The growing emphasis on Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) principles, particularly in corporate sectors, shapes investment trends and operational strategies, whose shift is supported by the increasing role of media in monitoring and influencing corporate ESG performance, thereby driving the energy innovation. Therefore, based on reported events from Baidu News and patent text information of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2022, this study innovatively applied machine learning and text analysis to measure ESG news sentiment and corporate energy innovation indicators. Combing with reputation, stakeholder, and agency theories, we find that a good reputation conveyed by positive ESG textual sentiments in the media significantly promotes corporate energy innovation, and the effect is mainly realized through alleviating financing constraints and agency problems and promoting green investment. Further analysis shows that ESG news sentiment promotes corporate energy innovation mainly among private firms, non-growth-stage firms, high-energy-consuming firms, and regions with better green finance development and higher ESG governance intensity. From the perspective of ESG news content and information content, greater ESG news attention can also exert an energy innovation incentive effect, in which the incentive effect exerted by positive media sentiment in the environmental (E) and social (S) dimensions, as well as excellent attention, is more robust. This study provides new insights for promoting green and low-carbon development and understanding the external governance role of media in corporate ESG development.

Existing literature has demonstrated the aggregation and allocation effects of the corporate holding financial institutions on financial resources, but there is little literature to discuss whether it will further affect corporate employment. Therefore, this paper uses data from China's A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2021 to examine whether holding financial institutions can affect corporate employment, thus serving the real economy. Empirical results show that holding financial institutions significantly expands corporate employment, which is pronounced in periods of tight monetary policy, in financially underdeveloped areas, and for enterprises with high financing constraints, weak external supervision, and high labor intensity. The conclusion still holds after conducting a series of robustness tests. Mechanism tests show that holding financial institutions can expand corporate employment by alleviating liquidity constraints and inhibiting the dissipation of internal funds caused by agency problems. Further discussion also shows that holding financial institutions has significantly improved corporate operating performance and increased the salary levels of executives and ordinary employees, which means that there is no “executive plunder” after profit increases; Meanwhile, holding financial institutions generates spillover effects along the supply chain, expanding corporate employment among major suppliers and customers. This paper has important implications for taking measures related to “finance serves for the real economy” to achieve high-quality economic development.

This paper examines how macroeconomic surprises affect corporate risk-taking in China. Using well-identified business cycle shocks to proxy the unexpected fluctuations of the Chinese aggregate economy, we find that the risk-taking level of publicly listed firms positively correlates with business cycle shocks in general. The underlying mechanism is the evolvement of firms’ financial constraints. However, this finding of full sample analysis is driven mainly by positive business cycle shocks, as the subsample analysis shows that firms also tend to increase risk-taking due to agency problems as adverse business cycle shocks get larger. Moreover, firm-level characteristics, such as managerial shareholdings, growth opportunities, and cash holdings, significantly affect the magnitude of corporate risk-taking’s response to business cycle shocks.

Using “the Measures for the Administration of Bank Wealth Management (henceforth BWM) Funds Sales” as an exogenous shock in fund distribution channels in Chinese BWM industry, we investigate the impact of non-affiliated distribution on fund performance. We find that the adoption of non-affiliated distribution brokers has a positive effect on BWM fund performance. We further find that the effect is more pronounced when the non-affiliated distribution broker has more market power and when the fund issuer has better governance. We interpret our findings to indicate that non-affiliated distribution brokers alleviate the agency problems of fund managers by introducing both ex-ante and ex-post monitoring, highlighting the role of non-affiliated distribution brokers as an external governance mechanism in wealth management industry.

This paper investigates the effect of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) on the ESG performance of their underlying firms. Using data from China, we find that ETFs enhance the ESG performance of their underlying firms. This finding remains consistent after several robustness and endogeneity tests. Further, we show that the effect is more pronounced for non-SOEs, firms in low-polluting industries, and firms at growth and maturity stages. Studying the mechanisms behind these results, we find that ETFs mitigate the corporate agency problems, enhance the willingness of managers to invest in ESG, and improve the ESG performance.

Site visits allow visitors to physically inspect productive resources and interact with onsite employees and executives face-to-face. We posit that, by allowing visitors to acquire investmentrelated information and monitor the management team, site visits offer disciplinary benefits for corporate investments. Using mandatory disclosures of site visits in China, we find that corporate investments become more responsive to growth opportunities as the intensity of site visits increases, consistent with the notion that site visits yield disciplinary benefits. We also find that the positive association between site visits and investment efficiency is more pronounced when visitors can glean more investment-related information and when they have stronger incentives and greater power to monitor managers. This positive association is also stronger among firms with more severe agency problems and higher asset tangibility. The overall evidence supports the notion that site visits serve as a unique venue for institutional investors and financial analysts to acquire valuable information and serve a monitoring function, which generates disciplinary benefits for corporate investments.

This study examines the impact of strategic alliances on corporate green innovation. We find that strategic alliances significantly promote corporate green innovation. Mechanism tests indicate that strategic alliances promote green innovation through channels of attracting market attention, alleviating agency problems, and stimulating collaborative innovation. Heterogeneity analysis demonstrates that the effects of strategic alliances are more pronounced for firms in areas with stringent environmental regulations and a favorable business environment, and firms facing intense product market competition. The findings provide new insights into the green transformation and upgrading of enterprises.

Digital transformation (DT) is an ongoing and costly process that requires careful planning and the motivation of top executives (CEOs). This research analyze the CEOs compensation as a motivation to embrace DT by reducing agency issue. We determine the extent of DT through a textual analysis method and utilize data from Chinese publicly traded companies spanning the period between 2007 and 2020. Our study findings are threefold, (a) we observe a positive relationship between CEOs' pay gap and DT, highlighting the significant role CEOs compensation plays in encouraging CEOs to adopt digitalization, (b) we find that managerial shareholding significantly enhances this relationship, (c) we note that the relationship between CEOs pay gap and DT is more pronounced in state-owned enterprises compared to non-stateowned enterprises. Additionally, we discover through channel analysis that agency cost and audit quality mediate the relationship between CEOs pay gap and DT potentially by reducing the agency problem between CEOs and shareholders. These findings are vital for comprehending the pay practices and behaviors of corporate executives regarding digitalization in China. Importantly, the study results remain robust when considering instrumental variables (IV), propensity score matching (PSM), and alternative techniques.

Utilizing the removal of the bank lending interest rate floor (IRFD) in China as an exogenous shock of banking liberalization, we find that IRFD leads to a significant rise in firms’ cost of equity capital, which is consistent with the prediction from the MM theory. The identified effects are more pronounced among firms with weaker ex-ante corporate governance and more severe ex-ante agency problems. We also find that IRFD witnesses an increase in the amount of acquired bank loans, a decrease in the average interest rate, and an increase in free cash flow. Further evidence also suggests IRFD provokes a drop in firms’ investment quality. Overall, our findings highlight an unexplored role of banking sector deregulation on firms’ cost of equity capital.

In this paper, we construct a content analysis structure to explore whether corporate governance information in voluntary disclosures can predict management expenses in the next term. Employing the site visit information disclosure of firms listed on the Chinese A-share market from 2012 to 2021, we find that corporate governance information disclosure is motivated by ownership concentration,and that corporate governance information can predict management expenses and comprises incremental information, indicating that the content analysis we construct is valuable and the disclosure of corporate governance information can mitigate the agency problems.There is a difference between state-owned listed firms and nonstate-owned listed firms.