所属栏目:新金融/绿色金融

Can Judicial Deterrence Curb Corporate ”Say-Do Discrepancies”? —A Quasi-Natural Experiment from the Environmental Courts
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发布日期:2026年08月26日 上次修订日期:2026年08月26日

摘要

Against the backdrop of global green development and China’s sustainable economic transition, many firms exaggerate green-transition disclosures to cater to national strategies and capital market preferences, leading to a severe "Say–Do Gap". Based on signaling theory, this study uses the phased establishment of environmental courts in 208 prefecture-level cities as a quasi-natural experiment, adopting a staggered DID design with 2007–2023 panel data of Chinese A-share listed firms for empirical tests. Results show widespread corporate green pandering, with improved disclosure not translating into actual carbon reduction. Environmental courts effectively curb this behavior, with environmental litigation risk as the core mediating channel. Heterogeneity tests reveal stronger deterrence in regions with weaker regulation/heavier pollution and polluting firms with stronger environmental technology. This study enriches literature from a judicial deterrence perspective and provides implications for substantive corporate green transition.
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Chujie Wang; Tianhao Zhang Can Judicial Deterrence Curb Corporate ”Say-Do Discrepancies”? —A Quasi-Natural Experiment from the Environmental Courts (2026年08月26日) https://www.cfrn.com.cn/lw/16832.html

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