This study aims to examine the causal effect of carbon regulatory risk on corporate bond yield spreads in emerging markets through empirical analysis. Exploiting China's commitment to peak CO2 emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060 as an exogenous shock to an unexpected increase in carbon regulatory risk, we perform a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) strategy. We find that exposure to carbon regulatory risk leads to an increase in bond yield spreads for carbon-intensive firms located in regions with stricter regulatory enforcement. This positive relationship is more pronounced for firms with financing constraints, belonging to more competitive industries, and located in regions with a high marketization process. We further identify that higher earnings uncertainty and increased investor attention serve as two mechanisms by which carbon regulatory risk influences the yield spreads of corporate bonds. Moreover, the spread decomposition reveals that the rise in bond yield spreads after an increase in carbon regulatory risk is primarily driven by the rise in default risk rather than the rise in liquidity risk. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of considering carbon regulatory risk exposure in financial markets, especially in developing economies like China.

This paper investigates whether increased female representation on corporate boards affects firms’ bond financing costs. Exploiting the 2017 Big Three’s campaigns as a plausibly exogenous shock, we document that firms experiencing larger increases in female board representation, induced by the campaigns, experience significant reductions in bond yield spreads and improvements in credit ratings. We identify reduced leverage and enhanced workplace environment as key mechanisms, and show that the effects are stronger among firms with greater tail risk and information asymmetry. An alternative identification strategy based on California’s SB 826 regulatory mandate yields consistent results. Our findings suggest that board gender diversity enhances governance in ways valued by credit markets.

Agency theory posits that debt-like compensation (such as defined-benefit pensions and other deferred compensation) aligns managerial interests more closely with those of debtholders and reduces the agency cost of debt. Consistent with theory, we find that a higher CEO relative leverage, defined as the ratio of the CEO's inside leverage (debt-toequity compensation) to corporate leverage, is associated with lower cost of debt financing and fewer restrictive covenants, for a sample of private loans originated during 2006-2008. These findings persist after accounting for the endogeneity of CEO relative leverage, and are more pronounced for firms with higher default risk. Additional analysis on a sample of new public bond issues also shows a negative relation between CEO relative leverage and bond yield spread. Overall, the evidence supports the notion that debtholders recognize the incentive effects of executive debt-like compensation and adjust the terms of corporate debt contracts accordingly.