所属栏目:公司金融/公司治理

Cross-listing, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance An Empirical Test on Bonding Hypothesis
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发布日期:2010年08月10日 上次修订日期:2010年08月10日

摘要

Applying the principle of the bonding theory, this study examined the relationship between corporate governance practice and performance of Chinese firms that are listed in the major international stock exchanges, including NASDAQ, New York, Hong Kong, Singapore and London AIM markets, and further investigated whether the Chinese firms that adopted the corporate governance mechanisms of the stock exchanges where they are listed would outperform those of firms listed locally in the Chinese stock exchange that operates in a weak enforcement mechanism environment. Hypotheses are tested using cross sectional data. The empirical tests show a mixed result. The cross-listings in New York and NASDAQ (dual-listing is excluded) exhibit bonding premium, while those noncross- listed Chinese firms demonstrated better firm performance that those listed in London, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Further, the study shed some lights on the relative importance of various corporate governance mechanisms in enhancing the firm performance in the context of the dominance of state-owned-enterprises in the market. The results reveal that different market has different corporate governance mechanisms under its different macro-environments. For the overall Chinese listings, the second largest shareholder of a firm could play a role as an effective corporate governance mechanism in increasing the firm’s performance. A negative relationship between the size of the board and the corporate governance was found. For those cross-listed Chinese firms, by adopting the stringent financial disclosure and the famous auditing firms could increase the firm performance, but not good enough comparing to these non-cross-listed Chinese firms. Meanwhile, controlling shareholder has negative effect on firm performance for the cross-listed Chinese firms. The study suggests that merely borrowing corporate governance mechanism does not guarantee the improvement of corporate governance (further to its firm performance), rather, firm’s own background and country effects also matter.
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Lixian Liu; Tony Naughton Cross-listing, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance An Empirical Test on Bonding Hypothesis (2010年08月10日) https://www.cfrn.com.cn/lw/13298.html

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