This paper consists of two parts. In the first part, through the calculation of “binomial correlation measure”, we suggest that from the perspective of default correlation it would be better to use structural approach rather than reduced form approach for pricing derivatives with two counterparties and its CVA calculation unless default intensities follow jump-diffusion process in latter one. In the second part, we derive the pricing model for CDS with counterparty risk and its CVA calculation by Black-Cox first passage time model in structural approach. Different from most of the previous paper our recovery is based on the CDS with counterparty risk, so the pricing model is a boundary-value problem of fully-nonlinear PDE. To solve it, we introduce an approximation problem by penalty model in reduced form approach by assuming an incentive function. Also finite element method and iteration approach are used. The numerical results show the convergence of approximation problem, iteration problem and finite element method, a comparison between CVA with different recovery rules and also the impact of wrong-way risk and right-way risk on CVA.

Although bank loans themselves are somewhat illiquid because of private information, most of their cashflows are not. Recent financial innovations allow commercial loans to be liquefied via credit derivatives and actual and synthetic securitizations. The loan originating bank holds the remaining illiquid tranche containing the concentrated credit risk, private information rent and the “excess spread” that incentivize the bank to continue to monitor and service the loans. Empirically, we find that the average size of the residual tranche is about 3%, which reflects the size of the “market determined capital” necessary to support the liquefaction. The liquefaction of bank loans makes possible a banking system that restricts the guaranteed accounts to be backed by 100% reserves and the non-guaranteed deposits to be backed by liquid securitized loan tranches, while retaining the deposit-lending synergy. Such a system is perfectly safe without deposit insurance and it renders banks bankruptcy-remote without sacrificing a bank’s traditional role as a financial intermediary.

Although bank loans themselves are somewhat illiquid because of private information, most of their cashflows are not. Recent financial innovations allow commercial loans to be liquefied via credit derivatives and actual and synthetic securitizations. The loan originating bank holds the remaining illiquid tranche containing the concentrated credit risk, private information rent and the “excess spread” that incentivize the bank to continue to monitor and service the loans. Empirically, we find that the average size of the residual tranche is about 3%, which reflects the size of the “market determined capital” necessary to support the liquefaction. The liquefaction of bank loans makes possible a banking system that restricts the guaranteed accounts to be backed by 100% reserves and the non-guaranteed deposits to be backed by liquid securitized loan tranches, while retaining the deposit-lending synergy. Such a system is perfectly safe without deposit insurance and it renders banks bankruptcy-remote without sacrificing a bank’s traditional role as a financial intermediary.