In China, regional disparities are important. We examine the difference in the sensitivity of investment to cash flow between firms in inland regions and those in coastal regions. By using the financial data of Chinese listed firms, we found that firms in inland regions rely more on their internal funds in terms of their investment activities than those in coastal regions and that the sensitivity gap between inland and coastal firms widened in the recent contractionary monetary policy period. This suggests that firms in inland regions are harder to obtain outside funds due to unfavorable social and economic environments for inland firms. Our findings suggest that capital markets in China respond rationally to the potential impact of regional disparities on a firm’s performance.

This article tests several predictions of tournament theory on executive compensation in the context of a transition economy. Using an unbalanced panel which consists of a total of 34701 executives in 450 publicly listed firms in China during 1999 and 2006, we find that (1) pay increases as executives move up the corporate hierarchy into higher ranks; (2) pay gap is the largest between the first and second tier executives, although it does not increase monotonically across all executive ranks; and (3) pay dispersion increases with the number of tournament participants and the level of noise in the business environment. In addition, we find evidence that state ownership of shares reduces executive compensation and pay gap, and corporate governance structure affect pay dispersion. Overall, our study shows that listed firms in China, as they become more and more market-oriented, have adopted a pay structure that is largely consistent with the predictions of tournament theory, and that it is important to consider both ownership structure and corporate governance in analyzing executive compensation structure.

In recent years China has faced an increasing trilemma - how to pursue an independent domestic monetary policy and limit exchange rate flexibility, while at the same time facing large and growing international capital flows. This paper analyzes the impact of the trilemma on China's monetary policy as the country liberalizes its goods and financial markets and integrates with the world economy. It shows how China has sought to insulate its reserve money from the effects of balance of payments inflows by sterilizing through the issuance of central bank liabilities. However, we report empirical results indicating that sterilization dropped precipitously in 2006 in the face of the ongoing massive buildup of international reserves, leading to a surge in reserve money growth. We estimate a vector error correction model linking the surge in China's reserve money to broad money, real GDP, and the price level. We use this model to explore the inflationary implications of different policy scenarios. Under a scenario of continued rapid reserve money growth (consistent with limited sterilization of foreign exchange reserve accumulation) and strong economic growth, the model predicts a rapid increase in inflation. A model simulation using an extension of the framework that incorporates recent increases in bank reserve requirements also implies a rapid rise in inflation. By contrast, model simulations incorporating a sharp slowdown in economic growth lead to less inflation pressure even with a substantial buildup in international reserves.

The global financial crisis is hitting China hard with great adversity. In response, China start to formulated the plan for dealing with the financial crisis and its possible fallout in June 2008 when China was in the critical stage of putting up the Olympic Games. The Chinese leadership judges the crisis is going to be a serious disaster but not as bad as the great depression of the 1930s. An America-type crisis is unlikely to happen in the country and the main threat would be the Chinese real sector being dragged down under, which in turn sparks a crisis in the financial sector. China’s strategy for combating the crisis therefore is to deal with the immediate crisis effects in the real economy in the first place, and looks for opportunities in the meantime. The overwhelming emphasis is placed on expanding domestic demand to fuel growth. Following this strategy, China has rolled out a comprehensive package of combating measures. The fiscal expansion hit the headlines with extensive government financial support for infrastructure and public service projects. Yet the Chinese monetary stimulus is actually more powerful. The stance of Chinese monetary policy has changed from being precautionary against inflation with flexibility to appropriate easing to promote growth. After several rounds of rate cuts, the Chinese version of quantitative easing takes the central stage. In China’s battle with the financial crisis, the monetary stimulus is playing a leading role at the moment. The international dimensions of China’s monetary policy typify how China turns a crisis into a world of opportunity. China has taken a conservative approach to managing her reserves in which the huge international reserves are taken as self insurance rather than an avenue for international leverage. Within this framework and if safety of these foreign assets can be assured, China can provide finance to countries in crisis through international financial organisations. In addition to the Panda Bonds, the chief way for China to make funding contribution is through IMF. For this matter, China supports the motion to increase the IMF’s lending capacity and would buy the bonds it issues. China is actively calling for reform of international financial architecture. Chinese advisers have publically argued that the increase in China’s funding contribution has to be paralleled by an increase in China’s profile in the power structure in the IMF. In many occasions, China has also acted as spokesman of the emerging and developing economies by making cases for increasing their say in world financial affairs. But on the whole, China has been cautious not to committing herself too much as she knows probably she has little to gain from international policy coordination. Against this backdrop, China has chosen to focus on regional financial cooperation proactively and considerable progress has been made in this area. China’s dealing with the current financial crisis is unassuming. What she has done is down-to-earth common sense. However, the Chinese approach is shown signs of working. Despite the early success of crisis handling, there remain fundamental problems in China’s structure of economic growth. How to redress structural imbalances in the economy, to boost domestic demand, to calm down the property market and, above all, to create millions of jobs, are still the major huge challenges China is facing.

本文运用GARCH族模型，以中国A股市场较有代表性的沪深300指数作为研究对象，对中国股市价格波动中存在的条件异方差性和正负冲击对股价波动影响的不对称性进行检验，结果表明在样本期内，我国股价波动存在明显的条件异方差性，但是并未发现正负冲击对股价波动影响的不对称性。

本文运用SVAR 模型对上证成份指数收益率与成交量之间的相关性进行研究，得出同期的成交量与股票价格之间的影响。同时进一步说明成份指数收益率与成交量是一个整体的系统，该系统内部存在着相互制约的因素来阻止收益率或成交量不断朝同某一个方向发展的趋势。最后在对该系统做脉冲响应分析时发现，当系统受到收益率和成交量方面的冲击时，这一系统有抗击外来冲击的功能，收益率与成交量都以一个较为平稳的方式不断地延续下去。

本文采用2005年11月1日至2008年9月26日沪深300指数成分股的日数据，在不同市场态势以及每个市场态势的不同市值组合下，构建面板数据的GMM模型，实证分析流动性对股票价格波动的影响，结果表明：无论在横盘时期、牛市时期还是在熊市时期，以换手率作为度量的流动性与股票价格波动都显著正相关， 只在熊市时期以流通市值衡量的公司规模与股票价格波动显著负相关，即存在“小盘股效应”。这些实证结论对于分析股票市场的微观结构和推出股指期货均具有参考和借鉴价值。

本文从收益率角度，考察了我国股票市场与世界主要股票市场（美国、英国、日本、香港）之间的联动性，并研究了其他股市的价格信息是否可以用来预测中国的股市走势。我们发现，在股权分置改革之后，我国股市与世界主要股票市场间的联动性显著加强，但是这种联动性呈现出一种非对称性，即我国股市对其他股市的价格上涨的信息反应灵敏，对于价格小幅下跌的信息反应不够灵敏。上证综指的开盘价显著受到美国股市的影响，且美国和英国股市的价格信息对于中国股市未来走势的预测较为准确。

本文从收益率角度，考察了我国股票市场与世界主要股票市场（美国、英国、日本、香港）之间的联动性，并研究了其他股市的价格信息是否可以用来预测中国的股市走势。我们发现，在股权分置改革之后，我国股市与世界主要股票市场间的联动性显著加强，但是这种联动性呈现出一种非对称性，即我国股市对其他股市的价格上涨的信息反应灵敏，对于价格小幅下跌的信息反应不够灵敏。上证综指的开盘价显著受到美国股市的影响，且美国和英国股市的价格信息对于中国股市未来走势的预测较为准确。

本文主要通过半参数条件方差建模方法分析股权分置改革对上海股市收益率序列波动性特征的影响。文章首先对股市波动特征的刻画方法作了简单回顾，讨论了条件方差建模的基本思路以及常见方法。进一步结合中国股市的实际，运用半参数条件方差建模的方法，对上海股市股权分置改革前后的波动性特征进行测度。最后对股改前后的波动特征进行了对比分析。本文主要的创新在于运用广义可加模型为基础的半参数模型的条件方差建模方法来测度股市的波动率。