We examine the dynamic connection between competition and bank risk within the credit market through the lens of moral hazard affecting banks and borrowers. By combining the perspectives of “competition-fragility” and “competition-stability”, we reveal the intricate influence that competition exercises over bank risk in this financial landscape. Our research scrutinizes these theoretical constructs empirically, drawing upon a dataset comprising 236 rural commercial banks in China from 2012 to 2020. The findings indicate a curvilinear relationship between competition and bank risk, as an inverted U-shape. Furthermore, competition plays a dual role - it improves borrowers’ moral hazard dilemma while exacerbating it for banks. This highlights both riskshifting and risk-margin effects within the competitive dynamics. Ultimately, the nonlinear association between competition and bank risk emerges due to the intricate interplay between the moral hazard factors affecting borrowers and banks.