Behavioral theories suggest that investor misperceptions and market mispricing will be correlated across firms. We use equity and debt financing to identify common misval- uation across firms. A zero-investment portfolio (UMO, undervalued minus overvalued) built from repurchase and issue firms captures comovement in returns beyond that in some standard multifactor models, and substantially improves the Sharpe ratio of the tangency portfolio. Loadings on UMO incrementally predict the cross-section of returns on both portfolios and individual stocks, even among firms not recently involved in external fi- nancing activities. Further evidence suggests that UMO loadings proxy for the common component of a stock’s misvaluation.

This paper examines the relationship between controlling shareholder equity pledges and their pricing using data on new debt financing instruments issued by Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010-2021. The findings suggest that controlling shareholder equity pledges lead to higher credit spreads on new debt financing instruments issued. Further findings suggest that this significant relationship only exists in groups where listed companies are on the eastern seaboard, where there is a higher risk of the share price collapse, and where management is more competent. It was also found that this relationship was not heterogeneous in the quality of the firm's information environment group and was only significant in the low hollowing out-group, thus ruling the hollowing out hypothesis and the information hypothesis and validating the uniqueness of the control transfer risk hypothesis in this paper.

This paper examines the ‘certification’ of government venture capital (GVC) programs, disputes whether the Chinese government venture capital (CGVC) can promote target firms’financing through the ‘certification’ on target firms, and how the ‘certification’ work. Using a dataset of 87865 Chinese listed firms over 2008–2018, we confirmed that CGVC’s investment promotes target firms’ equity financing but inhibits corporate debt financing through the certification effect and CGVC’s reputation. Moreover, the high reputation of GVC and high market awareness could strength the ‘certification effect.’Simultaneously, the ‘certification effect’is only effective for early and late-stage firms and private-owned firms, and invalid for mature stage and state-owned firms.

International debt financing is important for the development of emerging economies, as it allows firms from emerging markets (EMs) to have access to greater liquidity, a wider investor base, and more effective laws and regulations. However, the financial crisis in the late 1990s, coupled with recent rapid growth in corporate leverage in emerging markets, have forced policy makers to re-evaluate the risk of offshore financing and its role in EMs’ development. In this paper, we investigate the bonding/signaling effect of offshore financing to those firms in subsequent domestic market financing through the improvement of information disclosure and creditability. With a comprehensive database covering bond issuances by Chinese firms both in domestic and offshore markets over the period of 2010 to 2015, we find that: 1) The offshore bond issuance has a positive bonding/signaling effect on firm’s subsequent debt-raising in the domestic market in terms of longer maturity of corporate issuance and lower funding cost. 2) If the offshore issuance occurs in a stricter jurisdiction providing more effective investor protection and stringent disclosure, or with an international investment-grade rating, it will have a positive influence on firm’s subsequent debt-raising domestically. 3) Offshore debt financing improves the long-term firm performance, especially for financially-constrained companies. Our study presents new evidence for the role of the offshore market in promoting both the domestic institutional environment as well as firm growth, and provides policy implications for developing a broad offshore corporate bond market in emerging economies.

China's local government debt financing grows rapidly featuring surging chengtou bond issuance and risk exposure since the global financial crisis in 2008. The accumulation of local government debt poses systemic risks to China's fiscal and financial systems. Using weekly data from 2009 to 2014, this paper studies the joint dynamics and risk transmission mechanism between chengtou bond spreads and treasury yields under the framework of the extended no-arbitrage Nelson-Seigel term structure model, which guarantees the no-arbitrage relationship between treasury yields of different maturities. The results show that the chengtou bonds indeed exhibit considerable local risks and can lead to systemic risk of the treasury bonds, such that the treasury yields have significant component of risk premium due to chengtou risk. On the other hand, as the safest asset in China at present, the treasury yields with short-to-medium maturities decrease as a result of the “fly-to-safety" effect when the chengtou risk increases. Meanwhile, the dynamics of chengtou bond spreads reflect the market-oriented risk pricing by investors on credit and liquidity risks under limitations of the government implicit guarantee. Under this condition, it is the right timing to reasonably standardize and institutionalize the local government bond market with transparent market mechanism.

Using a panel of listed Chinese firms over the period 2001-2008, we investigate the interactions among corporate investment, financing, and payout decisions within a simultaneous equations system, where each decision is treated as endogenous and is subject to the constraint that sources much equal uses of cash, as implied by the flow-of-funds framework. We find that capital investment and dividend payout, being the competing uses of limited funds, are negatively interrelated, whilst both of them are positively connected to net amount of new debt issued, suggesting the existence of a joint determination of corporate decisions under financial constraints. In addition, we find that the simultaneity among the corporate decisions becomes more intensified for firms that are more financially constrained, which may reduce managerial flexibility of Chinese firms. Therefore, our result reveals new insight into the complex interdependence of corporate behaviour under financial constraints.

Agency theory posits that debt-like compensation (such as defined-benefit pensions and other deferred compensation) aligns managerial interests more closely with those of debtholders and reduces the agency cost of debt. Consistent with theory, we find that a higher CEO relative leverage, defined as the ratio of the CEO's inside leverage (debt-toequity compensation) to corporate leverage, is associated with lower cost of debt financing and fewer restrictive covenants, for a sample of private loans originated during 2006-2008. These findings persist after accounting for the endogeneity of CEO relative leverage, and are more pronounced for firms with higher default risk. Additional analysis on a sample of new public bond issues also shows a negative relation between CEO relative leverage and bond yield spread. Overall, the evidence supports the notion that debtholders recognize the incentive effects of executive debt-like compensation and adjust the terms of corporate debt contracts accordingly.

We examine the dynamic adjustment of cash holdings of publicly traded Chinese firms over the period 1998-2006. The empirical evidences are supportive of the dynamic trade-off theory of cash holdings. Importantly, there is strong evidence to support asymmetric adjustments. That is, the adjustments from above the target are significantly faster than adjustments from below. In addition, adjustment speeds are heterogeneous for firms facing differential adjustment costs. In particular, adjustment speed is negatively related to firm size, but positively related to the deviation from the target. Furthermore, in terms of adjustment method, Chinese listed firms make adjustments to their targets primarily through internal financing, while debt financing and dividend payment play a minimal role. Finally, we find that the precautionary motive arising from financial constraints explains the cash holdings adjustment behaviors of Chinese Listed firms well.

The paper studies the effect of social capital on the firms’ debt capacity and capital structure in China. We measure the social capital of China’s 31 provinces through four indexes: the number of NGOs per capita, the index of trust among peoples, the volunteer blood donation ratio of civics, and the money and material donation of civics. The results show that in those areas with more social capital, the firms are more likely to have higher debt ratio and longer debt maturity, and the firms can get debt financing with less tangible assets. And in those districts, the firms are easier to obtain bank credits and trade credits. The paper has two contributions to the economics literature: first, it confirms the economic value of social capital from a micro view; second, it provides a new perspective to understand the firms’ capital structure choice.

This article uses a contingent-claims valuation method to compare debt financing, investment, and risk choices of a firm adopting the second-best strategy with those of a firm adopting the first-best strategy. The former bears the agency costs, as conjectured by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977), because it chooses suboptimal investment timing and risk levels, while the latter is able to avoid them. For plausible parameter values, we find that the second-best firm that takes on more debt will under-invest and bear excessive risk. We also find that the agency costs of debt are 15.8% of the first-best firm value, which is higher than that found by Leland (1998) and Mauer and Sarkar (2005).