中央银行独立性主要是指中央银行制定和执行货币政策的自主性，是中央银行法律地位的核心问题。人民银行独立性不断增强是我国中央银行法律制度建立健全的重要趋势特征。2003年修正《人民银行法》第2、5、11、12、29、30及38条是目前人民银行独立性的主要法律规范。分析人民银行的独立性，除法律条文的文义性辨析外，还应当探求条文的历史与现实，并在人民银行实际独立性的基础上，进行有关制度重新设计。

中央银行在现代货币金融体系乃至经济体系中占据无可替代的地位。大约三百多年的历史进程中，各国中央银行法律制度不断建立与健全，而中央银行法律地位也随之经历由高度独立、到丧失独立性、再到回复独立的曲折发展。美国联邦储备银行、日本银行以及欧洲中央银行堪称世界范围内中央银行的三大巨头，相关保障中央独立性的法律制度具有代表性，值得我国借鉴与学习。

中央银行独立性问题在现代宏观经济研究特别是货币政策研究中备受关注，其与宏观经济指标的相互作用很大程度上决定着货币政策的运行效果。就此问题，本文首先介绍了西方学者对央行独立性的不同定义及研究的理论基础，随后从理论和实证两个角度分析中央银行独立性同宏观经济运行之间的关系，最后本文得出如下结论：中央银行独立性与通货膨胀之间的关系比较明确，与其他变量之间的关系仍不能明确界定；中央银行独立性的提升确实能有效降低通货膨胀率，但是抑制通货膨胀不能单独地成为支持中央银行独立性的理论基础；是否提高中央银行独立性应该结合其与物价、就业、经济增长的关系； The Central Bank Independent (CBI) issue has drawn more attention in macroeconomic research, especially is in the monetary policy research .To a large extent, it’s interaction with macroeconomic goals (price, economic growth, employment) mutually plays a remarkable role on the effect of monetary policy. On this question, this article first introduced the western scholar’s different definition on central bank independent and the theoretical basis of it. Then, we analyses the relationship between Central Bank independence and macroscopic economic performance theoretical and empirical angle. Finally we drawn draws the following conclusions: The relations Between the Central Bank independence and the inflation is quite explicit, but we are not clear about it’s relation with other variables such as growth、employment、deficits; Increasing Central Bank independent can effectively reduce the inflation rate, but “cut down” inflation cannot alone become the support for Central Bank independence; Whether or not to enhances the Central Bank independence should take in account it’s relations with the price, the employment, the economy grows; we should care about the “stationary” of variable when dealing with time-series data, otherwise the conclusion maybe less in accuracy and credibility;