中国金融学术研究网

所属栏目：公司金融/风险投资

Economic Policy Uncertainty and Covenants in Venture Capital Contracts

认领作者认领作者管理权限

发布日期：2024年12月27日上次修订日期：2024年12月27日

Na Ding dingnacufe@126.com Central University of Finance and Economics Zhaoyue Ren zhangxueyong@cufe.edu.cn Central University of Finance and Economics Xueyong Zhang renzhaoyue424@163.com Central University of Finance and Economics

摘要

This study investigates how economic policy uncertainty (EPU) affects venture capital (VC) contract terms. Using a unique database of contracts between VCs and entrepreneurial firms in China, we provide evidence that VCs include more investor-friendly covenants in contracts when EPU increases. Our findings hold across a battery of robustness checks, including addressing endogeneity concerns and using alternative EPU measures. Our mechanism analysis shows that higher investment risk and increased VCs’ bargaining power might be plausible reasons why EPU positively affects the presence of investor-friendly covenants in VC contracts.

展开

关键词：

Economic policy uncertainty Venture capital Financial contracting Covenant

下载论文在线阅读

复制链接

新浪微博

微信扫一扫

论文统计数据

浏览次数：
408
下载次数：
0

相关文献

1VENTURE CAPITAL IN CHINA: INVESTMENT DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES AND SUCCESS FACTORS 2Risk mitigation strategies of foreign venture capitalists in China 3Financing New Ventures in China - Regulatory Changes and Implications for Foreign Investors 4Venture Capitalist Directors and Managerial Incentives 5The Role of Venture Capitalists in Listed Companies: Evidence from Mainland China 6Chinese government venture capital and firms’ financing：does certification help 7Contractual Innovation In China’s Venture Capital Market