Trading constraints with unspecified constraint horizon are imposed on the shares held by the state in the IPO of each listed firm in China Stock Market. In 2005, a so-called Split Share Structure Reform (also known as Division Reform) was launched in which the holders of restricted shares give up a proportion of their shares to purchase the right to terminate the trading constraint. From the size of the compensation, we infer the value of restricted shares and find that their price discounts are negatively affected by the restriction looseness captured by our proposed new multi-dimensional measure and positively affected by the bargaining power of the holders of freely-traded shares.

We investigate considerations (compensations) paid in on-going Division Reform, a process of releasing trading constraint, in China Stock Market, and link this event with existing literature of restricted asset by inferring implied illiquidity discount of restricted shares from consideration. We also propose a new measure of restriction capturing multiple dimensions of restriction finding it together with the scale of restriction well explain the ratio of considerations and the implied illiquidity discount. We also use theoretical models to justify the 20% implied illiquidity discount and find it is below the 48.67% upper bound suggested by Longstaff (1995) and it falls within the range between 12.18% and 23.82% suggested by Lonstaff (2001) concluding the considerations paid in Division Reform is adequate and relative wealth of two classes of shareholders remains after the trading constraint released.