We investigate how institutional factors influence behavior of distressed firms in emerging markets, where bankruptcy laws are often weak and debtors have greater bargaining power in distress. By studying a comprehensive sample of distressed firms in China, a representative of the cases in other emerging markets, we find that institutional background matters considerably to distress resolution. Distressed companies facing better institutional background (i.e. with less state ownership structure, in regions with better government quality and greater degree of local financial development), display relatively better operating performance, more disciplined capital structure, and higher ultimate recovery likelihood. Our findings provide novel evidence on how institutional factors discipline distressed firm behavior and facilitate distress resolution in emerging markets.

Based on the background of the banking industry in China, this paper establishes Cournot, Bertrand and Stackelberg mixed oligopoly competition models with deposit and interest rates as strategic variables between a representative state-owned bank and a representative foreign bank. We discuss and compare the equilibrium deposits, interest rates and profits in different market structures. More importantly, considering the endogenous timing setup and taking the extended game with observable delay as the basic model, we analyze the competition results of the mixed duopoly at different market structures and make numerical simulations in order to get the outcomes of the extended game. It is found that, under the scenario of endogenous timing, and 1) the assumption that the foreign bank’s deposit return rate is more than twice that of the state-owned bank and 2) the degree of nationalization of state-owned bank is no less that 1/4, the SPNE of deposit extended game is (L, L), i.e. both banks will choose to move later, neither player has so called “first mover advantage” which leads to the Cournot outcome and payoffs. When the degree of privatization is more than 3/4 and both banks have the same deposit return rate, the SPNE of interest rate extended game is (E, L), i.e. the state-owned bank will lead and the foreign bank will follow.

The paper examines the short-run spillover effect of daily stock returns and volatilities between the S&P 500 in the U.S. and Shanghai SSE composite in China. First, we find that a structural break happened in the SSE stock return mean in December 2005. Second, analyzing modified GARCH (1,1)-M models, we find evidence of a symmetric and asymmetric volatility spillover effect from the U.S. to the China stock market in the post-break period. Third, the symmetric volatility spillover effect from China to the U.S. is also observed in the post-break period.

This paper studies the dividend problem when the asset of the company is driven by a diffusion process and the dividend barrier follows a Markov process. The explicit expressions for dividends is derived and a numerical example is given.

In this paper, we propose a new approach to test the presence of GARCH Effects of China stock market. Our method is based on Maximal Overlap Discrect Wavelet Transform (MODWT)that provides a natural platform to investigate the volatility behavior at different time scales without losing any information.The empirical results show that GARCH effects are more significant at short time horizons as compared to long. Furthermore, when compared the modeling results of GARCH-t with that of EGARCH-t, it yields very higher effectiveness to capture the leverage effect of financial time series at relavant time scales.

In recent times, the prices of internationally-traded commodities have reached record highs and are expected to continue growing in the foreseeable future. This phenomenon is partially driven by strong demand from a small number of emerging economies, such as China and India. This paper places the recent commodity price boom in historical context, drawing on an investigation of the long-term time-series properties, and presents unique features for 33 individual commodity prices. Using a new methodology for examining cross-sectional variation of commodity returns and its components, we find strong evidence that the prices of world primary commodities are extremely volatile. In addition, prices are roughly 30 percent more volatile under floating than under fixed exchange rate regimes. Finally, using the capital asset pricing model as a loose framework, we find that global macroeconomic risk components have become relatively more important in explaining commodity price volatility.

This paper explores whether the pricing of the option-type derivative is affected by some of fundamental characteristics, such as size and liquidity of the derivative itself and the underlying asset, which are not involved in the standard pricing theory. Considering the unique status of warrants in China due to the relatively more flexible trading mechanism, I empirically examine the pricing of Chinese covered warrants to develop this study. Empirical results show that market prices of Chinese warrants are significantly higher than theoretical prices predicted by traditional pricing models such as Black-Scholes, Jump-Diffusion, and CEV model. For call warrants, about 25 percent of the market price can not be explained by pricing models, and this figure rises to over 60 percent for put warrants. Further regression tests show that both size and liquidity of warrants and underlying stocks significantly affect warrant pricing errors. The way in which the size and liquidity affect the pricing error depends on the type of warrants. In addition, it is evident that movements of put warrant prices in China do not follow movements of stock prices. To explain the above pricing puzzles,the concept of functional asset pricing is proposed. According to this concept, these pricing puzzles just reflect the existence of functional value of financial instruments that has long been neglected by traditional pricing models. In fact, Due to the high level of liquidity and popularity, the Chinese warrant may well function as a good tool for obtaining short-term profits. The pricing of Chinese warrants by the market may correctly re°ect the value of this function, and thus is rational in essence.

This paper assesses the impact of the recent financial reforms in China. Following the country’s accession to the World Trade Organization, financial liberalisation has picked up considerable momentum. Measures introduced encompass deregulation in the banking sector and refinements in various financial markets, as well as allowing more freedom for Chinese and foreign investors to participate and interact domestically and overseas. Compared to other studies on financial liberalisation, this study focuses on a relatively narrower aspect of financial reforms namely, the impact on stock market liquidity. Using a panel data set drawn from the Shanghai stock market, we find a positive and significant liquidity impact associated with the recent round of measures, which reflects not only an improvement in capital allocation efficiency in China’s equity market but, from a financial stability point of view, also a reduction in its vulnerability. The finding also provides evidence on one of the important channels in which financial liberalisation can be transformed into economic growth over time.

The study aims to analyze the role of institutional investors in mediating the interest conflicts between blockholders and minority shareholders in emerging markets. China’s Non-tradable Share Reform provides us a perfect research environment. Before the reform, the ownership of Chinese public firms was concentrated in one or several blockholders. This part of block shares was non-tradable, and tradable shares were held by minority shareholders and institutional investors like mutual funds. Chinese government launched Non-tradable Share Reform in 2005, giving non-tradable shares liquidity rights. At the same time, non-tradable share owners had to compensate tradable share owners, such as offering a certain percentage of shares to them. The compensation schemes were advanced by non-tradable share owners and must be supported by two-thirds of votes cast by tradable share owners. Our study finds that institutional investors did actively participate in voting, but their number and holdings were reversely related with the compensation level. Our results suggest that institutional investors played shareholder activism in this reform, but their activism served for blockholder’s interests rather than minority shareholders’.

We examine changes in market values and accounting returns for a sample of publicly traded Chinese firms around announcements of block-share transfers among government agencies (“State Bureaucrats”), market-oriented State-owned enterprises (“MOSOEs”) and private investors (“Private Entities”). We provide evidence that transfers from State Bureaucrats to Private Entities result in larger increases in market value and accounting returns than transfers to MOSOEs. We also find that CEO turnover occurs more quickly when shares are transferred to Private Entities. Moreover, we find that the changes in firm value and accounting returns as well as the likelihood of CEO turnover are all functions of the incentives and managerial expertise of the new block holder. We conclude that corporate governance can be improved at State-controlled firms by improving the incentives and managerial expertise of controlling block holders, and that this is better accomplished by transferring ownership to private investors rather than by shuffling ownership among State controlled entities.