摘 要： 在多期假设下，大股东对上市公司的支持和利益输送预期可以同时存在。实证结果显示，定向增发的积极宣告效应是大股东支持效应和利益输送预期的净效果。大股东支持效应能够解释19.5%的定向增发市场反应波动，而利益输送预期能够解释2.5%的反应波动。定向增发发行折价代表了大股东支持效应的规模，因此不能够衡量定向增发利益输送的大小。

Abstract This paper deals with constructing Finite Dimensional Realization (FDR) of HJM with time-invariant hump shape volatility by applying Linear Realization Theory. Two realization algorithms, Standard Observable Canonical Realization and Jordan Canonical Realization, are introduced. The equivalence between Jordan Canonical Realization algorithm and commonly adopted method of constructing FDR is shown by concrete example. At the same time, simulation results indicate that Standard Observable Canonical Realization is better choice for constructing FDR than Jordan Canonical Realization in terms of more precisely capturing the state variables.

经济人假设是现代经济学的基石之一，它是对参与经济活动的主观主体的假定。然而，这样的假定无法完全有效的解释现实复杂的经济世界。随着实验经济学在全球的兴起，有关经济人的假设得到了广泛的实验研究。本文系统阐释了经济人假设的三个基本内涵，回顾了相应的实验研究，认为现实中的经济人是不完全自利、有限理性和具有多重目标的，并给出了相关的实验证据，最后对经济人假设做了在实验经济学视角下的评述。深入了解经济人假定下的经济主体的经济行为，对于深刻解释受控实验室中参与主体的行为逻辑显然有着重要作用。

以香港上市的202家中资公司(H股和红筹股)和配对的202家内地上市A股公司为样本， 本文从高管薪酬-企业业绩敏感度的角度来研究香港上市是否能够改善我国公司的治理体系。 研究发现，A 股公司高管的现金收入对业绩的敏感度高于香港上市公司，而后者高管的持股 比例对业绩的敏感度要高于前者。 并且，大股东的存在会加大两地上市公司的差异。这意味 着赴港上市能将高管激励从传统的以短期现金为主的模式，转变为以长期股权激励为导向的 体制，而且大股东在这种转换中承担着举足轻重的作用。

Dynamic allocation of control rights between managers and investors affects policy of the dividend and value of enterprise. The paper studied the relevant factors that affect optimal debt ratio and allocation of control right. We suggest that the enterprise decrease the debt ratio with the increase of moral hazard, liquidity risk and investors’ absolute risk aversion. With the increase of shareholder’s control right, the relationship between shareholder’s control right and managers’ moral hazard is reversed from positive to negative. The implication of the paper is moderate debt ratio may achieve the tough constraint on the managers’ decision.

本文从外部制度环境和内部资本配置两个角度，对创业企业代理成本影响因素展开实证研究。研究结果表明，资本自由化指数与创业企业代理成本之间呈现显著负向关系。表明区域的资本自由化程度越低，创业企业将出现更大的代理成本。并且其中由降低政府干预程度构成的资本自由化因素作用最为明显。研究还发现，创业企业的内部资本配置与代理成本有着显著的关系，具体表现为：（1）拥有国家资本的创业企业代理成本显著高于拥有个人资本或外商资本的创业企业，并且外商资本比例或个人资本比例越高，代理成本越低；（2）对短期负债率的提高能有效降低以营业费用率为表征的代理成本，但却提高了以管理费用率为代表的代理成本，显示现阶段，我国债权人治理效应仍然存在一定的局限性。本文的研究为未来金融改革方向、创业环境政策制定及国有创业企业产权多元化提供了一定的理论依据。

论文以中国深沪两市A 股上市公司2001-2005 年跨越多个年度的大样本数据为基础， 实证分析了股权集中背景下大股东持股及其他公司治理机制对公司价值的影响。结果表明， 大股东持股比例对公司价值的影响具有区间特征，两者间呈现出一种“N”型的三次曲线关 系。且发现在股权集中背景下，公司价值与大股东的国有性质、大股东控制权与所有权的分 离度、独立董事比例、高管持股比例负相关，而与股权结构的制衡水平正相关。表明在中国 股权结构高度集中和对中小投资者的法律保护不完善的背景下，合理安排股权和控制权结构 就显得非常重要。

Using a sample of listed subsidiaries and their parent companies in China, I study top executive compensation and turnover and their relationship to firm performance in business groups in China. The empirical results support the hypothesis that the pay-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation (CEO turnover) in a listed firm is positively (negatively) related to the accounting performance of its parent company. Using related party transactions to proxy for the correlation between the two firms, I find that management compensation in a listed firm is related to the performance of its parent company if related party transactions exist between them. In addition, I find a stronger relationship between the compensation (turnover) in a listed subsidiary and the performance of its parent company when the percentage of common directors and managers are less than median level. This result indicates that the incentive system can be used to align the interests of managers in the listed firm with that of its parent company when the information asymmetry is high and the parent company can not effectively monitor. Using brand name as a proxy for reputation, I find that management compensation and CEO turnover in group firms are more likely to be sensitive to the performance measures in their parent companies if both use the same brand name.

This study proposes an incentive alignment hypothesis of corporate spin-off activities, in which executive compensation contracts tie the interests of CEOs with those of shareholders and the reduction of agency problems enhances firm value through corporate spin-offs. Consistent with this hypothesis, CEOs with a high level of equitybased compensation are more likely to initiate a spin-off. The announcements of such corporate restructurings are reacted positively by the market. Firms engaging in spin-offs provide greater operating growth in the years following the restructurings compared with their size- and industry-matched control firms. Also consistent with this hypothesis, high incentive CEOs yield more personal gains by selling shares and exercising options following spin-offs.

Lin, Cai, and Li (1998) argue that under information asymmetry, SOE managers can use state-imposed policy burdens as excuses of poor performance and make the State accountable for it. The argument implies that turnover-performance sensitivity of SOEs decreases as policy burdens increase and that such impact depends on the extent of information asymmetry. Accordingly, this paper empirically explores how policy burdens affect top management turnover of Chinese listed firms between 2000 and 2005. We find that high surplus labor significantly reduces the sensitivity of chairman turnover to performance for state-controlled firms, while private firms do not exhibit such a pattern. Furthermore, our results show that high surplus labor reduces the turnover-performance sensitivity more for firms with greater information asymmetry. Overall, we find strong evidence supporting the implications of Lin, Cai, and Li (1998). In addition, we find that chairman turnover of Chinese firms is sensitive to different performance measures for state-controlled firms and private firms.