期权博弈

  • 详情 模块化企业并购及并购浪潮
    模块化及其创新是导致信息产业竞争激烈的根本原因,高强度竞争迫使企业采取兼并战略。基于模块化特征,本文建立模块化产品市场竞争模型和强强企业兼并与弱弱企业兼并之间的兼并期权博弈模型,研究模块创新对并购决策的影响和并购浪潮产生的机制。研究结果表明,模块化产品创新的持续性导致模块化产业并购频发,而模块化系统中重要模块的技术进步周期是导致模块化产业并购浪潮发生的重要原因。本文研究结论从技术层面为第五、六次并购浪潮中IT产业并购的集中爆发提供了合理解释。
  • 详情 经营成本对企业研发投资决策影响的期权博弈分析
    本文运用对称双头垄断时机选择期权博弈模型分析了经营成本对企业研发投资决策的影响。随着研发投资项目经营成本的增加,企业的投资收益下降而投资临界值上升。这使得企业即使面临竞争对手抢先进入的威胁,等待而不是立即投资仍然是最优的。经营成本对于企业的投资收益和投资临界值的影响大于项目投资成本,而且追随者企业对于经营成本更加敏感。 In this paper, we analyze the influence of operating costs on the R&D investment decision with a symmetrical duopoly real option timing game. As the operating costs increasing, the payoffs of firms decrease but investment thresholds increase, so firms prefer waiting to investing even facing the threat of preemption of the rival. We show that the investment thresholds are more sensitive to the change of the operating costs than that of the investment costs, and the operating costs have more influence on the payoffs of follower firm than that of leader firm.