升值压力。

本文重新考察了Elbadawi（1994）模型中吸收率的决定因素，认为Elbadawi（1994）模型只是从需求角度对吸收率的决定因素进行了论证。因此，本文从供给角度运用Balassa-Samulson模型对Elbadawi（1994）模型作了改进，引入了生产率因素，解决了吸收率的内生决定机制。在此基础上，根据均衡分析的思路，本文得出了均衡吸收率的决定因素，从而证明了相对生产率与Elbadawi（1994）的相容性，为均衡汇率的测算提供了理论基础。同时，本文基于BEER通过1980-2007年的季度数据对人民币均衡实际汇率进行了测算，证实了扩展的Elbadawi（1994）相对于其它模型的优越性。

当出口在一国经济中占重要地位时，汇率调整就会对就业产生重要影响，在此过程中其传导渠道备受关注。文章构建测算传导渠道的模型，发现：人民币汇率变动通过出口需求、资源配置和效率渠道对就业产生影响，其中出口需求渠道的作用最强，效率渠道的作用次之，资源配置渠道的效应最弱。但资源配置渠道的影响效应为正，即汇率升值通过资源配置能带动就业；而出口需求和效率渠道的影响效应为负，即汇率升值将通过出口需求和效率变动减少就业。文章据此提出在当前金融危机冲击下，我国应采取何措施缓解实际汇率变动对我国就业的影响。

汇率和物价是开放经济中最为核心的经济变量，同时二者之间又存在密切的联系。本文采用2001年1月—2009年1月的相关数据，针对汇率波动对进口价格指数、工业品出厂价格指数及消费价格指数的传导效应进行实证检验。研究结果表明：人民币汇率波动对于价格的传导是不完全，其中进口价格对于汇率的波动反应较为敏感，而工业品出厂价格与消费价格对于汇率的波动反应则相对缓慢，特别是无论从长短期的传导效果来看，汇率波动对于消费价格的影响都较为微弱。

本文基于1994～2005年人民币外汇市场制度特征，构建了一个央行频繁干预情形下的人民币汇率决定的市场微观结构模型。该模型发现：即使宏观基本面没有出现变化，汇率也依然会发生波动，指令流的变动是短期汇率波动的根本推动力。指令流通过交易商层面的短暂性资产组合效应和市场层面的持久性资产组合效应对汇率波动产生影响。我国中央银行为了维护日内涨跌幅限制下外汇市场有充分的流动性，必须被动地入市干预，中央银行的干预量由汇率决定模型内生决定。本文为人民币外汇市场参与者和监管当局初步打开了人民币汇率形成的“黑匣子”。

当前中国经济外需紧缩、出口受阻的现实使汇率变动的贸易效应再次成为理论界和政策界关注的热点问题。基于1981-2006年SITC标准分类的产业数据，本文运用协整与误差修正模型对人民币汇率变化影响出口贸易结构的分析结果表明：人民币汇率变化对出口额的影响无论是长期还是短期都是显著的，且人民币汇率波动对出口分类影响存在较大差别。最后提出了进一步加快出口企业产业转型、促进内需，实现我国产业结构优化升级的对策建议。

前人在研究汇率波动对我国进出口的影响时均采用的是线性模型。然而，在不同的汇率波动幅度下，汇率的价格传递是不对称的，那么汇率对贸易收支的影响可能是非线性的。基于此，本文提出了四个假设，并利用门限面板模型对其进行了验证。结论如下：（1）汇率波动对我国出口的影响存在着门限效应。（2）汇率波动对我国进口的影响存在着门限效应。（3）汇率波动对我国贸易收支净额的影响存在着门限效应。不同的波动幅度下，进出口汇率弹性的绝对值之和是不同的。（4）汇率波动对Marshall-Lerner条件是否成立的影响不存在门限效应，进出口汇率弹性的绝对值之和始终小于1。对于本文的结论，我们还进行了解释。

Business groups organized by pyramids enable the ultimate shareholders to control a portfolio of firms with less cash requirement. Further, corporate pyramid induces an internal capital market and makes capital transfer more convenient within the pyramid. In China, the state and business groups control a large number of listed firms through pyramidal ownership structure. What role does the corporate pyramid play in firms’ investment decisions? What is its influence on firm performance? This paper investigates the capital investment and firm performance from the perspective of pyramidal ownership structure. We find that as the layers of corporate pyramid increases, the capital overinvestment declines. The negative relations between pyramid and overinvestment exist for both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs), which indicate that increasing the layers within corporate pyramid reduces the likelihood of overinvestment of the listing firm and improving investment efficiency. Moreover, we show that the effects of increasing the layers of corporate pyramid on accounting performance are different for SOEs and NSOES. For SOEs, increasing the layers of pyramid results in less government interference on the listed firm and more flexibility in operate. Therefore, increasing pyramidal layers is positively related to accounting performance. While for NSOEs, pyramiding is to build an internal capital market for the ultimate shareholder’s capital investment. Although pyramid may reduce overinvestment of the listing firm, agency costs may offset the positive effect and induce a lower accounting performance.

Like other major countries in the world, Chinese listed firms have recently experienced a dramatic rise in executive compensation. However, the arguments that could explain the same phenomena in developed countries can not be extended to the case in China. First, most Chinese listed firms are controlled by the state, thus management cannot set their own compensations through captured boards as suggested by Bebchuk and Fried (2004). Second, very few listed firms in China granted stock options and/or common stocks as part of executive compensations prior to 2005. There is little possibility that executives increased their own compensations by offering stock-option plans implied by Bolton et al. (2006). Based on the facts that the legal investor protection has been improved in China, we argue theoretically and empirically in this paper that the rise in executive compensation of Chinese listed firms can be attributed to the enhancement of legal investor protection. Since the management has to give up part of their private benefit with the improvement of legal investor protection, some private benefits extracted by management before have to be paid in an explicit way in order to make management incentive compatible. This finding partially leads to the increasing trend in executive compensations. It therefore provides a new perspective to explain why executive compensations keep rising in this emerging market where legal investor protection has been improving.