Using a difference-in-differences (DID) approach, this research assesses the effect of a firm’s credit rating issued by domestic rating agencies on stock price crash risk (SPCR). The results show that SPCR for treated firms decreases by 11% after firm ratings, suggesting that they can aggravate information content at the firm level. The effect is consistently more evident when stock price synchronization is higher and is stronger in firms with low media coverage, in firms with low audit quality, in state-controlled firms, and in firms with low investor protection. In addition, during a bear market year, the quality of firm ratings is higher. Overall, our findings support that investors could gain more information via firm ratings issued by credit rating agencies. Through our research, policymakers and investors can pay more attention to firm ratings that help play the information intermediary role of credit rating agencies.

We examine the influence of implicit government guarantees on the information content of credit ratings in China, guided by a theoretical credit rating game model in the presence of government guarantees. Using issuers’ controlling shareholder identity as the defining metric of implicit government guarantees, we document a less sensitive relationship between credit ratings and primary market offer yields for SOE bonds (i.e., bonds issued by firms controlled by government or government related agencies) than that for non SOE bonds. Moreover, ratings of non SOE bonds have a stronger predictive power on both future downgrades and a market based measure of issuer expected default probability than those of SOE bonds. These findings are robust to considering the u nobserved influence of the controlling shareholder identity on security pricing and bond default risk. Taken together, our empirical findings are consistent with the model’s prediction that government guarantees can dampen the incentives for credit rating agencies to acquire costly information, thus lowering the equilibrium informativeness of ratings for SOE bonds.

We provide the first direct evidence on how issuers choose a credit rating agency (CRA). Using rating data from a leading CRA in China, we find that although in most cases the issuers publish more favourable ratings, in some cases issuers just select the ratings provided by CRAs they have business relationships with, especially when the more favourable ratings are above issuers’ prior ratings. Our further analysis suggests that this phenomenon is driven by the switching cost arising from the issuer being considered as a rating shopper when it obtains an upgrade from a CRA without a business relationship.