This paper develops a dynamic trade-off model to study the interaction between product market competition and capital structure. Firms make interdependent entry, investment, financing and default decisions. Trade-off between tax benefits, bankruptcy costs and strategic considerations in the product market determines optimal capital structure. The model delivers the following results that are consistent with empirical evidences: (1) Firms may have non-linear and non-monotonic reactions to their competitors’ change of leverage, depending on their original levels of leverage; (2) The within-industry variation of leverage can be large, because incumbents and entrants use leverage strategically differently ; (3) Entrants have higher leverage than incumbents in equilibrium, because the incumbents use lower leverage to gain strategic advantages over the entrants.

Many prior studies conclude that Chinese independent directors engage in window dressing. The results of research into the relationship between the proportion of independent directors on the board and firm performance are mixed. We use the number of negative opinions issued by a firm’s independent directors as a proxy for their effectiveness in the monitoring role they play. We hypothesize that both board structure and the personal characteristics of independent directors influence the effectiveness of monitoring. Using a matched control sample of firms in which there were no disputes in the board room over the sample period, we find that independent directors who have more political capital, such as former government officials, Communist Party members, and those who also have a senior management position in another firm are more likely to issue negative opinions. We also find that the independent directors of firms with more balanced power structure in board and those that operate in a better institutional environment have a greater tendency to issue negative opinions.

The controlling shareholder of a firm may suffer as a result of its right to control the firm due to unfavorable market reactions associated with concerns on private benefit extraction by the controlling shareholder. Thus, the controlling shareholder has an incentive to build a good governance mechanism as a commitment device in order to discipline itself, which allows it to sell shares at a higher price in the initial public offering (IPO). An improvement in pricing efficiency will give the controlling shareholder more incentive to limit its private benefits from controlling the firm. Therefore, we propose that, besides improving the efficiency of capital allocation, the development of the financial market can shape the corporate governance of firms in an economy, thus improving firm operation efficiency. A model of IPO is constructed to demonstrate this mechanism of market discipline. Using data from China stock market on the regulatory changes in IPO pricing and firm ownership structure, we find evidence consistent with the model’s implications.

Previous studies have typically found a negative relation between pyramidal ownership and firm value, and have interpreted it as supporting evidence of the incentive problems created by pyramiding. Those studies, however, do not adequately control for the endogeneity of ownership to factors that also affect firm performance, leaving the agency problem indistinguishable from the unfavorable fundamental shock. Using a unique sample of privately owned listed enterprises in China, this paper examines the effect of pyramidal ownership on returns in response to the announcement of the Share Split Reform in China. This reform triggered zero fundamental shocks but resurrected entrepreneurial incentives in proportion to the separation of ownership and control. Estimates of agency cost of pyramidal ownership are significant and material, and are robust against a range of alternative hypotheses. Moreover, institutional investors appear to appreciate the reform more when a firm’s pyramidal ownership is less separated. The findings suggest that, despite the endogenous determinant of ownership choice, agency theory alone successfully explains the pyramidal discount.

We investigate the role played by institutional development in the prevalence and value of family firms, while controlling for the potential effect of cultural norms. China provides a good research lab since it combines great heterogeneity in institutional development across the Chinese provinces with homogeneity in cultural norms, law, and regulation. Using hand-collected data from publicly listed Chinese firms, we find that, when institutional efficiency is low, family ownership and management increase value, while family control in excess of ownership reduces value. When institutional efficiency is high, none of these effects are significant.

This study investigates how ultimate controlling shareholders influence dividends payout policy in industrial firms in the natural experimental setting of Hong Kong, which features no tax on dividends and the prevalence of concentrated ownership. We find that the ultimate control held by the controlling shareholders is negatively associated with the level of dividends payout, consistent with the agency costs explanation of dividends; and that the dividend payout behavior in firms with controlling shareholders exhibits similar patterns as in US, UK and EU firms. We also conduct separate analysis on family controlled and state controlled firms and find that the heterogeneity across these large shareholders has a confounding effect on corporate dividend payout behavior.

This paper evidences a lead-lag relationship between securities which experience high levels of short-selling and those that do not. This is based on evidence that short-selling increases the speed with which information, especially negative information, is absorbed into prices. Previous literature mainly focus on the presence of short-selling and its effect on prices. This paper focuses on the magnitude of short-selling and finds a strong lead-lag relationship between returns of stocks that experience heavy short-selling compared to those that experience slight amounts. The relationship conforms to that of Chordia & Swaminthan’s (2000) speed adjustment hypothesis, in that it facilitates the imputation of common information. The relationship is strongest in small illiquid stocks where short-selling aids in the imputation of common information symmetrically and asymmetrically, and reduces as stocks become larger and more liquid. However in extremely volatile markets this relationship suffers. The relationship is robust to various factors including out of sample tests, accounting for size, and accounting for volume. Of note is the finding that short-selling aids in information imputation over-and-above the efficiency attributed to sophisticated investors. This indicates that market maker and uninformed short-sales add to the lead-lag effect.

We examine the execution quality of electronic stock traders who are geographically dispersed throughout the U.S. Traders who are located near market central computers in the New York City area experience faster order execution. Moreover, the time to execute orders rises as a trader’s actual distance (mileage) to NYC widens. In electronic market settings, data transfer limitations and transmission slowdowns result in geographically dispersed electronic traders having different access to trading speed. We find that speed advantaged traders experience lower transaction costs and engage in strategies that are more conducive to speed.

The cost of trading in securities markets is often estimated on the basis of: 1) a trade execution rather than an original order; and 2) a quote midpoint at the time of trade execution rather than at the time of order submission. In our paper, we obtain data from a U.S. brokerage firm to examine the severity of these two problems. We find that the quote midpoint and order size at submission differ from that at execution approximately 40% of the time. These differences are economically important and are more likely to occur when the market is less liquid. Our results highlight the need for caution when inferring trading costs from market center data sources.

We examine the determinants of U.S. equity traders’ choice of electronic versus intermediated execution. While traders exhibit a strong overall preference for automation, when the market is less liquid at order submission time, traders seek market maker automated and human order-matching services more often. Traders overall tendency to choose intermediaries is highly correlated with their demand for liquidity. Market maker participation rates are higher for more active and larger size traders. Traders who choose intermediaries more often trade more stocks, execute orders quicker, price orders more aggressively, and disperse their trading over longer periods of time. Although U.S. stock intermediaries continue to lose market share, our results highlight the important niche role these firms can play in an increasingly automated, electronically-driven marketplace.