Dynamic allocation of control rights between managers and investors affects policy of the dividend and value of enterprise. The paper studied the relevant factors that affect optimal debt ratio and allocation of control right. We suggest that the enterprise decrease the debt ratio with the increase of moral hazard, liquidity risk and investors’ absolute risk aversion. With the increase of shareholder’s control right, the relationship between shareholder’s control right and managers’ moral hazard is reversed from positive to negative. The implication of the paper is moderate debt ratio may achieve the tough constraint on the managers’ decision.

资本结构对于实现商业银行的财务目标起着至关重要的作用，目前研究资本结构影响因素的理论主要有权衡理论、啄序理论和市场择时理论。本文运用Fama-MacBeth回归对中国五家商业银行的实证研究发现:中国上市商业银行存在着持续的显著的市场择时行为，这一发现能为我国商业银行的融资模式和政策制定等提供理论和实证依据。

目前，学术界对债务期限结构的研究主要是从治理角度论述内部人股权比例对债务期限结构的影响。本文根据在不同制度环境下，债务期限的决策者不同，内部人股权比例对债务期限结构的影响机制也不同这一特征，试图通过理论分析，全面探讨内部人股权比例对债务期限结构的影响机制。研究发现，在制度环境较差的情况下，债权人作为债务期限的决策者，内部人股权占比情况是债务人能否取得债权人进行长期投资的信任基础；而在制度环境相对较好的情况下，债务人是债务期限的决策者，内部人股权占比情况直接决定着内部人对债务期限选择的激励。

An asset manager trades o? the bene?ts of higher leverage against the costs of adjusting leverage in order to mitigate expected insolvency losses. We explicitly calculate optimal dynamic incentive-compatible leverage policies in simple versions of this problem.

This article provides a survey on term structure models designed for pricing fixed income securities and their derivatives

Using the daily data of Chinese 7-day repo rates from January 1, 1997 to December 31, 2008, this paper tests a variety of popular spot rate models, including single-factor diffusion, GARCH, Markov regime-switching and jump-diffusion models. We document that Chinese spot rates are subject to both market forces and administrative forces. GARCH, regime-switching and jump-diffusion models capture some important features of the dynamics of Chinese spot rates, but all models under study are overwhelmingly rejected. We further explore possible sources of model misspecification using diagnostic tests.

解决“两权分离”所导致的代理问题是投资者利益保护的重要内容，也是促进新 兴市场国家企业健康成长、保障资本市场稳健发展的必经程序。本文以2003~2005 年沪深两 市上市公司数据，考察了产品市场竞争、公司治理与代理成本之间的关系。研究结果表明， 产品市场竞争和合理的公司治理机制能够降低企业的代理成本、提升代理效率。而在不同产 品市场竞争环境下，不同公司治理机制表现出不同作用。这一研究结论意味着，在中国资本 市场公司治理整体上存在诸多问题、而相应改革进展缓慢这一既定的前提下，要想有效解决 代理问题，通过降低进入壁垒等方式加强产品市场竞争，是一可行途径。

The issues concerning the governance mechanism of board independence and its determinants remain controversial in the field of corporate finance. Particularly, the association between the properties of family power and board independence is yet comprehensively discussed and is crucial important for the financial market in Europe and Asia. We set out in our study to identify the determinants of board independence with the sample of listed firms in Taiwan from 2002 to 2006 based on the notions that independent boards play an important role to enhance corporate governance mechanism. The argument that the higher involvement of family power in the board room is harmful to the board independence is expected. The evidence shows that firms with larger size and greater opportunities of managers to consume private benefits tend to hire more independent directors. Besides, higher growth opportunities, as well as greater outsider influence provide the same positive effect on appointing independent directors. Regarding to the most important evidence, firms with greater proportion of family members on the directorship reduce the tendency to appoint more independent directors; moreover, the higher percentage of shares owned by family members provides the positive effect on board independence. However, firm age is found to have a contradictory effect to that reported in the prior studies and firms which are more seasoned do not necessarily tend to hire more independent directors. Furthermore, we also compare board structures across different firm sizes and find that board composition in small and large firms is extremely divergent. We tend to contribute to the literatures with the evidence that firms with greater influence of power of family directorship on the board meeting are burdened with severe problem of less independence of the board.

We seek to exam the government’s role on post-privatization performance in China. Using a sample of 514 firms privatized for the period from 1996 to 2002, we find evidence that the government’s role could be both positive and negative. On the one hand, firms with politically connected CEOs have significant higher return on sales (ROS) than firms with non-politically connected CEOs both before and after listing; and CEO’s political connection has a positive effect on firms with debt burden. Also there is a significantly positive relationship between the proportion of shares owned by Government Agencies and Tobin’s Q. On the other hand, firms with politically connected CEOs underperformance firms with non-politically connected CEOs in terms of ROS change after listing, and, a significantly negative relationship is found between the proportion of shares owned by Government Agencies and postprivatization ROS.

The B-share markets in China, originally for foreign investors only, were opened to local investors in 2001. This reform was expected to improve the information efficiency in B-share markets, since local investors were supposed to be better informed than foreign investors. Meanwhile, we find that, after opening to local investors, B-share price synchronicity increases, and firm-specific return variation (idiosyncratic risk) decreases. Opening B-share markets to local investors fails to improve or even deteriorates the information capitalization of B-share prices. The findings may help us understand Chinese government’s policy making. For instance, in August 2007, Chinese government announced that Chinese citizens would be allowed in public to buy and sell Hong Kong stocks through special accounts with domestic commercial banks. But after hearing opinions from different entities, Chinese government decides to infinitely postpone this policy.