Applying the principle of the bonding theory, this study examined the relationship between corporate governance practice and performance of Chinese firms that are listed in the major international stock exchanges, including NASDAQ, New York, Hong Kong, Singapore and London AIM markets, and further investigated whether the Chinese firms that adopted the corporate governance mechanisms of the stock exchanges where they are listed would outperform those of firms listed locally in the Chinese stock exchange that operates in a weak enforcement mechanism environment. Hypotheses are tested using cross sectional data. The empirical tests show a mixed result. The cross-listings in New York and NASDAQ (dual-listing is excluded) exhibit bonding premium, while those noncross- listed Chinese firms demonstrated better firm performance that those listed in London, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Further, the study shed some lights on the relative importance of various corporate governance mechanisms in enhancing the firm performance in the context of the dominance of state-owned-enterprises in the market. The results reveal that different market has different corporate governance mechanisms under its different macro-environments. For the overall Chinese listings, the second largest shareholder of a firm could play a role as an effective corporate governance mechanism in increasing the firm’s performance. A negative relationship between the size of the board and the corporate governance was found. For those cross-listed Chinese firms, by adopting the stringent financial disclosure and the famous auditing firms could increase the firm performance, but not good enough comparing to these non-cross-listed Chinese firms. Meanwhile, controlling shareholder has negative effect on firm performance for the cross-listed Chinese firms. The study suggests that merely borrowing corporate governance mechanism does not guarantee the improvement of corporate governance (further to its firm performance), rather, firm’s own background and country effects also matter.

In this study we examine the incentives for listed family controlled firms in China to establish political connections and their organizational structure as measured by shareholding concentration and composition of board of directors. We hypothesize and find that listed family firms are more likely to establish political connections when the local markets are less developed and the governments are more powerful in allocating economic resources. In particular, firms are more likely to build political connections when local governments suffer from severe budgetary deficits, when they tend to rely on discretionary charges and administrative penalties for raising revenues, and when they have more leeway in granting business subsidies. We also find that controlling shareholders of family firms with political connections tend to concentrate their shareholding and dominate the board of directors so that they can make deals with government officials in secrecy and enjoy the benefits exclusively among themselves.

Friedman et al. (2003) developed a model in which, in equilibrium, controlling shareholders may choose either tunneling or propping depending on the magnitude of an adverse shock and the magnitude of the private benefits of control. In this paper, we employ connected transaction data from China to test the implications of their model. We hypothesize that, when listed companies are financially healthy (in financial distress), their controlling shareholders are more likely to conduct connected transactions to tunnel (prop up) their listed companies and the market reacts unfavorably (favorably) to the announcement of these transactions. Our empirical findings strongly support our hypotheses. Our analysis supports Friedman et al.’s (2003) model by furnishing clear evidence that it is possible that propping and tunneling might occur in the same company but at different times.

To understand the interaction between internal control mechanism and the mar- ket for control, using a di¤erences-in-di¤erences methodology, we examine CEO turnover following an exogenous decline of takeover threats? second generation of antitakeover legislation in the U.S. Di¤erent from previous research using only time series variation in CEO turnover, we ?nd that, compared to a control group, the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance increased for the ?rms a¤ected by the laws. The increases are both statistically and economically signi?cant. We also ?nd that the increases in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance are concentrated in the ?rms with bad internal governance. Our results suggest that internal control mechanism and the market for control may be substitutes instead of complements.

This study aims to examine empirically whether ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms affect income-smoothing behavior in China. The sample comprises 1353 companies listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Market during the period 1999 to 2006. By comparing the variability of income to the variability of sales an income smoother can be identified if income is less variable. Our empirical results show that the proportion of Chinese firms practicing income-smoothing is greater than those of Singaporean, Japanese and U.S. firms. Income smoothing in China is more severe when the state is the controlling shareholder of the listed firm. Firms with more independent directors are more likely to engage in income smoothing. This article presents the current development of China’s corporate governance system and indicates that agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minor investors account for a significant portion of earnings management in China.

This paper investigates the relationship between firm productivity and corporate governance, including ownership structure, incentive compensation and board characteristics. Using TFP approach, I find ownership concentration and total compensation both are positively related to TFP, and the state ownership and the power of the first largest holder have negative effects on TFP. Using demand labour function approach, I find some contrary results, which need to be studied further.

Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This study intends to solve the disputes between the free cash flow hypothesis and the tunneling hypothesis in explaining the role of cash dividends on asset expropriation of the controlling shareholders in Chinese listed firms, by investigating the values of cash holdings and cash dividends between firms with high and low ownership control. Research Findings/Insights: The results show that investors value more the cash dividends of firms with high ownership control than those of firms with low ownership control, and value more the cash holdings of firms with low ownership control than those of firms with high ownership control, more consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis rather than the tunneling hypothesis. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study contributes to the literature of agency theory and international corporate governance by solving the disputes regarding the role of cash dividends in asset expropriation of controlling shareholders in Chinese listed firms. This study also contributes to the literature of cash holdings by showing that the most essential condition for these firms to hold high level of cash holdings is the quality of investor protection. This provides an example of the applicability of the Anglo-Saxon theory to emerging markets. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Even though the evidence does not support the tunneling hypothesis of cash dividends, it still suggests that investors are concerned with high cash payouts, which could thus lower firm value. Thus, changing corporate ownership structure and improving investor protection are necessary to deepen the development of financial markets.

We investigate the role of natural culture in corporate risk-taking using measures of income variability, R&D spending, and use of long-term debt. We identify three dimensions of national culture that should influence corporate risk-taking, and we isolate the effects of country-level and firm-level variables by using a hierarchical linear modeling approach. The three specific cultural values that we study – harmony, individualism, and uncertainty avoidance-- have both direct and indirect effects on our various measures of risk-taking. These results survive when we control for firm-level and country-level characteristics.

This paper provides a parallel investigation on the impact of board composition, board activity and ownership concentration on the performance of listed Chinese firms. We find that independent directors enhance firm performance effectively than other board factors. The frequency of shareholder meetings, rather than board meetings, is positively associated with firm value. Tradable share ownership concentration has a positive and linear relationship with firm value, while state and total share ownership concentration represent U(V) shapes. Importantly, companies with the highest levels of both total share and tradable share ownership concentration have a greater firm values than companies with the highest levels of only a single concentration.

Recent researches suggest that private benefits of control of managers are a key predictor of acquisition performance and that there exists a negative correlation between measures of private benefits and acquirer announcement returns. However, empirical evidence has not confirmed such a negative relationship. The study in this paper shows that this relationship between private benefits of control of managers and acquisition performance may depend on the level of government shareholding. The study is based on an analysis of a sample of 246 M&A events from the listed companies of Chinese state-controlled enterprises, during the period 2001-2006 and it reveals that, under a low level of government shareholding, private benefits of control are positively correlated with the performance of acquiring firm; but private benefits of control are negatively correlated with the performance of acquiring firm under high government shareholding. Results also indicate that the private benefits of control of managers are important determinants of the acquiring firm performance. These findings sharpen the current understanding of the relationship between private benefits of control of managers and acquiring firm performance.