Many studies suggest a positive and monotonic relationship between technological progress and wage income inequality since 1980s for industrialized economies. We examine this topic in the context of the Chinese economy where new technologies like automation, AI and digitalization have witnessed worldís most rapid growth in the last decade. Surprsingly, we Önd an inverted U-Shaped relationship - a "Digital Kuznets Curve", using a panel dataset constructed in line with the newly published "2021 Categorization of Core Industries of Digital Economy". We then set out a task-based growth model with heterogenous human capital and occupational choice, and show that this hump-shaped relationship can emerge either by introducing an erosion e§ect of digitalization on worker ability that increasingly counterveils the skill-biasing e§ect, or by directly adding a dynamic learning cost that captures the externality of digitalization. Our study contributes to the understanding of the nature of digitalization in re-shaping labor market structure.

Previous studies have typically found a negative relation between pyramidal ownership and firm value, and have interpreted it as supporting evidence of the incentive problems created by pyramiding. Those studies, however, do not adequately control for the endogeneity of ownership to factors that also affect firm performance, leaving the agency problem indistinguishable from the unfavorable fundamental shock. Using a unique sample of privately owned listed enterprises in China, this paper examines the effect of pyramidal ownership on returns in response to the announcement of the Share Split Reform in China. This reform triggered zero fundamental shocks but resurrected entrepreneurial incentives in proportion to the separation of ownership and control. Estimates of agency cost of pyramidal ownership are significant and material, and are robust against a range of alternative hypotheses. Moreover, institutional investors appear to appreciate the reform more when a firm’s pyramidal ownership is less separated. The findings suggest that, despite the endogenous determinant of ownership choice, agency theory alone successfully explains the pyramidal discount.

Chinese authorities have traditionally relied mainly on administrative and quantitative measures in conducting monetary policy, with interest rates playing a less prominent role. Additional support for this view resides in a number of earlier studies that have found that the impact of interest rates on the real economy has been miniscule. However, taking into account numerous reforms in the financial sector and more widely in the Chinese economy, interest rates may have gained some influence in the last few years. It is important to study the effectiveness of interest rates also in light of future reforms of the monetary policy tools in China. Whereas administrative policy measures were effective in guiding the behaviour of state-owned enterprises, the authorities may need to increase the use of more market-oriented monetary policy tools as the share of the economy in private and foreign ownership grows. We use a vector error correction model to study, within a credit demand framework, whether the impact of interest rates in China has become stronger over the last decade. Our results suggest that loan demand has indeed become more dependent on interest rates, albeit the channel from interest rate to the real economy is still weak.

The US dollar has been volatile and falling again and again in recent decades as well as recent years, and for many observers, it is going to be broken sooner or later. The central importance of the dollar is due to the fact that it is not just a currency for the US. Over half of all dollar bills in circulation are held outside of the US borders, and almost half of the US Treasury bonds are held as reserves by foreign central banks. The US dollar is supposed to be the anchor that stabilizes the global currency market. Instead, today it is a major source of instability. In the back ground, the US fiscal deficits have been running high again under Bush administration, once up to almost 3% of US GDP. And current account deficit is set to about 7% in 2005 and more volatility is widely expected. The situation is very challenging for the central banks of Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore which collectively hold about US$2.8 trillion worth of US Treasury bonds as part of their reserves. The moment that they reduce their purchases, the value of the dollar slips. Yet, the more they buy, the more they are exposed to a potential free fall of the US dollar. China has been blamed, not only by US congressmen who are understandably not very familiar with either the complicated currency issues or the domestic politics in any other country, but also many economists or business strategists. It was said that it was all because RMB did not reevaluate, as the source of this "global imbalance" and currency instability. How much revaluation of RMB would remove the US deficits of $700 billions, or at least the US-China trade deficits $200 billions (including Hong Kong)? 500% or 1000%? Of cause no body asked for that kind of magnitude now. Normally smart people say 30-50%, with the unsaid intention to blame-then-suggest again another 30-50% after some initial moves, then the third, the fourth. This seems not really new phenomena at all. It has been all so familiar before and since the Nixon shock in early 70s', and in 80s' when there was the Plaza Accord. The convenient targets to blame were the gold standard, the Dutch Mark, the Japanese Yen. Now it is turn for Chinese reminbi. So the question is what are the real causes of the global imbalance and currency instability? In this short paper, we first take a look at what is really going on with the Chinese economy and trade balance, and then try to identify sources of the current imbalance , and then, as a concluding remark, think again the possibilities to reform the global currency system.

It is a striking economic phenomenon that China’s foreign exchange reserves reached $US 606.9 billion. This paper pursues to explore the underlying motivations and implications by not only analyzing the complicated relationships between the Chinese economy and foreign exchange reserves but also establishing a tentative model to evaluate the adequacy of foreign exchange reserve holdings. The model has successfully confirmed that China’s recent holdings of foreign exchange reserve, in particular in 2004, appeared to exceed the adequate level largely due to speculative hot money inflows when the Chinese currency Renminbi had been expected to appreciate.