详情
Information Asymmetry and Insurers’ Nitpicking Behaviors
This paper explores the widespread perception of insurers as bad payers, often accused of unjustly rejecting legitimate claims. We explore the mechanisms leading to this negative image by examining the strategic “nitpicking” behaviour of insurers. Such behaviour involves an insurer’s effort to find evidence that can help it cut the indemnities of honest claims. Our findings reveal that this nitpicking behaviour only arises in markets with asymmetric information, where policyholders are unable to observe insurers’ nitpicking strategies. Conversely, in markets with symmetric information, insurers lose the incentive to engage in nitpicking. Moreover, our study highlights that nitpicky behaviour leads to a reduction in welfare and Pareto-inefficiency. This is because nitpicking is essentially an overpriced gam- ble that charges lower premiums from policyholders at a no-loss state, but cuts actual indemnities received by policyholders at a loss state.