人民币汇率的波动问题一直是学术界讨论的焦点，本文选取自汇率制度改革后的826个高频日汇率数据，在使用GARCH（1，1）模型研究美元和港币对人民币汇率波动的基础上，对美元、港币、日元和欧元对人民币汇率的互动性进行了研究，认为港币对人民币汇率波动的持续性强于美元对人民币汇率的波动，在我国的外汇市场上，美元和港币的主导性最强，欧元次之，日元最弱。

本文首先详细综述了预期汇率变化对货币需求影响的理论分析与实证检验的国内外文献，然后利用利用中国1999-2007年的月度数据估计了包含人民币预期升值率与国外利率的货币需求函数，结论显示人民币预期升值率的上升将通过货币替代效应与资本流动效应显著增加我国微观经济主体对狭义货币与广义货币的持有。最后本文从理论与实证分析结果出发，为我国开放条件下货币政策的制定与实施提出了相关的政策建议。

本文主要研究外资并购对于我国上市公司长期绩效的影响。基于一般并购理论、跨国并购理论、并购绩效理论、跨国并购绩效理论，提出外资并购我国上市公司绩效分析的理论假设，对外资并购我国上市公司的长期绩效影响进行实证分析和检验。结论表明，外资并购在总体上对目标公司绩效提升具有显著性影响。最后在理论和实证研究的基础上，提出相应的政策建议。

Chinese outbound investment can overall be explained by traditional theories on FDI and MNEs. However, in some aspects Chinese outward FDI is unique and differs from known investment in the “Western” context. Most importantly, it is largely executed by Chinese SOEs. This paper aspires to deepen understanding on the phenomemon by focusing on the policy dimension of Chinese outbound investment. It provides an understanding of the potential and actual government influence, comparing motivations for internationalization by Chinese enterprises and the Chinese government, and pointing out where Chinese companies own a comparative advantage in their internationalisaton activities compared to its mostly Western competitors due to the particular Chinese policy support. Apart from typical motivations for internationalization that apply for Chinese MNEs (market-seeking, resource-seeking, strategic asset seeking and efficiency-seeking motivations), a number of additional motivations exist, which are directly linked to the particular institutional and societal context of China.

Chinese commercial banks have experienced tremendous growth over the past decade but have received limited academic attention due to data collection difficulty. We’ve successfully compiled a hand-collected panel dataset of Chinese commercial banks governance characteristics from 1998 to 2007. We empirically examine the relation between board governance and the profitability of Chinese commercial banks. We find that board governance has significant impact on Chinese banks’ performance. Specifically, higher board ownership, lower percentage of insiders on board, and lower block ownership are associated with better bank performance. In addition, to improve bank performance, Chinese bank managers should also focus on effectively control of bank’s operating cost, increasing net interest margin, and closely monitoring loan productivity. This is the first study conducted on the efficacy of Chinese banks’ governance system and its relation with banks’ profitability. Empirical evidence from this study has important policy implications in reforming China’s banking system into a more transparent and more efficient market driven system.

We investigate the performance and characteristics of acquiring firms on 1148 M&A on the two Chinese stock markets from 1998 to 2003. Using the market model, the CAPM model and the buy-and-hold methods, we find significantly positive abnormal returns before (6 months) and upon M&A announcements, while the long-run abnormal returns (6 months) after M&A are insignificant. Within our sample, cash is the dominant payment method and the competition during M&A is low. The cross-sectional analysis on acquirers' market performance upon announcements shows that the political advantages of acquiring firms have a significantly positive impact on the acquirers' performance, while the economic advantages do not. Cross-provincial M&A and better corporate governance create value to acquiring firms. Finally, cash payment impacts positively and regulation development impacts negatively the performance of acquiring firms during M&A.

Many prior studies have been devoted to financial distress of Chinese listed companies over the last two decades. However, these distressed companies are still failed to find out the exact determinants of financial distress. Therefore, the purposes of this paper are to provide an investigation of financial distressed companies trading on Chinese Stock Exchanges, and to elaborate the determinants of falling into financial distress by using a panel data set containing information on the stock market under Binary Logit Model during the period 1998-2005. The empirical findings present the relationship between 13 independent variables and the probability of financial distress, and particularly analyze the impact of corporate governance on Chinese financial distressed companies. Of these corporate governance variables, agency costs and ownership structure appear to be important factors to affect the probability of financial distress.

We document the under-pricing of state asset sales in China. Because these stakes were in partially privatized firms, there is a credible benchmark - the price of publicly traded shares - to measure the extent of under-pricing. On average, we find that blocks of government shares sell at a discount of more than 70 percent relative to tradable shares. Further, sellers that conceal their state ownership status (likely in order to elude regulatory scrutiny) sell at a further 5 percentage point discount. The impact on subsequent performance is negative - both profitability and investment fall after transfers. We also document patterns in the data consistent with increased tunneling after asset sales.

In this paper, we investigate the agency costs of government ownership and their impact on corporate governance and firm value. China is used as a laboratory because of the prevalent state shareholdings in exchange-listed firms. In this context, we specifically consider the trade-offs involved in the voluntary formation of an audit committee when the controlling shareholder is the state. The decision to improve corporate governance (in this case, introduce an audit committee) is shown to be value relevant and a function of existing agency relationships and non-trivial implementation costs. Our findings are robust to the level of pyramid groups, the ownership-control wedge, and financial leverage. The research adds to the debate regarding the effect of government shareholdings on corporate culture and performance - a topic that has taken on renewed importance in recent times.

Following the economic theory of venture capital financing, a corporate governance framework would be economically efficient for VC investments if it can help to reduce the agency costs resulted from information and incentive problems. As a highly successful model in global VC industry, the standard VC investment contracts in the Silicon Valley practice largely embody such framework. By analyzing the currently effective laws and regulations of China that are relevant to the investments by foreign venture capitalists, this paper paints a practical picture of how can foreign VC investors do business in China. It is shown that, the recent (starting from 2005) outflow of a set of new legal norms can be seen as a dividing point for the VC investing practice in China – the previously prevalent mode “offshore structuring, offshore listing” is challenged, and both the investment and exit are gradually pulled onshore. This being said, the current Chinese laws and institutions still cannot fully entertain the contracting and governance model prevalent in the Silicon Valley VC investment practices, and in this light, this paper goes on to discuss, in particular, various strategies that may be availed by foreign VC firms to tap and/or subvert the Chinese laws and regulations when financing Chinese new ventures. Finally, under the theme of globalization and crossborder corporate governance convergence, this paper provides a general comment on the currently applicable Chinese legal framework, and stresses the importance of converging towards efficient legal rules through contracts in the global competitive village.