This study develops a novel deep learning framework for bank distress prediction, designed to overcome the limitations of static network analysis and to enhance model interpretability. We propose a Spatio-Temporal Attention Network that uniquely captures the time-varying nature of systemic risk. Methodologically, it introduces two key innovations: (1) a dynamic interbank network whose connection weights are adjusted by the volatility of the Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate (SHIBOR), reflecting real-time market liquidity changes; and (2) a dual spatio-temporal attention mechanism that identifies critical time steps and pivotal contagion pathways leading to a distress event. Empirical results demonstrate that the model significantly outperforms traditional benchmarks across key metrics including accuracy and F1-score. Most critically, the architecture proves exceptionally effective at reducing Type II errors, substantially minimizing the failure to identify at-risk banks. The model also offers high interpretability, with attention weights visualizing intuitive risk evolution patterns. We conclude that incorporating dynamic, liquidity-adjusted networks is crucial for superior predictive performance in systemic risk modeling.

We construct the most comprehensive bankruptcy database of Chinese firms to date and document significant real effects arising from the establishment of specialized bankruptcy courts. Specifically, the recovery rate for unsecured creditors increases by 38.6 percentage points after the reform. This improvement is not driven by shorter case durations or lower direct bankruptcy costs, as intuition might suggest. Instead, it results primarily from greater efficiency in the discovery and disposal of assets during bankruptcy proceedings. The reform also increases the likelihood of reorganization and promotes capital infusion in such cases. Higher recovery rates generate broader spillovers: reductions in non-performing loans, expansion of unsecured lending by local banks, relaxation of firms’ financial constraints, shifts in capital structure and investment, and greater public willingness to file for bankruptcy when distressed.

The growing significance of sustainable development has underscored the importance of integrating corporate sustainability indicators into corporate strategies. As external stakeholders increasingly emphasize corporate environmential performance, social responsibility and governance (ESG), understanding its impact on corporate value becomes essential, especially in emerging markets like China. This research aims to bridge these knowledge gaps by empirically investigating the influence of ESG ratings on firms’ value among Chinese listed firms, with a special emphasis on the mediating roles played by financial distress and financing constraints. By analyzing data from listed companies of China over the period 2018 to 2022, this research explores the correlation between firms’ value and ESG ratings. The findings indicate a positive association between firms’ value and ESG ratings. Enhanced ESG ratings directly boost market valuation and indirectly elevate firm value by mitigating financing constraints and financial distress. Further analysis reveals the positive effects of ESG ratings are more noticeable in industries that are not heavily polluting and in state-owned enterprises. This research provides valuable insights for enterprise management by systematically examining how ESG ratings contribute to corporate value through the mitigation of financial distress and constraints, while also highlighting the variations in ESG strategy implementation across different types of enterprises.

We examine the impact of state-owned shareholders on fraud within private firms. Utilizing a sample of A-share private listed firms in China observed from 2008 to 2021. We discover a significant negative association between state-owned shareholders and the likelihood of fraud in private firms. State-owned shareholders primarily act as inhibitors of fraud, and their effect on the probability of fraud being detected is not statistically significant. This finding remains robust even after conducting a series of sensitivity tests to mitigate potential selectivity bias and reverse causality endogeneity issues. In the analysis of heterogeneity, we found that state-owned shareholders play a more active role under conditions of imperfect external institutional development, and they also exert a more significant inhibitory effect on enterprises with lower governance levels and higher business risks. Our mechanism test demonstrates that the inhibitory effect of state-owned shareholders on corporate fraud is achieved by improving corporate governance and alleviating financial distress. This study also examines the impact of state-owned shareholders' local characteristics, external supervision mechanisms, and internal governance mechanisms in unique Chinese enterprises on fraudulent behaviour by private enterprises. Overall, our study provides empirical evidence that state-owned shareholder ownership is associated with reducing fraudulent behaviour within private firms.

How much value has been lost in the Chinese bankruptcy system due to excessive liquidation of companies whose going concern value is greater than the liquidation value? I compile new judiciary bankruptcy auction data covering all bankruptcy asset sales from 2017 to 2022 in China. I estimate the valuation of the asset for both the final buyer and creditor through the revealed preference method using an auction model. On average, excessive liquidation results in a 13.5% welfare loss. However, solely considering the liquidation process, an 8% welfare gain is derived from selling the asset without transferring it to the creditors. Firms that are (1) larger in total asset size, (2) have less information disclosure, (3) have less access to the financial market, and (4) possess a higher fraction of intangible assets are more vulnerable to such welfare loss. Overall, this paper suggests that policies promoting bankruptcy reorganization by introducing distressed investors who target larger bankruptcy firms suffering more from information asymmetry will significantly enhance welfare in the Chinese bankruptcy market.

How does executive authority affect household behavior? I develop a model in which the executive branch of the government is partially constrained. These constraints credibly limit intervention under normal conditions but can be overridden when a sufficiently large fraction of the population is in distress. Households anticipate this and strategically coordinate their financial risks through public markets, creating collective distress that compels government bailouts. Weaker constraints lower the threshold for intervention, making implicit guarantees more likely. The model explains why implicit guarantees are prevalent in China and predicts that such guarantees may discontinuously emerge elsewhere as executive constraints gradually weaken.

This paper examines the consequences of Chinese regulators deviating from a long-standing full bailout policy in addressing the distress of a city-level commercial bank. This policy shift led to a persistent widening of credit spreads and a significant decline in funding ratios for negotiable certificates of deposit issued by small banks relative to large ones. Our empirical analysis reveals a novel contagion mechanism driven by reduced confidence in future bailouts (implicit non-guarantee), contributing to the subsequent collapse of other small banks. However, in the longer term, this policy shift improved price efficiency, credit allocation, and discouraged risk-taking among small banks.

This study explores the relationship between board chairs' early-life experience in the Great Chinese Famine and the debt maturity choices made by Chinese listed firms between 2000 and 2017. Our findings indicate that board chairs with famine experience exhibit a propensity towards long-term debt usage. We argue that this finding can be attributed to a risk-averse rather than altruistic orientation among board chairs who have experienced famine. Our results are particularly salient for firms with lower asset redeployability, higher distress risk, no political affiliations, and those that are not stateowned enterprises. Furthermore, this study provides three analyses to support the risk aversion traits: (1) board chairs with disaster experience underestimate their company's profit potential, (2) board chairs located in areas with higher mortality rates exhibit more obvious risk aversion behavior, and (3) extending the debt maturity date, board chairs can effectively increase company investment and mitigate the underinvestment problem.

This paper models the effect of corporate information preference on stock return volatility based on optimization problems of information decisions for firms and investors. Our model hypothesizes a positive correlation between corporate information preference and volatility. Utilizing the ideal institutional background of the Chinese stock market, we empirically confirm that corporate information preference has a positive impact on volatility, particularly for firms facing more severe financial distress, limited investor attention, and fewer analyst coverage. Our study provides a new perspective for analyzing the interaction between information supply and asset price dynamics.

How much value has been lost in the Chinese bankruptcy system due to excessive liquidation of companies whose going concern value is greater than the liquidation value? I compile new judiciary bankruptcy auction data covering all bankruptcy asset sales from 2017 to 2022 in China. I estimate the valuation of the asset for both the final buyer and creditor through the revealed preference method using an auction model. On average, excessive liquidation results in a 13.5% welfare loss. However, solely considering the liquidation process, an 8% welfare gain is derived from selling the asset without transferring it to the creditors. Firms that are (1) larger in total asset size, (2) have less information disclosure, (3) have less access to the financial market, and (4) possess a higher fraction of intangible assets are more vulnerable to such welfare loss. Overall, this paper suggests that policies promoting bankruptcy reorganization by introducing distressed investors who target larger bankruptcy firms suffering more from information asymmetry will significantly enhance welfare in the Chinese bankruptcy market.