所属栏目:银行与金融机构/保险与保险公司

Contract Design and Insurance Demand
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发布日期:2026年11月17日 上次修订日期:2026年11月17日

摘要

We introduce experimental variation in the insurance contracts offered to rice farmers in China to study how contract design affects insurance takeup. We compare a single-contract offering with menus that include multiple contracts differing in premiums and payouts. Expanding the contract menu substantially increases take-up, primarily through higher adoption of the basic, lowest-cost contract. Additional experimental variation in relative prices and information provision shows that these effects are driven by context effects arising from relative price comparisons within the menu, rather than information inference. The findings highlight contract menu design as an effective supply-side tool for expanding insurance coverage.
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Jing Cai Contract Design and Insurance Demand (2026年11月17日) https://www.cfrn.com.cn/lw/17045.html

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