Local financial development is crucial for advancing regional financial supply side structural reform, enabling local governments to leverage financial instruments to effectively mobilize land resources and foster competitive growth. The introduction of numerous financial products linked to land-related rights and interests has resulted in a pronounced transmission and interconnection of fiscal and financial risks across regions. This study examines the impact of local financial development on land financialization in China using panel data from prefecture-level cities and detailed information on land mortgages. The findings indicate that the establishment of city commercial banks (CCBs) contributes to the progress of land financialization by incentivizing local government financing vehicles to participate in land mortgage financing, increasing the transfer of debt risks to the financial sector. Notably, the impact of CCBs on land financialization is more pronounced in regions with urban agglomeration, high GDP manipulation, inadequate local financial regulation, and robust implicit government guarantees. Further analysis reveals that CCB establishment has negative spillover effects on land financialization in neighboring areas, while expansion strategies such as establishing intercity branches, engaging in cross-regional mergers, and relaxing regulations have mitigated the rise of land financialization at the regional level. This study provides policy recommendations that focus on reducing local governments’ reliance on land financing and enhancing the prevention and management of financial risks.

Climate change and the escalation of extreme weather events jeopardize every corner of the globe. This paper investigates the impact of extreme high temperatures on the spread of newly issued municipal corporate bonds (MCBs) in China, which serves as a crucial instrument for local governments to meet the financial demands. We find that relative to the reference temperature range of 16 ◦C–20 ◦C, the issuing spread of MCBs increases by 2.48 basis points for each extra day where the mean temperature surpasses 32 ◦C. The findings highlight the risk-increasing effects of extreme temperatures in financial markets.

Biodiversity conservation incurs substantial economic costs. We investigate how financial markets price the risks such costs induce, exploiting the “Green Shield Action,” a major regulatory initiative launched in China in 2017 to enforce biodiversity preservation rules in national nature reserves. While improving biodiversity, the initiative led to significant increases in bond yields for municipalities with these reserves. The effects are driven by increases in local governments’ fiscal risk due to expected increases in transition costs resulting from shutting down illegal economic activities within reserves and additional public spending on biodiversity. Investors show little non-financial consideration towards endeavors counteracting biodiversity loss.

Using the data of Chinese listed firms from 2003-2020, this study applies a System GMM estimation approach to document that high local government ecological concerns increase a firm’s stock price crash risk. This finding remains consistent after addressing endogeneity issues and undergoing robustness checks. This study also reveals that the implementation of the new environmental protection law in 2015 mitigates the relationship between local government ecological concerns and stock price crash risk. Further analyses indicate that stricter environmental regulation and high subsidies, as well as enhanced corporate social responsibility and governance, can effectively alleviate the adverse effect of local government ecological concerns on stock price crash risk. In addition, we note that the influence of local government ecological concerns on stock price crash risk is more significant in the eastern region, heavily polluting industries, and non-SOEs. Lastly, the research identifies two potential channels through which local government ecological concerns can impact stock price crash risk by reducing the quality of information disclosure and intensifying investor disagreement.

This study finds that reducing political influence over local courts weakens local government debt capacity. We establish this result by exploiting the staggered roll-out of a judicial centralization reform aimed at alleviating local court capture in China and find reduced judicial favoritism towards local governments post-reform. The majority of local government lawsuits are with contractors over government payment delays. The reform not only increases government lawsuit losses but also exposes their credit risk, as payment delays without court support signal government liquidity constraint. Investors respond by tightening lending and increasing interest rates, which curbs government spending.

This study documents how the political hierarchy plays a significant role in determining corporate environmental governance. By conducting difference-in-differences analysis to investigate listed firms in China, this study demonstrates that local and central SOEs headquartered in jurisdictions far removed from central government supervision have worse environmental governance than POEs. Verticalization reforms implemented in 2016 enable provincial environmental protection bureaus to direct lower-level bureaus. Local governments cannot control environmental protection bureau leaders for economic development. This study finds that the corporate environmental governance of local SOEs has significantly improved following the reform, as local environmental protection bureaus no longer have conflicts of interest with local governments. However, the reform has not resulted in improvements to corporate environmental governance in central SOEs, whose executives occupy higher status than provincial Environmental Protection Bureau leaders, nor in POEs, which were already managed before the reform. Further evidence indicates that local SOEs experience an increase in abatement investments and relationship building expenses following the reform. Lastly, our study reveals that verticalization reform costs are negligible. Local SOEs have not experienced a decline in financial performance or corporate valuation. This study suggests that policymakers should consider the political ranking of government agencies and enterprises to improve environmental governance.

This paper highlights the crucial role of land allocation mechanisms in promoting industrial agglomeration by examining China’s 2007 industrial land market reform. By introducing transparency into the land-selling process, the reform facilitated more buyers to compete for land (reflected by increased land sale prices), enabling local governments to allocate land to the most suitable users. Combining comprehensive data sets that include information on initial local industrial structure, new industrial establishments, and industrial land transactions, the empirical analysis finds that the reform significantly increased the entry of firms from industries aligned with local specialization, particularly in areas that implemented the reform more strictly. A back-of-the-envelope calculation indicates a 1.3% increase in the national average total factor productivity of new entrants over three years post-reform due to a better match between new entrants and local industry specialization. Supporting evidence demonstrates the reform’s positive effect on economic growth (reflected in changes in nighttime lights), potentially through increasing local firms’ TFP.

The disordered and rampant local tax incentives have interfered with regular business competition and resource allocation, and whether they have the rationality of existence has also become an urgent problem to be clarified. In China, the government has undertaken a new round of policy adjustment to comprehensively sort out and standardize tax incentives, trying to realign value-oriented tax competition among local governments. Thus, this paper examines the real effect of standardizing tax incentives using China's State Council documents Nos. 62[2014] and No. 25[2015], with the measurement of abnormal tax burdens and abnormal fiscal subsidies. The result shows that this round of policy governance has maintained the steadiness of the overall tax burden and fiscal subsidy, and only abnormal tax burdens and fiscal subsidies have been reduced through structural adjustment; In addition, it has also taken into account the difference among regional economic development. The governance in the Midwest is generally lighter than in the East. Meanwhile, the effect of governance among different property companies has presented a reduced tendency as "state-owned enterprises -- local state-owned enterprises -- private enterprises".

This research analyses the ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic on China's economy, examining the divergent epidemic prevention policies used by local governments. Empirical evidence highlights that the emergence of COVID-19 cases correlates with a 1.13% reduction in quarterly GDP growth. However, when a city's secretary maintains an informal ties with the provincial secretary, GDP growth remains resilient. Analyzing micro-level data, we observe that city secretaries with informal ties tend to enact flexible anti-contagion measures. This flexibility stems from a decreased likelihood of reprimand for virus transmission. Such shields exclusively manifests when incumbent provincial secretaries share informal ties with central leadership. This underscores the interplay of political networks in shaping localized economic responses.

We investigate the impacts of anticipated government environmental audits (GEAs) on firm productivity. We use a 2009 policy set forth by China’s National Audit Office that required GEAs of local governments as an exogenous event to examine the effect of the policy announcement on firms’ total factor productivity (TFP). Our difference-in-differences tests indicate that TFP in heavily polluting firms improved more than other firms’ TFP after the announcement of the policy. We also find that to raise TFP, firms engage in green invention patents or receive government environmental subsidies. In addition, our cross-sectional analysis suggests that firms in regions where governments have strong environmental enforcement or that are in the eastern regions of China increase TFP more.