It is widely accepted that paying cash dividend might mitigate agency problem between majority shareholder and minority shareholders. Some common law countries use mandatory cash dividend policy to protect minority shareholders. We provide opposite evidence in this paper. First, we find that in China’s stock market, firms with intermediate or high shareholding concentration have higher incentive to pay cash dividend. As controlling shareholders in China hold non-negotiable shares, we argue that this phenomenon is associated with non-negotiable shareholders’ incentive to retrieve cash from the firm. Second, non-negotiable shareholders generally give up subscription right in rights offering. Furthermore, firms with intermediate or high shareholding concentration increase dividend payment soon after rights offering. Giving up subscription right and using receipts from rights offering to pay cash dividend together mean that non-negotiable shareholders in firms with intermediate or high shareholding concentration sell a proportion of the shares they hold to negotiable shareholders by paying cash dividend. The average selling price is about 3 times higher than that in private negotiation. Market reacts negatively to cash dividend announcement of firms with intermediate or high shareholding concentration. Our findings show that dividend might be used as a vehicle of tunneling.