The Central Environmental Protection Inspector (CEPI) is a critical regulatory measure in China aimed at improving ecological quality. From a compliance cost perspective, we examine the impact of the CEPI on corporate environmental governance. The findings reveal an asymmetry in the CEPI's influence: it significantly promotes environmental governance efforts on the non-production side of enterprises, while having no substantial effect on the production side. Additionally, government environmental subsidies do not provide a resource incentive in the process of the CEPI influencing corporate environmental governance. However, local environmental governance pressure mitigates this asymmetry, leading the CEPI to significantly enhance environmental governance on both the production and non-production sides. Further analysis shows that under the synergistic effect of local environmental governance pressure, the CEPI encourages state-owned enterprises to focus on environmental governance on the production side, while non-state-owned enterprises tend to focus on the non-production side. Moreover, political connections reduce the positive impact of the CEPI on production costs under local environmental governance pressure. Finally, the CEPI also significantly encourages enterprises to expand their production scale. These findings offer valuable insights for refining the CEPI system to better promote corporate environmental governance.