本文基于有限注意力假说，用分析师共同覆盖构建公司相关性，检验了A股市场关联公司之间股票的动量溢出效应。研究发现，以共同覆盖分析师数量作为权重构建的关联公司股票加权平均收益率，能正向预测焦点公司未来1~12月的收益率，基于关联公司收益率构建的多空组合可获得10%~12%的年化超额收益；在截面回归中，关联公司动量溢出效应较同行业或同地区公司的动量溢出效应更强。异质性分析表明，在拥有更多分析师共同覆盖、非明星或低学历分析师共同覆盖，以及焦点公司股票被更多压力抵抗型机构投资者持有时，关联公司动量溢出效应更强，说明该效应的成因与分析师和投资者的有限注意带来的行动迟缓和反应滞后相关。本文的工作对A股市场跨资产动量效应给出了全新证据，对市场监管与投资者决策具有参考价值。

股权质押在 A 股市场十分普遍，质押风险防范是研究的焦点之一。本文基于 2004-2016 年 A 股上市公司的样本研究发现，存在股权质押的大股东增持的可能性显著增加，质押比例越高、面临的预警压力越大，大股东增持的可能性也越高。进一步地，尽管存在股权质押的大股东增持公告的市场反应相对较差，但依然显著为正；而且，增持企业的长期市场表现显著好于同样面临预警压力但未增持的企业。这些结果表明，尽管投资者能够识别大股东增持的不同动机，但增持仍是大股东应对股权质押风险的重要手段。本文的研究不仅进一步丰富了股权质押风险防范的研究、加深了对大股东增持动机的理解，而且对企业应对资本市场价格异常波动、监管层出台救市措施具有重要启示。

文献表明卖方分析师在对基金重仓持股进行盈利预测时,现有基金客户的佣 金压力会迫使其发布乐观预测，而本文进一步发现，分析师还有争取潜在客户佣金的压力，这会抑制佣金压力所导致的乐观偏差。那么，分析师面对这两种利益冲突时，就需要权衡。故本文首次研究了券商与基金的不同客户关系对分析师盈利预测偏差的影响，验证了分析师对基金持股预测时的这种权衡效应;并首次提出了“佣金利益冲突假说”，探讨了这种利益权衡对分析师择时的影响。本文结论：首先，佣金压力会迫使分析师对现有客户持股做出更为乐观的盈利预测，而潜在客户持股则能够对分析师形成压力抑制乐观偏差，部分地缓解佣金压力的影响；其次，不同经济环境中，这种利益权衡仍然存在，并导致分析师的择时行为：在好时机时，佣金压力和潜在客户压力对分析师的影响均会增强，前者导致分析师倾向发布更为乐观的盈利预测，而后者使分析师面临更大的利益权衡；最后，在截面上，明星与非明星分析师、高与低券商声誉分析师之间表现出不同的利益权衡和择时模式:时机转变时，佣金压力影响明星分析师的程度显著高于非明星分析师，而潜在客户压力影响非明星和低券商声誉分析师的程度显著高于明星和高券商声誉分析师。

近年来，随着中美贸易摩擦持续发酵，新冠病毒疫情在全球肆虐，我国经济下行压力持续加大，新的矛盾和问题不断形成，对金融环境造成较大冲击，防范化解重大风险尤其是金融风险成为首要任务，信贷资产风险是金融风险的关键，国有商业银行作为我国金融体系的主体力量，信贷资产风险管理面临重大挑战。本文聚焦国有商有银行信贷资产现状、分析信贷资产风险成因、提出风险防控对策，介绍中国银行临沂分行在化解信贷风险方面的成功经验，期望对信贷风险管理有所助益。

应对国际气候变化的政策框架有两类：一是减排政策，政府补贴、碳税与碳配额作为市场性政策的代表，从奖励与惩罚两方面下手，各有千秋，碳税政策或更符合我国国情；二是绿色金融，当下统一绿色金融界定标准、激励绿色信贷、进行环境信息披露制度、气候风险分析和前瞻性压力测试是较优的政策选项。

首先，本文基于GHM模型探究交易环境的积极变化对担保机构事前投资效率的影响，依托担保有效性的微观分析视角，检验地方政府性债务管理改革是否提升了金融市场的运行效率。其次，本文利用2010-2018年3728只城投债样本进行实证检验，得到以下结论：第一，地方政府性债务管理改革减弱了政府隐性担保与行政干预，提升了担保机构增信的有效性。第二，“43号文”的颁布对高信用平台公司发行城投债的担保增信有效性的提升作用更为显著。第三，在财政压力较小的地区，地方政府性债务管理改革对担保机构增信有效性的提升作用较好。最后，本文提出应提升政策叠加效应，增加专业担保机构在城投领域的担保供给量等政策建议。

本文研究了上市公司创新绩效的行业同群效应及其产生机制、影响因素和对企业业绩 的影响。实证结果分析表明，上市公司创新的行业同群效应在中国市场中显著存在。经过一 系列稳健性检验和排除内生性后，上述结论依然成立。就其产生机制而言，企业创新的同群 效应通过行业竞争压力使企业需要做出与同群企业类似的创新决策以维持竞争优势，降低风 险。进一步基于“业绩压力”和“信息传递”的视角，我们发现分析师关注与投资者关注会 显著影响创新的同群效应。此外，本文的异质性分析发现，公司规模、产权属性和盈利能力 均会对企业创新的行业同群效应产生重要影响。最后，我们证明了创新的行业同群效应能够 对企业业绩产生正向影响，这表明企业创新的行业同群效应达到了保持竞争优势和市场份额 的目的，也暗示了创新的行业同群效应更可能是企业主动选择的结果而非盲目跟风。

欧美全球性银行的交易银行业务历经多年发展，已经建立起一套成熟的发展模式。当前我国的金融市场化进程不断提速，银行业务尤其是对公业务面临转型升级的巨大压力。交易银行以其风险可控、资本节约、收益稳定的独特优势，必将成为今后一个时期国内银行对公业务转型发展的主要方向。而国内商业银行在建设交易银行的过程中，尤其需要健全多层次的协同机制，提升多维度的协同能力。

本文针对商业银行流动性风险国际监管框架的演变，探讨监管重点与流动性风险变化的互动关系，从而梳理出国际流动性风险监管的目的、手段和发展趋势，进而研究其对我国流动性风险监管实践的影响。 本文从分析商业银行流动性风险的成因入手，指出其根源是银行存款和贷款业务所形成的期限错配，因此这种风险是银行在经营活动中难以避免的。流动性风险区别于银行面临的其他风险的主要表现是其低频率、高损失的特点，这使得银行一旦面临流动性危机的打击就很难在短时间内恢复过来，所以必须引起银行管理层和监管机构的重视。从20世纪90年代起单一的流动性指标监管方法已经逐渐被综合的流动性风险管理体系所取代，但各国之间尚存在较大差异。 本文对次贷危机前美国、英国和东亚各国的流动性风险监管框架作了横向比较。经过比较后发现，在流动性风险监管体系中，存在两种不同的方法，即定性方法和定量方法。前者偏重在制度层面对银行进行指导以提高其流动性风险管理能力，而后者则偏重以硬性指标客观计量和评估流动性风险，两者互有优劣，不可偏废。相对来说，英美国家因为金融制度比较完善、人才水平较高，其监管机构以使用定性方法为主；而东亚各国由于金融发展水平较低，产品结构简单，从业人员水平参差不齐，所以更偏好使用定量方法。 当各国金融监管机构还在为如何在定性方法和定量方法之间进行取舍的时候，美国次贷危机和之后席卷全球的金融危机不期而至，这大大加快了流动性风险管理理念和监管实践的发展速度。作为次贷危机的受害者，本文深入分析了英国北岩银行（Northern Rock plc）的挤兑危机案例，对危机背景、银行的经营特点、事件经过和后续影响都作了较为细致的论述，并指出银行自身流动性风险管理不善是形成危机的主要原因，这表现在不合理的资产负债结构、期限错配、利率缺口以及内部控制的缺失。尽管北岩银行管理层对于流动性危机的发生负有不可推卸的责任，但是监管失败的教训同样发人深省，这间接促成了巴塞尔银行监管委员会（Basel Committee on Banking Supervision，以下简称巴塞尔委员会）制定后危机时代的流动性风险监督管理新框架。 本文回顾了历年巴塞尔委员会制定的流动性风险监管文件，将其大致分为次贷危机前和次贷危机后两大类。本文指出，巴塞尔委员会早期制定的流动性监管框架已经很难适应飞速发展的国际金融形势，面临诸多迫切需要解决的问题，包括融资渠道的变化、资产证券化、复杂金融工具的泛滥、抵押品的广泛应用、支付结算系统和日内流动性需求以及跨境资金流。在这些问题中，很大部分也同样存在于危机前的北岩银行，因此危机的爆发带有某种必然性。巴塞尔委员会在次贷危机后发布的《流动性风险管理和监督稳健原则》和《第三版巴塞尔协议：流动性风险计量、标准和监测的国际框架》奠定了第三版巴塞尔协议下国际流动性风险监管新框架的基石。前者制定的17项流动性风险监管新原则和后者引入的流动性覆盖率（Liquidity Coverage Ratio，简称LCR）和净稳定资金比例（Net Stable Funding Ratio，简称NSFR）两大指标分别从定性方法和定量方法两方面完善了现有的流动性风险监管框架，这也反映了未来国际流动性风险监管的趋势。 正如在本文开篇提到的，流动性风险是银行不可避免的风险，对于中国银行业来说，也不能置身事外。经过分析我国银行业的流动性风险现状，笔者认为我国银行的资产负债结构仍属传统，偏重以存款作为融资来源、以贷款作为盈利来源，因此长期流动性风险不容忽视而短期流动性风险尚属可控。同时，不同类型商业银行的流动性风险来源也有所不同。此外，国内银行的流动性风险管理水平也有待提高。与巴塞尔协议类似，在次贷危机前后，我国的流动性风险监管框架也有了质的飞跃，这主要归功于中国银监会颁布的《中国银行业实施新监管标准的指导意见》、《商业银行流动性风险管理指引》和《商业银行流动性风险管理办法（试行）》（征求意见稿）。这些法规系统性地借鉴巴塞尔委员会的先进经验，辅以本地化的监测工具，从而形成了兼顾定性方法和定量方法的有中国特色的流动性风险监督管理新框架。 本文最后指出，无论是定性方法还是定量方法，在流动性风险监管中都起着举足轻重的作用，两者不可偏废。监管机构在设计流动性风险监管框架并实施现场或非现场监管时，应灵活运用定性方法和定量方法并结合压力情景评估银行的流动性风险，这样才能全面有效地实施流动性风险监管，避免系统性的流动性危机。另外，本文还建议我国监管机构在本地化国际流动性风险监管框架方面做更多尝试。 With respect to the evolution of the international supervision framework for commercial bank’s liquidity risk, this article aims to discuss the interaction between the regulatory focuses and the diversification of liquidity risk, in order to sort out the purposes, approaches and development trends of the international supervision on liquidity risk and their impacts on China’s supervision practice of liquidity risk. In regard to the causes of commercial bank’s liquidity risk, this article points out that the mismatch of maturity between the bank’s deposits and loans is the fundamental reason. Such risk is inevitable when conducting banking business. The features of liquidity risk (i.e. low frequency but extremely severe) distinguish itself from other risks that the bank faces, which hinders the bank from a quick recovery after being stricken by a liquidity crisis. Therefore, both the bank management and the regulators must draw their attentions to it. From 1990s, the monitoring method of single indicator has been gradually replaced with the comprehensive liquidity risk management system. However, there are still big variances between different countries. This article compares the framework for liquidity risk supervision between the United States, the United Kingdom and the East Asian countries prior to the subprime mortgage crisis. It is noted after comparison that there are two different approaches in the liquidity risk supervision system, namely the qualitative approach and the quantitative approach. The former emphasizes improving the bank’s liquidity risk management skill by guiding the bank from governance perspective, while the latter prefers measuring and evaluating the liquidity risk by means of objective indicators. Each of these two approaches has its pros and cons that neither should be overemphasized at the expense of the other. Relatively speaking, the Anglo-American countries prefer qualitative approaches due to their mature financial system as well as professional practitioners. By contrast, East Asian countries rely on quantitative approach because of their under-developing financial system, simple product structure and less experienced practitioners. When the financial regulators in various countries were still wondering whether to adopt the qualitative approach or the quantitative approach, the subprime mortgage crisis occurred in the United States and thereafter became a global financial crisis. This crisis accelerated the development of the management theory and the supervision practice of liquidity risk. This article analyzes the bank run on Northern Rock plc (the Bank) in the United Kingdom, a victim of the subprime mortgage crisis, by elaborating the crisis background, the business features of the Bank, the incident course as well as the subsequent impacts. The major cause of the bank run was the Bank’s own mismanagement of its liquidity risk, which included unbalanced structure of assets and liabilities, maturity mismatch, interest rate gap and ineffective internal control as well. Although the management of the Bank bore the ultimate responsibility for this liquidity crisis, the lesson of the supervision failure was thought-provoking. It also indirectly led to the renewed framework for the post-crisis liquidity risk management and supervision by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Basel Committee). This article reviews the historical documents of liquidity risk supervision that were formulated by the Basel Committee and divides them into two categories, i.e. before and after the subprime mortgage crisis. This article points out that the framework for liquidity risk supervision which was established by the Basel Committee at the early stage could no longer meet the rapid development of the international financial environment and faced many problems which need be solved urgently. These problems included the change of financing channels, asset securitization, misapplication of complex financial instruments, extensive use of collaterals, payment-settlement system, demand for intraday liquidity and cross-border cash flow. Northern Rock plc had most of these problems prior to its bank run crisis. Therefore, the crisis was with certain inevitability. After the subprime mortgage crisis, the Basel Committee issued “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision” and “Basel III: International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” which laid the foundation of the renewed international framework for the liquidity risk supervision under Basel III. The former defines 17 new principles of liquidity risk supervision whilst the latter introduces two key indicators, i.e. the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). Both of the two foundational documents improve the existing framework for liquidity risk supervision from qualitative and quantitative aspects respectively. They also reflect the trends of international liquidity risk supervision. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, the liquidity risk is inevitable to all banks including the China’s banks. Based on the analysis of the status quo of the Chinese banks’ liquidity risk, the author draws the conclusion that the structures of assets and liabilities of the China’s banks are traditional, i.e. the deposits are the source of financing while the loans are the source of profit. Hence, their long-term liquidity risk cannot be ignored whilst their short-term liquidity risk is still under control. In addition, the liquidity risk management skills of the China’s banks need further improvement. Similar to the Basel Accord, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (the CBRC) promulgated “Guidance Opinions on the Implementation of the New Supervisory Standards of Basel III in China Banking Sector”, “Guidelines on Liquidity Risk Management for Commercial Banks” and “Administrative Measures on Liquidity Risk Management for Commercial Banks (Trial) (Draft for Consultation)” right after the subprime mortgage crisis, which made great improvement in the framework for liquidity risk supervision in China. By referring to the advanced experiences of the Basel Committee, together with the help of the localized monitoring tools, these regulations forms a new framework for liquidity risk management and supervision with Chinese characteristics which takes into account both the qualitative and quantitative approaches. Finally, this article reminds that both the qualitative and quantitative approaches play equally important roles in the field of liquidity risk supervision that neither of them is dispensable. When designing the framework for liquidity risk supervision and conducting the on-site or off-site inspections, the regulators should apply flexibility in the use of qualitative and quantitative approaches and attach importance to the stress scenarios to assess the bank’s liquidity risk. By this means, comprehensive and effective supervision on liquidity risk can be achieved to prevent systemic liquidity crisis. Furthermore, it is suggested that the domestic regulators should make more efforts to localize the international framework for liquidity risk supervision.

本文对我国证券投资基金的季末橱窗粉饰现象进行了实证研究。运用2003 年 到2011 年开放式股票型基金的净值数据，我们发现我国基金市场存在显著的季末 橱窗粉饰现象，且基金经理学历、工作经验、任职时间、基金历史业绩以及赎回 压力这些因素对窗饰程度影响显著。对基金重仓股的检验则发现，股票的基金持 股比例越高，季末橱窗粉饰程度越大。这些发现支持了我国基金管理者因为自身 动机而操纵季末所持股票价格的理论，为监管层规范机构市场行为提供了证据。 根据本文研究建立的套利投资组合还可以获得较稳定的超额回报，为投资者交易 提供参考。