This paper investigates whether increased female representation on corporate boards affects firms’ bond financing costs. Exploiting the 2017 Big Three’s campaigns as a plausibly exogenous shock, we document that firms experiencing larger increases in female board representation, induced by the campaigns, experience significant reductions in bond yield spreads and improvements in credit ratings. We identify reduced leverage and enhanced workplace environment as key mechanisms, and show that the effects are stronger among firms with greater tail risk and information asymmetry. An alternative identification strategy based on California’s SB 826 regulatory mandate yields consistent results. Our findings suggest that board gender diversity enhances governance in ways valued by credit markets.

We investigate the impact of government environmental credit ratings on bond credit spreads based on a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2022. Empirical results demonstrate that a favourable environmental credit rating significantly reduces bond credit spreads, highlighting the incentivising effect of environmental credit ratings. Mechanism testing reveals that a good environmental credit rating diminishes information asymmetry and enhances an enterprise’s resource acquisition capabilities, reducing bond credit spreads. Furthermore, subgroup analyses suggest the reduction effect is more pronounced in enterprises with low debt and tax credit ratings.

We investigate the impact of government environmental credit ratings on bond credit spreads based on a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2022. Empirical results demonstrate that a favourable environmental credit rating significantly reduces bond credit spreads, highlighting the incentivising effect of environmental credit ratings. Mechanism testing reveals that a good environmental credit rating diminishes information asymmetry and enhances an enterprise’s resource acquisition capabilities, reducing bond credit spreads. Furthermore, subgroup analyses suggest the reduction effect is more pronounced in enterprises with low debt and tax credit ratings.

This paper creates default-probability-(PD)-implied credit ratings for Chinese firms following the S&P global rating standard. The domestic credit rating agency (DCRA) ratings are higher than the PD-implied ratings by ten notches on average for the identical level of default risk, implying that the domestic ratings are significantly inflated. The PD-implied ratings outperform the DCRA ratings in detecting defaults and complement the latter in predicting yield spreads. The PD-implied ratings draw information from operating efficiency-related variables; in contrast, the DCRA ratings pay attention to scale-based firm characteristics in credit risk assessment.

Using a difference-in-differences (DID) approach, this research assesses the effect of a firm’s credit rating issued by domestic rating agencies on stock price crash risk (SPCR). The results show that SPCR for treated firms decreases by 11% after firm ratings, suggesting that they can aggravate information content at the firm level. The effect is consistently more evident when stock price synchronization is higher and is stronger in firms with low media coverage, in firms with low audit quality, in state-controlled firms, and in firms with low investor protection. In addition, during a bear market year, the quality of firm ratings is higher. Overall, our findings support that investors could gain more information via firm ratings issued by credit rating agencies. Through our research, policymakers and investors can pay more attention to firm ratings that help play the information intermediary role of credit rating agencies.

Using political turnovers in mayoral appointments at the prefecture-city level in China, we show that investors in the municipal corporate bond market price their concerns for rising local political uncertainty into bonds and relocate capital toward other corporate bonds issued by local firms. Municipal/non-municipal corporate bond issue spreads increase (decrease) by 8.9 (14) basis points before the expected political turnover of mayors and reverse afterwards. The effect is more prominent for bonds issued in cities with investors who have a strong local preference, suggesting investors switch from MCBs to local non-MCBs in their bond holdings. The pricing effect is also stronger for bonds issued in regions with more developed financial markets and bonds with lower credit ratings. Lastly, bond market participants only price in the political risk induced by the turnovers of politician with direct involvement in local economic activities.

Stock market trading restrictions affect stock prices and liquidity directly through constraints on investors’ transactions and indirectly by altering the information environment. We isolate this indirect effect by analyzing how stock market restrictions affect corporate-bond prices. Exploiting the staggered relaxations of trading restrictions in the Chinese stock market as a quasi-natural experiment, we document that the easing of trading restrictions on a firm’s stock decreases the credit spread of its corporate bond. This effect is stronger for firms with less transparency or lower credit ratings. Our evidence suggests that the effect is likely due to improved stock price informativeness.

Using a comprehensive dataset of Chinese corporate bond issuances, we uncover substantial evidence of issuance overpricing: the yield spread of newly issued bonds at their first secondary-market trading day is on average 5.35 bps higher than the issuance spread. This overpricing is robust across subsamples of bond issuances with different credit ratings, maturities, issuance types, and issuer status. We further provide extensive evidence to support a hypothesis that competition among underwriters drives this overpricing through two specific channels—either through rebates to participants in issuance auctions or through direct auction bidding by the underwriters for themselves or their clients.

Over the past twenty years, especially the past decade, China has taken enormous strides to develop its bond market as an integral step of financial reform. This paper aims to provide the most up-to-date overview of Chinese bond markets, by highlighting two distinct and largely segmented markets: Over-the-Counter based interbank market, and centralized exchange market. We explain various bond instruments traded in these two markets, highlighting their inherent connection with the banking system, and many multi-layer regulatory bodies who are interacting with each other in an intricate way. We also covers the credit ratings and rating agencies in Chinese market, and offer an account of ever-rising default incidents in China starting 2014. Finally, we discuss the recent regulatory tightening of shadow banking since late 2017 and its impact on bond investors, and the forces behind the internalization of Chinese bond markets in the near future.

We examine the influence of implicit government guarantees on the information content of credit ratings in China, guided by a theoretical credit rating game model in the presence of government guarantees. Using issuers’ controlling shareholder identity as the defining metric of implicit government guarantees, we document a less sensitive relationship between credit ratings and primary market offer yields for SOE bonds (i.e., bonds issued by firms controlled by government or government related agencies) than that for non SOE bonds. Moreover, ratings of non SOE bonds have a stronger predictive power on both future downgrades and a market based measure of issuer expected default probability than those of SOE bonds. These findings are robust to considering the u nobserved influence of the controlling shareholder identity on security pricing and bond default risk. Taken together, our empirical findings are consistent with the model’s prediction that government guarantees can dampen the incentives for credit rating agencies to acquire costly information, thus lowering the equilibrium informativeness of ratings for SOE bonds.