Banks have a significant funding-cost advantage if their liabilities are protected by bailout guarantees. We construct a corporate finance-style model showing that banks can exploit this funding-cost advantage by just intermediating funds between investors and ultimate borrowers, thereby earning the spread between their reduced funding rate and the competitive market rate. This mechanism leads to a crowding-out of direct market finance and real effects for bank borrowers at the intensive margin: banks protected by bailout guarantees induce their borrowers to leverage excessively, to overinvest, and to conduct inferior high-risk projects. We confirm our model predictions using U.S. panel data, exploiting exogenous changes in banks' political connections, which cause variation in bailout expectations. At the bank level, we find that higher bailout probabilities are associated with more wholesale debt funding and lending. Controlling for loan demand, we confirm this effect on bank lending at the bank-firm level and find evidence on loan pricing consistent with a shift towards riskier borrower real investments. Finally, at the firm level, we find that firms linked to banks that experience an expansion in their bailout guarantees show an increase in their leverage, higher investment levels with indications of overinvestment, and lower productivity.

The economic institutionalist literature often suggests that sub-optimal institutional arrangements impart unique distortions in China, and excessive corporate debt is a symptom of this condition. However, lax monetary policies after the global financial crisis, and specifically, quantitative easing have led to concerns about debt bubbles under a wide range of institutional regimes. This study draws on data from Chinese listed firms, supplemented by numerous macroeconomic control variables, to isolate the effect of international capital flows from other drivers of firm leverage. We conclude that the rise in, and distribution of, Chinese corporate debt can partly be as-cribed to the effects of monetary policy outside of China and that Chinese institutional features amplify these effects. Whilst Chinese firms are affected by developments in the global financial ecosystem, domestic institutional realities and distortions may unevenly add their own particular effects, providing further support for and extending the variegated capitalism literature.

As digital transformation strategies have emerged as a primary approach for enterprises to enhance their Total Factor Productivity (TFP), it is crucial to empirically examine the impact of these strategies on TFP. For this purpose, this study considers these transformation strategies as a quasi-natural experiment and employees a propensity score-weighted difference-indifferences methodology on data from Chinese firms listed on the A-share market between 2007 and 2020. The key findings include: (1) digital transformation has a significant positive influence on TFP; (2) Generalized boosted regression trees analysis reinforces this finding after controlling for other TFP determinants; (3) notably, non-state-owned and technology-intensive enterprises exhibit a more distinct enhancement in TFP following digital transformation. These results underscore the need for firms to increase investment in research and development capabilities and digital competencies.

Exploiting a unique market-oriented media reform initiated in 1996 in China, we investigate the role of media environment in affecting firm behaviour. We find robust evidence that market-oriented media environment is conductive to firm innovation, with the reform promoting patent quantity and quality substantially. The effect is more pronounced for firms with higher information asymmetry. Matching firm data with 1.3 million news reports, we find the market-oriented media reform significantly improves the criticalness and unbiasedness of news coverage and shapes an innovation-friendly environment. Our findings highlight economic outcomes of relaxing media control and underline substantial gains from deepening the reform.

We examine the pricing ofsystematic information asymmetry, induced by Chinese gov-ernment intervention, in the cross-section of stock returns. Using market-wide order im-balance as a proxy for systematic information, we observe a strong correlation betweenthe standard deviation of market-wide order imbalance and economic policy uncertainty.Furthermore, we find a significant positive relationship between the sensitivity of stocks tosystematic information asymmetry (OIBeta) and their future returns. The average monthlyreturn spread between high- and low-OIBeta portfolios ranges from 1.30% to 1.77%, andthis result remains robust after controlling for traditional risk factors. Our results providesubstantial evidence that the pricing of OIBeta is driven by systematic information asym-metry rather than alternative explanatory channels.

The process of internationalization of China’s banking industry began in 1917. After a hundred years of development, China’s banking internationalization has made great achievements. However, there is still a big gap between China’s banking industry and the financial institutions in some developed countries in the field of internationalization. In the process of internationalization, China's banking industry are now still facing the dilemma of backward development concept, lack of effective risk control system and international talents. This thesis mainly introduces the history, present situation and difficulties of the internationalization of China’s banking industry. The first part gives a description to the history of the internationalization of China’s banking industry, which starts in the year of 1917. An analysis of the current situation of China’s banking industry’ internationalization is given in the second part of this article. And the third part summarizes the difficulties that are faced by China’s banking industry.

Despite nearly twenty years of privatization, mixed-ownership reform has been the mainstay of SOE reform in China in recent years. This raises the question of whether the financial performance of mixed-ownership firms (Mixed firms) is better than private-owned enterprises (POEs). Although Mixed firms suffer more from government intervention, unclear property rights, and interest conflicts between state shareholders and private shareholders, they can also benefit from the external resources controlled by the state. Therefore, the performance of Mixed firms is still unclear. Collecting data from the Chinese A-share listed market, we divide the firms into POEs, Mixed firms controlled by the state (MixedSOEs), and Mixed firms controlled by the private sectors (MixedPOEs). Measuring profitability using ROA and ROE, we find that on average, POEs perform better than Mixed firms, and MixedPOEs have a higher profitability than MixedSOEs. Within Mixed firms, more state shares are related to lower profitability, and more private shares are related to higher profitability. Using the NBS survey data, we further find that on average, SOEs exhibit the lowest profitability, with MixedSOEs and MixedPOEs in the middle, and POEs have the highest profitability. We try to address the endogeneity challenge in several ways and get similar results. Overall, our analysis provides new evidence on the financial performance of mixed-ownership firms.

Why do firms appoint expired independent directors? How do expired independent directors affect corporate governance and thus impact investment decisions? By taking advantage of the sharp increase in expired independent directors’ re-employment in China caused by exogenous regulatory shocks, Rule No. 18 and Regulation 11, this paper adopts a PSM-DID design to test the impact of expired independent directors on CSR performance. We find that firms experience a significant decrease in CSR performance after re-hiring expired independent directors and the effect is stronger for CSR components mostly related to internal governance. The results of robustness tests show that the main results are robust to alternative measures of CSR performance, an extended sample period, alternative control groups, year-by-year PSM method, and a staggered DID model regarding Rule No. 18 as a staggered quasi-natural experiment. We address the endogeneity concern that chance drives our DID results by using exogenous regulatory shock, an instrumental variable (the index of regional guanxi culture), and placebo tests. We also find that the negative relation between the re-employment of expired independent directors and CSR performance is more significant for independent directors who have more relations with CEOs and raise less objection to managers’ decisions, and for firms that rely more on expired independent directors’ monitoring roles (e.g., a lower proportion of independent directors, CEO duality, high growth opportunities, and above-median FCF). The mediating-effect test shows that the re-employment of expired independent directors increases CEOs’ myopia and thus reduces CSR performance. In addition, we exclude the alternative explanation that the negative relation is caused by the protective effect brought by expired independent directors’ political backgrounds. Our study shows that managers may build reciprocal relationships with expired independent directors in the Chinese guanxi culture and gain personal interest.

We examine the effect of minority shareholder voting rights on labor investment efficiency using a sample of Chinese firms. Taking advantage of the difference-in-difference setting, our study reveals that the expansion of minority shareholder voting rights has a detrimental effect on labor investment efficiency. Through analysis of holding period and a managerial shortsightedness index based on textual analysis, we find that this outcome can be attributed to the fact that minority shareholders typically prioritize short-term gains over long-term corporate growth. Moreover, the impact of voting power is more pronounced in determining the investment efficiency of rank-andfileemployees. Our results are more significant for firms that face severe financial constraints, are non-state-owned enterprises, exhibit lower levels of internal control, possess fewer female managers, demonstrate lower human capital quality and higher labor intensity. Taken together, our paper suggests that minority shareholders could be myopia in making labor decisions.

We investigate the unintended real effects of regulator-led minority shareholder activism on corporate innovation. We use manually collected data from the China Securities Investor Services Center (CSISC), a novel regulatory investor protection institution controlled by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) that holds 100 shares of every listed firm. We find that by exercising its shareholder rights, the CSISC substantially curtails the innovation output of targeted firms. This effect is amplified in cases involving a high level of myopic pressure and few innovation incentives. We further observe variation in the real effects of different intervention methods. Textual analysis reveals that CSISC intervention with a myopic topic and negative tone contributes to a decrease in innovation. The results of a mechanism analysis support the hypothesis that regulator-led minority shareholder activism induces managerial myopia and financial constraints, impeding corporate innovation. Furthermore, CSISC intervention not only diminishes innovation output but also undermines innovation efficiency. In summary, our findings suggest that regulator-led minority shareholder activism exacerbates managerial myopia to cater to investors and financial constraints, ultimately stifling corporate innovation.