Traditional production function theory treats executive characteristics as exogenous fac-tors, failing to capture how managerial heterogeneity dynamically influences productiv-ity. This study integrates Upper Echelon Theory and Dynamic Capabilities Theory to develop an endogenous production function framework where executive attributes serve as dynamic parameters reshaping capital and labor elasticities. Using fixed effect-s panel-data models, we analyze Chinese listed companies, examining how executives’ education, experience, and compensation interact with production parameters. Re-sults show executive characteristics significantly moderate factor productivity: higher education and board independence enhance capital productivity, while compensation intensity transforms labor elasticity from negative to strongly positive values. Hetero-geneity analysis reveals effects vary across ownership types and technology intensity, with technology-intensive firms showing strongest responsiveness. This research recon-ceptualizes executives as active architects of production processes, provides a rigorous framework for endogenizing management factors, and offers evidence-based guidance for corporate governance and talent strategy optimization.

This study investigates the impact of employee ownership on firms’ investment responsiveness to stock market feedback. Using data from Chinese listed firms, we find that employee ownership significantly enhances the sensitivity of corporate investment to Tobin’s q. This effect is more pronounced in firms with higher information asymmetry, greater labor intensity, weaker corporate governance, and higher financial distress risk. While employee ownership is linked to increased subsequent profitability volatility, it also mitigates financial mismatch and downside operating risk. Our findings also suggest that employee ownership drives a shift in corporate strategy, leading to more aggressive approaches and improved risk preferences. These results highlight the role of employee ownership in mitigating agency problems and enhancing firms’ ability to incorporate market information into investment decisions.

Research Question/Issue: This study investigates whether and how political connections affect customer complaints in the Chinese market, using a comprehensive dataset from the country’s largest online complaint platform. Research Findings/Insights: Analyzing 22,644 firm-year observations from 2018 to 2023, we find that politically connected firms experience significantly fewer customer complaints. A one-unit increase in political connection strength is associated with a 9% reduction in complaints relative to the sample mean. This effect operates through two primary mechanisms: a reputation-motivation channel and a financial resource channel. The mitigating effect is more pronounced for firms in highly marketized regions, those with higher advertising expenditures, companies facing greater earnings pressure, and those with lower tangible asset ratios. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our study contributes to the literature on political connections and corporate governance by demonstrating how political capital translates into tangible consumer experience advantages. It also advances research on the determinants of customer complaints by highlighting the role of internal governance mechanisms, particularly managerial political ties. Our findings support the Corporate Reputation and Financial Resource Hypotheses while challenging alternative explanations based on regulatory shielding or managerial complacency. Practitioner/Policy Implications: For corporate leaders, our results underscore the importance of reputation management and quality investment, particularly when political connections are absent. Policymakers should consider strengthening public monitoring institutions to reinforce reputational incentives across markets. Investors may use customer complaints as an indicator of product quality and operational stability in their investment decisions.

Overwork intensity (OI) is a salient issue that directly affects employees’ motivation and productivity. By using a novel dataset of overwork intensity constructed from daily high-resolution nightlight satellite images, we examine whether overwork intensity is a priced risk in the cross-section of stock returns. We show that a zero-investment portfolio that buys the highest OI quintile stocks and shorts the lowest OI quintile stocks earns 0.495% returns per month. This result is robust when controlling for various well-known risk factors. We argue and empirically verify that profftability, corporate governance, investor sentiment and lottery preference are the potential channels that drive the result.

In emerging markets characterized by signiffcant information asymmetry, mitigat-ing firm-level risk is paramount for market stability. While the governance role ofinstitutional investors is known, the impact of their direct, on-the-ground engagementremains underexplored. This study’s objective is to investigate how institutionalinvestor site visits, a crucial hands-on governance mechanism, affect stock returnvolatility. Using a sample of Chinese-listed A-share firms from 2012 to 2022, wefind that frequent site visits significantly reduce firm-level stock return volatility.This risk-reduction effect is more pronounced for firms with greater agency problems,poorer ESG performance, and higher expropriation risk. Our analysis, robust toendogeneity concerns, indicates this effect is driven by improved external oversight.We conclude that direct institutional engagement is a vital channel for reducinginformation asymmetry, enhancing corporate governance, and ultimately promotingmarket stability by lowering investment risk.

This paper examines the impact of Exchange-Traded Fund (ETF) ownership on corporate earnings management. We find that ETF ownership is associated with a significant reduction in earnings management, and this result remains robust across a wide range of endogeneity tests and robustness checks. Further analyses reveal that ETFs exert a pronounced mitigating effect on sales manipulation, production manipulation, and expense manipulation. Mechanism tests indicate that ETFs curb earnings management by improving stock liquidity and strengthening external monitoring. We also find that the influence of ETFs is stronger in private firms, in firms with lower information transparency, and in firms with CEO duality, suggesting that ETFs serve as a more prominent external governance force when internal governance mechanisms are relatively weak. Overall, this study enriches the literature on the economic consequences of ETFs and provides new empirical evidence that financial innovation in emerging markets can help alleviate the information risk faced by investors.

The role of institutional investors in the development of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) criteria lacks consensus in the academic community. This study utilizes a quasi-natural experiment involving Chinese mutual funds that have signed the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI) to investigate whether institutional Investors’ ESG investment commitments can significantly reduce ESG rating disagreement among the companies in their portfolios. We first find that companies held by ESG commitment institutional Investors exhibit less disagreement in ESG rating compared to those held by Non-ESG commitment institutional Investors. we then show that institutional Investor’ ESG investment commitment influence ESG rating disagreement by enhancing the quality of ESG disclosure and attracting external ESG attention. We further discover that institutional investors’ ESG investment commitments significantly mitigates the ESG rating disagreement among domestic ESG rating agencies and firms with a higher level of corporate governance.

Under the goal of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality, taking environment, social responsibility, and corporate governance (ESG) as the important investment factor has become an action guide and standard for capital market participants. The practice of the ESG concept is not only a new way for enterprises to form new asset advantages and realize green and low-carbon transformation, but also important access for promoting high-quality and sustainable development. Based on Chinese-listed companies within the period of 2009 to 2015, we investigate the impact of ESG responsibility performance on export performance as well as its mechanism. We theorize and find out show that ESG responsibility performance can significantly and stably promote enterprises’ export performance. Mechanism analysis shows that ESG can improve export performance by reducing financing costs and easing financing constraints, and the green technology innovation effect is also an important channel for ESG to affect export performance. Therefore, government should strengthen the supervision and incentive of ESG performance, encourage enterprises to improve their environmental, social and governance performance in order to adapt to the goal of carbon peak and carbon neutrality and promote the high-quality development of export trade. Future research may consider combining ESG accountability with other factors such as supply chain management, intermediate imports, and transnational spillovers to more fully understand its impact on export performance, so as to create more value for society.

Trust can be obtained by firm location (endowed trust) or behaviors (earned trust). We are interested in whether firms located in trusted regions are more likely to protect stakeholders’ benefits as a strategy to earn trust. Based on a sample of Chinese firms, we find a significant and positive correlation between regional endowed trust and local firms’ environmental and social commitment. We suggest that endowed trust has two effects: 1) shaping local firms’ legal cognition and thus decreasing misconducts; and 2) providing resources and thus mitigating financial constraints, both of which encourage firms to protect the environment and society. Moreover, the positive effect of high endowed trust is weakened when corporate governance or local legal environment is strong.

This paper extracts investor risk concern from the text of investormanagement communications and examines their impact on insider opportunistic sales. Utilizing data from listed companies holding online earnings communication conferences (OECCs) in China from 2007 to 2022, we find that heightened investor risk concern significantly curbs insider opportunistic sales, as manifested by reduced frequency and magnitude of such transactions. This governance effect of investor risk concern persists irrespective of motivation strength behind opportunistic sales. Further analysis reveals that the governance effect intensifies when investors exhibit superior information processing capabilities and when management’s risk statements better align with investor expectations. Notably, while mitigating opportunistic sales, elevated investor risk concern also significantly decreases the firm’s cost of equity capital. Our findings underscore the importance of fostering transparent and engaging investor-management communication in promoting effective corporate governance and mitigating insider misconduct.