This paper compares Chinese firms’ IPO performance both in the short- and the long-run on domestic and overseas markets and investigates what factors determine the IPO destinations of Chinese firms. We find China’s domestic IPO market performs well over both time horizons, while some listings in the overseas market perform well in the long run except for small- and mid-cap listings in the US. Analysis based on a capital asset pricing model reveals IPO premiums and short-term returns are less affected by three common risk factors, while longer term returns are mainly driven by market fundamentals. Investigation of the drivers for Chinese firms’ IPO destinations using the binary choice model shows that firm specifics, institutional setups, and market characteristics influence the choice of IPO destinations. The prospect of a high IPO premium and strong trading in IPO shares are substantial drivers for firms to list their shares onshore. On the other hand, indicators of market size and profitability appear to have the highest predictive power for the likelihood of overseas listings, followed by firm’s ownership structure, IPO offering size and IPO underwriting costs. Institutional setups have the least predictive power for overseas listings. These results are in general robust to domestic delisting and IPO suspension events.

Using a sample of China’s partially privatized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that have emerged in the global equity markets, this paper examines the decision to list overseas and its consequences. We find that overseas listing of Chinese SOEs is primarily determined by political needs, not by firms’ desire to fund growth and expand foreign sales. In addition, we find that overseas listed SOEs have more professional boards of directors, use greater accounting conservatism, exhibit higher investment efficiency, and have better one-year and two-year post-listing stock performance than their domestically listed counterparts. Additional analysis exploring the impact of political relations on overseas listing effects finds that strong political connections weaken the overseas listing effect on investment efficiency and post-listing stock performance, consistent with the positive overseas listing effect on investment efficiency being attenuated by government influence to satisfy state objectives such as excess employment. Taken together, our study suggests that overseas listing provides a mechanism for constraining politicians’ pursuit of private benefits and improving efficiency for partially privatized Chinese SOEs. However, the effectiveness of this mechanism is limited for SOEs with strong ties to the government.