我们发现，解禁前后股改限售股存在-13%的累积异常收益，价格下跌主要发生在解禁40天之前。信息发现假说认为，在禁售期内，流通股股东如果发现公司价值低于预期或者非流通股股东行为不当，就会选择在解禁前出售股票，导致股价下跌。回归分析支持信息发现假说认为：透明度高的股票价格下跌较小，公司基本面的改善与解禁前后收益正相关。实证结果还发现，解禁股收益能够反映公司基本面的时序变化和个体差异，从而验证了中国资本市场的有效性。

2001年之后，我国机构投资者正经历着一个快速发展的时期。针对之前屡屡发生的违规行为，机构投资者在我国资本市场发展过程中究竟扮演了什么样的角色目前还存在很大的争议。根据Grossman与Stiglitz（1980）等研究提出的信息经济学理论，机构投资者的作用更直接的体现为通过知情人交易向市场传递信息。在以往研究的基础上，本文通过考察机构投资者交易对股价中公司特有信息含量的影响，从信息的角度对机构投资者在我国资本市场中所起到的作用进行了更进一步的检验。在控制了内生性、噪音等因素影响之后，实证结果显示机构投资者交易确实增加了股价中的公司特有信息含量，提高了市场的效率。本文加深了对我国资本市场中机构投资者的理解和认识，从更直接的角度验证了引入机构投资者对市场的作用，另一方面也在一定程度上说明监管者正确导向了机构投资者的行为。

In this paper, real and financial linkage is to be investigated. We focus on six typical stock markets after time zone effect taken into consideration. We select monthly annual CPI rate as transition variable in Smooth Transition Conditional Correlation CARR (named STCC-CARR for short) model to scrutinize interdependence among international stock markets. As it is testified, correlations among them are fluctuant with different inflation cycles and could not be ignored arbitrarily. The highest correlations come out between countries when both are in contractionary phase, while the lowest correlations do when both are in expansionary phase.

We examine the effect of illiquidity discount on stock prices on the warrants prices in China. We construct measures of liquidity based on market microstructure models, and find that they explain a significant portion of the cross-section variation in the warrants pricing biases and implied stock discounts in the market. We conclude that, due to the T+1 rule in Chinese stock market, equity market is illiquid relative to the warrants market that doesn’t bear the T+1 rule. This imposed illiquidity cause the discount on the stock price, which is not reflected in the warrants market. Thus the illiquidity in stock market contributes to the pricing bias in warrants market.

This paper investigates the impact of macro variables on the volatility of bond returns. Using the principal components analysis, we extract the “real” and “money” factors from the real activities and monetary variables, respectively. Following Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001), we decompose the bond volatility into market-level volatility and maturity volatility. Using the daily returns on the 1-, 5-, 10- and 30-year US treasury bonds, we find that the macro factors significantly affect the bond volatility. In particular, the “real” factor affects the bond volatility of all maturities while the monetary variables are significantly related to the volatility of short-term bonds and weakly related to the volatility of medium-term bonds.

We examine the independent and dominating effects of the liquidity level, the information asymmetry and the divergence of opinion on asset returns in an important emerging market, Chinese stock market. We use the variable ILLIQ from Amihud (2002) to proxy for the liquidity level, the variable PIN from Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002) to proxy for the information asymmetry and the variable OBS based on Nas and Skjeltorp (2006) to proxy for the divergence of opinion. We find striking evidence that stocks with a higher liquidity level, or a lower information asymmetry, or a higher divergence of opinion, experience significantly lower excess returns. More importantly, the explanatory power of the liquidity level on asset returns may only reflect those from the information asymmetry and the divergence of opinion. Moreover, we find no evidence on the dominating effect between the information asymmetry and the divergence of opinion when examining their impact on asset returns.

对期货市场最佳套期保值比率的研究可分为两大类：一类是从组合资产收益风险最小化的角度，研究最小风险套期保值比率；另一类是同时考虑组合资产收益和收益方差，从效用最大化的角度研究均值－风险套期保值比率。研究套期保值的模型方法一般运用以下六种: 传统回归模型（OLS）、双变量向量自回归模型（B-VAR）、误差修正套期保值模型（ECHM）、广义自回归条件异方差模型（EC-GARCH）、VaR最小方差套期保值方法（VaR）、基于几何谱风险测度GM的期货套期保值模型（GM）。本文比较了以上六种模型方法各自的优势和缺陷。

When the government is simultaneously the owner and regulator of the securities market, the evolution of securities market regulation follows a path of compulsory institutional change. China’s government authorities have played a dual role in this process by acting both as the securities market regulator and the controlling owner of the stock exchanges. This paper uses the evolution of China’s securities market regulation from 1980 to 2007 to illustrate this theoretical framework. It provides unique evidence of how securities regulation evolves in response to government direction and supervision if the government is both the owner and the regulator of the securities market.

Using a sample of China’s partially privatized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that have emerged in the global equity markets, this paper examines the decision to list overseas and its consequences. We find that overseas listing of Chinese SOEs is primarily determined by political needs, not by firms’ desire to fund growth and expand foreign sales. In addition, we find that overseas listed SOEs have more professional boards of directors, use greater accounting conservatism, exhibit higher investment efficiency, and have better one-year and two-year post-listing stock performance than their domestically listed counterparts. Additional analysis exploring the impact of political relations on overseas listing effects finds that strong political connections weaken the overseas listing effect on investment efficiency and post-listing stock performance, consistent with the positive overseas listing effect on investment efficiency being attenuated by government influence to satisfy state objectives such as excess employment. Taken together, our study suggests that overseas listing provides a mechanism for constraining politicians’ pursuit of private benefits and improving efficiency for partially privatized Chinese SOEs. However, the effectiveness of this mechanism is limited for SOEs with strong ties to the government.

本文目的是研究我国投资者法律保护、股权结构与公司价值的关系。近些年的公司治理文献中，“隧道效应”，即公司控股股东牺牲中小股东利益以自利，引起了广泛关注。本文中我们构建了一个简单模型，考察公司治理的内外部机制——内部股权结构与外部法律和监管——对该效应的抑制，并分析了它们对于公司价值的影响。最后利用我国110家上市公司的面板数据检验了理论模型的预测。实证表明，好的投资者保护和适当的股权结构都有利于提升公司价值。